Este trabalho tem como principal objetivo investigar a relação entre a substância divina e a subjetividade em Descartes. Essa investigação possibilitou-nos chegar à conclusão de que Deus é primeiro princípio tanto na ordem ontológica quanto na ordem epistemológica, isto é, Ele tem o que estamos chamando de precedência em todas as nuances do sistema cartesiano. Essa conclusão só foi possível graças à duas investigações. A primeira, foi em torno do processo da dúvida, mas utilizando para isso apenas um trecho desse processo que, em nosso entender, tem comunicação com vários textos de Descartes, para mostrarmos a precedência da substância divina em pleno processo da dúvida. A segunda, foi em torno da relação entre a substancia incriada e a substância criada, cujo objetivo foi também realçar a precedência da substância incriada. De tal sorte que, ao cabo de nosso trabalho, pudemos entender que Deus tem prioridade tanto na ordem ontológica quanto na ordem epistemológica. / The main goal of this work is to investigate the relation between the divine substance and the subjectivity in Descartes. Such investigation made it possible for us to conclude that God is the primary principle, in the ontological order as well as in the epistemological order, i.e. He has what we call precedence in all nuances of the cartesian system. Such conclusion was only possible due to two investigations, namely: one around the process of doubt, using though only one part of this process to do so, which, in our understanding, communicates with several of Descartes\' writings, in order to show the precedence of the divine substance in plain process of doubt. The second one was about the relation of the uncreated substance and the created substance, which aim was also to enhance the precedence of the uncreated substance. Therefore by the end of our work we could understand that God has the priority not only in the ontological order but also in the epistemological order.

Este trabalho tem como principal objetivo investigar a relação entre a substância divina e a subjetividade em Descartes. Essa investigação possibilitou-nos chegar à conclusão de que Deus é primeiro princípio tanto na ordem ontológica quanto na ordem epistemológica, isto é, Ele tem o que estamos chamando de precedência em todas as nuances do sistema cartesiano. Essa conclusão só foi possível graças à duas investigações. A primeira, foi em torno do processo da dúvida, mas utilizando para isso apenas um trecho desse processo que, em nosso entender, tem comunicação com vários textos de Descartes, para mostrarmos a precedência da substância divina em pleno processo da dúvida. A segunda, foi em torno da relação entre a substancia incriada e a substância criada, cujo objetivo foi também realçar a precedência da substância incriada. De tal sorte que, ao cabo de nosso trabalho, pudemos entender que Deus tem prioridade tanto na ordem ontológica quanto na ordem epistemológica. / The main goal of this work is to investigate the relation between the divine substance and the subjectivity in Descartes. Such investigation made it possible for us to conclude that God is the primary principle, in the ontological order as well as in the epistemological order, i.e. He has what we call precedence in all nuances of the cartesian system. Such conclusion was only possible due to two investigations, namely: one around the process of doubt, using though only one part of this process to do so, which, in our understanding, communicates with several of Descartes\' writings, in order to show the precedence of the divine substance in plain process of doubt. The second one was about the relation of the uncreated substance and the created substance, which aim was also to enhance the precedence of the uncreated substance. Therefore by the end of our work we could understand that God has the priority not only in the ontological order but also in the epistemological order.

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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University / The problem of knowledge in contemporary thought is unusually complex. This dissertation seeks to isolate but one of the fundamental questions of epistemology and investigate it in the literature of Britain and America since 1920. The problem is: the nature of the given in the knowledge situation. After nothing certain historical roots of the theory, four contemporary theories of the given are examined. Their implications are brought out, and critical evaluations are made. The literature on the problem as a whole is relatively meager. One book by R.D. Mack deals with the given in Bradley, Whitehead, and Dewey. Many thinkers consider the problem seriously in developing their epistemologies and several important articles about it have appeared in the journals. Some have denied the uniqueness of the question by saying that everything is given. [TRUNCATED]

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This thesis reconstructs and interprets the life and writings of the relatively unknown nineteenth century philosopher John Grote (1813-1866). It places his work in the intellectual contexts of the University of Cambridge of his day and discusses his place in the development of Victorian Thought. The thesis argues that John Grote, (brother of the historian George Grote) is a most original thinker in his own right and that historically he holds a crucial place in the debates that make up Victorian thought. Cambridge University between 1830 and 1870 is seen to have nurtured a dualistic intellectual movement called the Cambridge Network which rivalled intellectually, the centres of Edinburgh and London and the movements of Positivism utilitarianism -and common sense philosophy. In developing the Cambridge philosophy of his day in response to developments elsewhere in British philosophy, John Grote (like James Frederick Ferrier in Scotland) is shown to have elaborated a nascent form of indigenous philosophical idealism in England prior to the 1870's and the emergence of oxford Idealism. The introduction argues that a modern understanding and appreciation of John Grote's philosophy is unlikely without the reconstruction of the cultural, intellectual and institutional world which he inhabited. The loss of detail about this world in the twentieth century, explains why past attempts to popularize Grote's work have failed. Conventional accounts of the history of Victorian philosophy are elaborated and attacked in the introduction, as are the methodological assumptions upon which they were written. Chapter one provides details of Grote's life and writings but gives special prominence to his novel, and in retrospect revolutionary, work on language. Chapters two and three provide a historical reconstruction of the intellectual context that attended the production of Grote's corpus. The middle chapters from four to nine reconstruct Grote's analytic philosophical work in the areas of metaphysics, epistemology, ontology, ethics, and politics, revealing Grote's commitment to epistemological and ethical idealism and the production of a 'relational theory of obligation' and a 'jural theory of politics'. My arguments are synthesised in chapter ten and the conclusions and some indications as to John Grote's influence are appended.

