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What is the individual’s preferred income tax rate? How much income tax progressivity do people want? How do individuals form these preferences? This dissertation answers these questions by leveraging the 1996 International Social Survey Program – Role of Government III survey and the anchoring and adjustment heuristic. When researchers ask individuals for their income tax preferences most respondents construct their preference on the spot using few cognitive resources. Individuals also want their income tax preference to be reasonable (i.e., the state can afford basic goods and services), so individuals anchor their preferences on existing state tax policy, their own income tax rate, and their previous responses when applicable. After individuals establish an anchoring point, they make adjustments based on ideological beliefs, level of trust, and self-interest; however, the effects of these adjustments are mediated by the institutional structure of the state. The results of the ordinary least regression models point to four conclusions. First, individuals behave as reasonable cognitive misers. They anchor their income tax preferences on the status quo, and their previous responses. This result explains cross-state differences in income tax preferences. Second, liberal individuals prefer progressive taxation in individualistic states (i.e., states with means-tested welfare states, majoritarian governments, and pluralist interest group systems), and flat taxes in cooperative regimes (i.e., states with expansive welfare states, consensus regimes, and corporatist interest group systems). Third, trusting individuals prefer flat taxes, and preferences for progressive taxation are a means to ensure tax evaders pay their fair share. Fourth, the effects of self-interest on tax preferences are limited, and only influence tax preferences on those earning one-times and eight-times the wages of a full-time unskilled worker. / Political Science

My research aims to highlight the way in which Black political mobilization in the Southeastern United States specifically is linked to the movement for decolonization throughout Africa and the Caribbean in this time period. This project will include an examination of the thoughts and writings of many of the aforementioned key figures of the Pan African movement on the question of race and coloniality of Black people in the United States. I will organize this examination around the question of Black labor at this time period and the way in which it was (re) organized leading up to the Second World War leading to the “success” of development projects throughout the rural Southeast, mainly the Tennessee Valley Authority. This will lead to an analysis of the way in which Black southern communities specifically understood their positionality in connection to that of colonized subjects throughout the Black Atlantic.

<p>What is the political role of risk? What is its role in the power structures of today’s societies? And how can understanding its role lead to a better understanding of political change? This research is inspired by the students of late modernity who argue that the way we are dealing with risk is nowadays structuring culture, society and politics. According to these conceptions of late modernity, risk and political change are closely intertwined through the idea of reflexivity, a process of self-confrontation of a society with its own rules and institutions. This study builds on this theorization of risk and aims to discover why France and Canada, even though they were facing similar technological challenges, were progressively taken along different paths when it comes to regulating GMOs. This study has found that major differences in risk related discourse and in the strategies adopted to manage social risks are factors in explaining different policy outcomes. In addition, it shows that differences in institutional risks management also contribute to the explanation. The comparison of the French and Canadian cases has indeed revealed that, if risks can create significant pressures in favour of institutional and political change, governments may in turn possess the necessary leverage to prevent reflexivity. This comparative analysis exposed that this capacity to manage institutional risk by controlling discourse and preventing reflexivity is related to the characteristics of such core democratic institutions as the parliament, the public administration, the press, and civil society.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

