The editor's thesis (Ph. D.)--St. Louis University. / Latin and English on opposite pages. Description based on print version record. Bibliography: p. 136-140.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1980. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 57-59).

Thesis--Wisconsin. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 220-222).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1972. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis--University of Pennsylvania. / Bibliography: leaf xiii.

Thesis -- Yale University. / Includes bibliography.

The structure of our world is given in the grammar of our native tongue. If so people whose native tongue has quite a different grammar must be living in a quite different world. A logic such as Aristotle's may seem universal to the speakers of Greek, in fact it may seem universal to speakers of any Indo-European tongue, but the logic will hold good only for the 'universe' of the language or language-family in question. This implies a relationship between logic and grammar rather like the one Russell and Whitehead -claimed for mathematics and logic. Their Principia Mathematica tried to show that the mathematical notion of number rests on, or arises out of, the logical notion of class, that is, we come to understand what a number is through our grasp of what a class is. This thesis is a kind of Principia Logica: it suggests that the whole framework of common sense logic rests on, or arises out of, the grammatical structure of the language the logic was conceived in or took shape in terms of. And if so logical criteria come into being and take shape inside a language or language-family, and are dependent for their validity and even for their meaning on the structure of the language in question. To test, or to try to test, a mode of thought or an argument form against a logical system would be to put the cart before the horse: the logic only makes sense because the form of argument or mode of thought was there already. If so philosophers and logicians ought to think of the words 'world', 'universe' and 'universal' with tongue in cheek. In so far as a judgment seems to us universally true it is unlikely to hold good for the world of an alien language family. If our world is not the only world anybody writing logic or philosophy down ought to make it clear whose world he has in mind - and to do this it may be enough to make sure it is addressed to somebody in particular. Western philosophers seem to have addressed themselves to the whole world, or to mankind, or God. This thesis shows, if nothing else, how hard it can be to address even one other human being. To sum up with another analogy; it seems to me, as a single man, that the difference between one and two is greater than the difference between any other two numbers. There may be a world of difference between zero and one, but between one and two there's all the difference in the world - and that's the difference that matters. Perhaps the only way 1,000 differs from 1,001, as Frege puts it, is in the expression on its face. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

This study reports on some of the features and practices of sense making involved in the work of explicating the normative order of language use. The normative order of interest is (what Wittgenstein would call) the grammar of the concept justification. The data consists in the author's mundane work of figuring out in what context some type of talk would count as "doing justifying." The warrant for this enterprise issues from ethnomethodology's concern with sense making, or practical reasoning. While ethnomethodologists have addressed accounting and interpretive practices, the phenomenon under investigation here is of a different, previously unexplored type: "figuring out." In order to prepare for the analysis consideration is given in Part One to three questions: What are the "features and practices of sense making?" What analytic status must such features and practices have in order to be of ethnomethodological interest? How can the features and practices of figuring out grammar be best studied? Ordinary language philosophy is drawn on to answer the first two questions. A distinction is made between natural and social science in terms of the source of, and constraints on their concept formation and use. This distinction provides for seeing why it is that natural science can have a technical language while social science only can make technical use of ordinary language. That technical use is argued to depend for its sensibility cm the indexical limits of ordinary use. Features and practices of sense making thus turn out to be whatever members sanctionably can call features and practices of sense making. Some claims in ethnomethodology are found not to meet this indexical criterion. The answer to the second question has been that invariant or formal properties are of interest. Different versions of invariance are located in the literature. Using Wittgenstein's argument against essentialism the search for universal invariance is rendered questionable. Instead, particular invariance and type-invariance are claimed to be discoverable and warrantable within the limits of ordinary language. In addition the argument is put forward that (repeatable) contingent practices deserve attention. The third question is answered by considering and comparing a third person and a first person approach to studying figuring out. In terms of contingent practices it is found that a third person approach faces a problem of indexicality, whereas a first person approach does not, or if it does, it can survive it. Methods of ethnomethodological reduction and eidetic variation are discussed. In Part Two the concepts of meaning, force and grammar are introduced and explicated. These concepts are then used in presenting the normative order that governs the use of the concept of justification. Consideration is then given to how the generation of that normative order (grammar) is to be viewed analytically. Using a first person approach in Part Three, the author's own work of figuring out the grammar of justification becomes the topic of study. That study is written and furnished as a "journey": the analysis of each practice is developed in response to the properties of the phenomena, and each analysis draws and builds on the prior one. Four contingent practices are analyzed: calling, filling, grounding, and answering-seeking. As well, three features are found to be essential to figuring out: pre-reflective knowing, pre-reflective awareness of possibly knowing and orienting-to-grammaticality. Together these seven properties reveal that figuring out has a structure fundamentally different from accounting and interpreting. Through a consideration of these seven properties and other features an argument is provided in Part Four against using the Weber-Schutz version of social action as a resource for defining ethnomethodology's domain. Instead, it is argued that ethnomethodology's domain and phenomena are coextensive: the social is sense making. / Arts, Faculty of / Sociology, Department of / Graduate

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