Magister Legum - LLM / Surrogacy on many occasions is referred to a million-dollar industry. Just like many countries, South Africa has prohibited commercial surrogacy, thus South Africa only permits altruistic surrogacy. The prohibition has consequences for third parties such as surrogacy agencies and surrogacy facilitators, as their right to occupation freedom which is guaranteed by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, is limited. No right is absolute, any right can be limited if it can be proved that it is in the best interest of the public. The prohibition on commercial surrogacy is argued to be in the best interest of the public as it can lead to the exploitation of women and the commodification of children.

In this research, I carefully and coherently examine Chapter 19 of the Children's Act 38 of 2005 as the first legislation to afford surrogate motherhood agreements legal recognition in South Africa. I argue that the application of Chapter 19 imposes a number of unwarranted limitations on several of the constitutional rights of the parties to a surrogacy agreement. In addition, I propose that Chapter 19 is not in accordance with the principal of the best interests of the child. I examine the history of surrogate motherhood in South Africa and establish that, prior to the enactment of Chapter 19, no legislation expressly afforded surrogate motherhood agreements legal recognition. Hence, prior to the enactment of Chapter 19, parties who entered surrogacy agreements could, first, not rely on the agreement to enforce contractual obligations, and secondly, the legal positions of the parties to the agreement were uncertain. Thirdly, a child born of a surrogacy agreement was seen as the child of the surrogate mother and not of the commissioning parents.

In this research, I carefully and coherently examine Chapter 19 of the Children's Act 38 of 2005 as the first legislation to afford surrogate motherhood agreements legal recognition in South Africa. I argue that the application of Chapter 19 imposes a number of unwarranted limitations on several of the constitutional rights of the parties to a surrogacy agreement. In addition, I propose that Chapter 19 is not in accordance with the principal of the best interests of the child. I examine the history of surrogate motherhood in South Africa and establish that, prior to the enactment of Chapter 19, no legislation expressly afforded surrogate motherhood agreements legal recognition. Hence, prior to the enactment of Chapter 19, parties who entered surrogacy agreements could, first, not rely on the agreement to enforce contractual obligations, and secondly, the legal positions of the parties to the agreement were uncertain. Thirdly, a child born of a surrogacy agreement was seen as the child of the surrogate mother and not of the commissioning parents.

Magister Legum - LLM / In this research, I carefully and coherently examine Chapter 19 of the Children's Act 38 of 2005 as the first legislation to afford surrogate motherhood agreements legal recognition in South Africa. I argue that the application of Chapter 19 imposes a number of unwarranted limitations on several of the constitutional rights of the parties to a surrogacy agreement. In addition, I propose that Chapter 19 is not in accordance with the principal of the best interests of the child. I examine the history of surrogate motherhood in South Africa and establish that, prior to the enactment of Chapter 19, no legislation expressly afforded surrogate motherhood agreements legal recognition. Hence, prior to the enactment of Chapter 19, parties who entered surrogacy agreements could, first, not rely on the agreement to enforce contractual obligations, and secondly, the legal positions of the parties to the agreement were uncertain. Thirdly, a child born of a surrogacy agreement was seen as the child of the surrogate mother and not of the commissioning parents. / South Africa