The use of child soldiers has troubled human rights activists, policy-makers, and local communities for decades. Although rebellions around the world routinely use children in their activities, many do not. Despite its overwhelming importance for conflict resolution, the topic of child soldiers remains understudied. My research blends classic rational choice and constructivist themes to develop an explanation for when child soldiers will be used, and when they will be avoided. The likelihood of child recruitment is influenced by the value of international opinion; this is determined by the groups' long-term goals. Secessionist rebellions desire to have their own state. However, statehood is jealously guarded by the international community and is only granted under extreme circumstances. The use of child soldiers has been condemned around the world as a crime against humanity, and it can curtail international support. Thus, secessionists should be the least likely rebel type to use child soldiers out of a concern to appear legitimate. Opportunistic rebellions face few constraints in their recruitment efforts. They do not desire international support because their long-term goal is the same as their short term goal: profit. Instead of refraining from using children in order to curry favor with external parties, they will abduct, adopt, and abuse children because they are cheaper to employ than adults. Opportunists are unconcerned with losing legitimacy or reducing the chances of victory. Therefore, they should be the most likely to use child soldiers. Concern for costs can affect all rebels. As duration grows, constraints over long-term legitimacy diminish. Therefore, all rebellions should be more likely to use child soldiers as duration increases. I test my theory quantitatively by looking at 103 rebel groups active between 1998-2008. I explore rebellions in Somalia, Colombia, Afghanistan and Sudan to further elucidate the causal mechanisms. There is considerable empirical support for the theory. These results offer policy-relevant conclusions in the areas of rehabilitation and conflict resolution. More importantly, they offer a workable strategy to curb the use of child soldiers in civil war.

The United States has maintained a heavy military presence in Afghanistan for a little more than a decade however; the US has been involved in Afghanistan on and off for over three decades. The 2001 ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan became framed around the goal of saving Afghan women. In order to understand how this framing came about and what the impact of this framing was I study US congressional documents, speeches and other public rhetoric by government officials in the 1980s and early 2000s. Analyzing rhetorical language and reoccurring themes helps us understand what major framing devices and narrative techniques were in play during these time periods. Ultimately I conclude that women’s safety was a post-facto justification for intervention; the framing techniques used during the 2001 were utilized in order to create a clear, coherent narrative that selectively ignores the impact of US involvement in Afghanistan during the Cold War.

This paper compares the effectiveness of an NGO and a government branch at promoting development through gender equality in Tanzania, in an attempt to determine whether one actor is more suited to this sector of development. Due to the nature of the actors, their approaches impact different parts of the population of Tanzania and are complementary in their impact. Both NGO and government efforts can help to empower women and in turn promote economic development in Tanzania.

For decades LGBTQ rights have been approached purely by a legal strategy, in particular advocating for the legalization of same-sex marriage. However, discrimination and violence against the LGBTQ community continues to be a major issue in Latin America because of cultural values such as Catholicism and machismo that uphold a standard of and, in turn, have control over people’s sexuality. Using a human rights approach towards the politics of sexuality, LGBTI activists in Costa Rican and Nicaragua have been successful in transforming public opinion about sexuality and more importantly, sexual diversity. As a result of their egalitarian framework and efforts to educate people about sexual diversity, they have made great advancements toward achieving acceptance and equality for LGBTI people. This study focuses on how Costa Rican and Nicaraguan LGBTI activists have worked around traditional cultural values such as Catholicism and machismo that prevent people from accepting and tolerating LGBTI people. The examples of LGBTI activists in these two countries have important implications for other LGBTI activists and the strategies they use to try to achieve full equality (social and legal) for people whose sexual identity differs from the conventional.

This paper evaluates the effectiveness of urban planning interventions in interrupting the degenerative socio-spatial cycle which perpetuates division in divided cities. To analyze the abilities of different types of urban planning projects to transform division, this paper implements a new system of classifying urban planning interventions in divided cities, delineating projects by their object, rather than by process. Under this system, urban planners pursue one of three objects: segregation, the creation of integrated spaces, and the transformation of divided space at a micro-spatial level. Applying this model to six urban planning projects in Belfast and Mostar from 1969 to 2008, this paper finds that segregation perpetuates inter-group conflict, the creation of integrated spaces separate from divided cities fails to impact such conflict by bypassing contested areas, and that symbolic micro-spatial projects have the potential to transform space to positively impact conflict.

How did EU and US legislation go from initially appearing to be the same, if not mirroring each other, to differing significantly in their execution of competition legislation goals? Why did the US take a more authoritative tone in enforcing interstate competition legislation? And if the EU is so inclined to mimic US policies 50 years ago, why didn’t their competition enforcement take the same form today? I hypothesize that the US and EU’s legislative history with regulating governmental supremacy is part of the clue to answering for these differences.