Includes bibliographical references. / A company, as a separate legal personality, is not able to act on its own accord. It must necessarily participate in legal transactions through natural persons acting on its behalf. Directors are the persons who act on behalf of the company in transactions with third parties. Their functions and responsibilities arise by virtue of the company as being a separate legal personality. The company acts through its organs. One of its organs is the board of directors, which is entrusted with the management of the business of the company. The other organ, through which a company acts, is the general meeting of the company, which is not the object of this study. The management of a company can only be effective if the directors are empowered with sufficient discretion to exercise their powers in an effective and efficient manner. However, it is also important that members of the company in its general meeting exercise effective oversight over the management of the company by the directors. It is, however, not easy for members to exercise judicious control over management because of the diversity and dispersal of shareholders. Hence, directors are subject to various duties, which are normally classified as the duty of care and skill, and the fiduciary duties. The effective control of the directors is dependent on the enforcement of these duties, which are based on common law.

The development within the European Union is that we are heading towards a common internal market. The law has during the year become more harmo-nized within the Union in many areas. The company law within the European Union has become harmonized through several company law directives and the freedom of establishment, which is included in the EC Treaty. The aim of an internal market is about to be achieved, but there are still differences between the systems of law within the Member States. To avoid these differences within the area of company law a common European company type became reality in 2004, the European public limited-liability company. Companies within the European Union have the possibility to create a Euro-pean public limited-liability company (SE Company). The SE Company is mainly governed by the SE Regulation. The SE company has advantages like the possibility to move the registered office from one Member State to another without losing its legal personality. It can also make the company structure easier and relief administrative costs for a company with activity in the European Union. The company was supposed to be governed by one single set of rules, the SE Regulation, no matter where in the Union the company has its registered of-fice. This has not become reality since the SE Regulation on several occasions refers back to the national company law. The SE Company has not been a success, only a few SE companies have been created. The advantages do not seem to be that important reasons, the companies do not seem to think that it is worth the cost and the trouble to change type of company.

<p>The development within the European Union is that we are heading towards a common internal market. The law has during the year become more harmo-nized within the Union in many areas.</p><p>The company law within the European Union has become harmonized through several company law directives and the freedom of establishment, which is included in the EC Treaty.</p><p>The aim of an internal market is about to be achieved, but there are still differences between the systems of law within the Member States. To avoid these differences within the area of company law a common European company type became reality in 2004, the European public limited-liability company.</p><p>Companies within the European Union have the possibility to create a Euro-pean public limited-liability company (SE Company). The SE Company is mainly governed by the SE Regulation.</p><p>The SE company has advantages like the possibility to move the registered office from one Member State to another without losing its legal personality. It can also make the company structure easier and relief administrative costs for a company with activity in the European Union.</p><p>The company was supposed to be governed by one single set of rules, the SE Regulation, no matter where in the Union the company has its registered of-fice. This has not become reality since the SE Regulation on several occasions refers back to the national company law.</p><p>The SE Company has not been a success, only a few SE companies have been created. The advantages do not seem to be that important reasons, the companies do not seem to think that it is worth the cost and the trouble to change type of company.</p>

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<p>Exklusivitetsklausuler används ofta som säkerhet för att den presumtiva köparen, budgivaren, ska våga inleda det kostsamma och tidskrävande förhandlingsarbetet. Exklusivitetsklausulen ger budgivaren, och i vissa fall säljaren, trygghet genom att säljaren förhindras att föra parallella förhandlingar. Exklusivitet är särskilt vanligt förekommande vid företagsförvärv eftersom sådana transaktioner ofta innefattar betydande kostnader och risker. Exklusivitetsklausulen kan vara en del av en avsiktsförklaring, eller finnas upprättad i ett särskilt avtal. Huruvida klausulen de facto ger budgivaren någon trygghet kan emellertid ifrågasättas och kanske erbjuder istället lojalitetsplikten skydd vid sidan av den överenskomna exklusiviteten. Exklusivitetsklausuler i avsiktsförklaringar uttrycker en avsikt att inte föra parallella förhandlingar och möjligtvis går det inte att likställa avsikten men någon plikt att endast förhandla med en part. Klausulen tvingar heller inte säljaren att sälja företaget och utan försäljning har budgivaren lagt ned tid och kostnad förgäves. Lojalitetsplikten har en stark ställning i svensk rätt och förmodas bli allt starkare genom lojalitetspliktens förekomst i lex mercatoria. Det går dock inte att direkt anta att lojalitetsplikten skulle uppställa krav på att parterna inte för parallella förhandlingar, utan andra principer såsom avtalsfriheten komplicerar situationen. Bedömningen får göras utifrån vad som kan anses vara ett illojalt beteende, det vill säga principen om culpa in contrahendo. Såväl exklusivitetsklausuler som lojalitetsplikten, i de fall lojalitetsplikten uppställer</p><p>krav på exklusivitet, skapar viss skadeberäkningsproblematik när åsidosättandet av exklusiviteten väl är ett faktum. Budgivarens skada kan påstås bestå dels av förhandlingskostnader som lagts ned i onödan, dels av förlorad vinst till följd av det förlorade förvärvet och frågan är vad denne kan förvänta sig bli ersatt för när exklusiviteten nonchalerats. Skadan är dessutom en indirekt, snarare än direkt, följd av de parallella förhandlingarna. Det är försäljningen till någon annan, inte de parallella förhandlingarna i sig, som orsakat skadan. Det finns många frågetecken runt exklusivitet och dess rättsverkningar som jag med denna uppsats avser att reda ut.</p>

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The enormous expansion of knowledge society has lead to a path away from the industrial enterprises toward the more knowledge-based entrepreneurship companies. This development has also meant that intellectual capital now can be seen as the core of the new business structure. However the growth has not been reflected in either the legal or the economic regulations in relation to what could have been expected, which means that there is thus a gap between de lege lata and de lege ferenda. This can specifically been seen regarding the prohibition of adding property other than cash applied in payment for shares or regarding issue of new shares when it comes to work and services. The prohibition may therefore be considered to stand against the knowledge companies’ advancement. Consequently the question is therefore whether or not changes can be made with consideration to the creditors and to the current legal foundation. It is my opinion that some changes can be made if de development of valuation methods continue to progress and if the regulations regarding labor would open up to more detailed agreements between employers and employees. If such steps were to be taken the possibility of payment with work and services would increase, however the cost of developing those improvements is today in my opinion not defensible and therefore intellectual capital continues to fall between the Swedish regulations.