The study of personal epistemology is concerned with people‟s beliefs or assumptions about the nature of knowledge and knowing, otherwise referred to as epistemological assumptions. As a relatively new field of enquiry, questions about the nature and scope of the construct and how best to investigate it have been tackled by many researchers although fundamental questions still remain. The current study explored the possible effects of three characterisations of questions aimed at eliciting epistemological assumptions on conclusions drawn about such assumptions in terms of their level of sophistication. The three characterisations explored were the level of directness with which questions targeted epistemological assumptions, the domain-specificity of the question, and whether the questions were open or closed-ended. A paper-and-pencil measure was designed to manipulate these variables, and the conclusions drawn about the assumptions of a sample of 30 postgraduate Psychology students were compared across the conditions to determine if there was any evidence for their influence. Comparison of results suggested that the characterisations do exert an influence and caution is raised regarding the validity of methodologies that have been, and continue to be, employed in the study of personal epistemology. The findings further lend support to particular conceptualisations of the construct, but at the same time also unearth additional questions about how epistemological beliefs are best construed and studied.

This thesis offers a fresh interpretation and defense of epistemological disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge. I adopt a multilevel approach according to which perceptual knowledge on one level can enjoy factive rational support provided by perceptual knowledge of the same proposition on a different level. Here I invoke a distinction Ernest Sosa draws between 'judgmental' and 'merely functional' belief to articulate what I call the bifurcated conception of perceptual knowledge. The view that results is a form of epistemological disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge specifically at the higher judgmental level, layered over a straightforward externalism about perceptual knowledge at the lower merely functional level. The first chapter orients the reader to epistemological disjunctivism- with particular emphasis on the 'reflective epistemological disjunctivism' defended by Duncan Pritchard with inspiration from John McDowell. Here I review the arguments for thinking such a proposal true, as well as highlight some problems and three emerging challenges for the view: what I call the internalist challenge, the new access challenge(s), and the 'new evil genius' challenge. These challenges largely inspire the chapters to follow. In the second chapter I present the positive proposal: a fresh interpretation of epistemological disjunctivism in terms of perceptual knowledge at the specifically judgmental level. I argue that this is a modification that epistemological disjunctivists should adopt since it inoculates their view against the internalist challenge: the challenge of explaining why perception should provide one with knowledge by providing one with motivating reasons for belief. In the third chapter I motivate the view further in connection with the more familiar 'basis problem' for epistemological disjunctivism. I argue that this approach supports a unique strategy for solving that problem: one that is consistent both with what is known as 'the entailment' thesis and the thought that we can reduce perceptual knowledge to a kind of rationally supported belief. In the fourth chapter I move to playing defense. I defend the proposal against the so-called 'new evil genius' challenge. This is the challenge to explain why subjects in pairs of 'good' and 'bad' cases can seem equally justified for sustaining their perceptual beliefs. I argue that what we are being sensitive to here, rather, is the fact that both subjects can be equally epistemically responsible and/or reasonable for believing what they do. Before concluding this chapter I also offer an error theory. In the fifth chapter I defend the proposal against the new access challenges raised in chapter one. These alleged challenges for epistemological disjunctivism arise specifically for versions of reflective epistemological disjunctivism that hold that one's rational support for perceptual beliefs is not only factive but reflectively accessible as well. Rather than address the challenges head on, I try to dislodge the thought they depend upon-viz., that one's factive rational support for perceptual beliefs is reflectively accessible to the subject. Here I argue that the reflective accessibility of one's factive rational support is actually a wheel turning idly in the debate with the underdetermination-based radical sceptic-so that we can simply drop it without consequence. The result is an epistemological disjunctivism that is immune to access problems. I then offer a final summary and conclude. At the end of this thesis I have attached an appendix, which is an excursion into religious epistemology and an exploration of a form of religious epistemological disjunctivism. Here I apply the epistemological disjunctivist insight to the case of religious perception in order to defend the idea that one can offer independent rational support for theistic belief by appealing to religious beliefs that are justified on the basis of religious experiences. This appendix chapter is in keeping with the general spirit of the thesis insofar as it seeks to developed epistemological disjunctivism in new and fruitful directions.

Philosophiae Doctor - PhD / The study aimed to investigate the kind of knowledge privileged when student teachers use Information Communication Technologies in facilitating learning in science subjects. The assumptions were that future student teachers, through their pedagogic practices, may either reproduce or interrupt educational inequalities. The ability to interrupt inequalities is conditioned by the manner in which these student teachers have been inducted into the field of teacher education and this process includes the ability to manipulate technological resources to facilitate epistemological access. This concept originally coined by Morrow in the 1980s looked at black students seeking entry to university. Since then the concept was used to signify the importance of knowledge in the curriculum. In this study, the exploration of epistemological access goes beyond physical or formal access and includes meaningful access to knowledge. The semantics dimension of Legitimation Code Theory (LCT) proposed by Maton was used, with a particular focus on semantic density (SD) as a theoretical framework. Maton argues that semantic density can vary across teaching practices and contexts. The study assumes that student teachers, through their pedagogic practices, may either reproduce or interrupt educational inequalities

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