This paper examines the ineffective and unsustainable information management system employed by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The Vietnamese public faces an absence of information, due to strictly controlled state media and an unreliable unofficial media. Meanwhile, the current information management system does not allow the regime to meet its core interests of increasing government legitimacy and decreasing corruption. Increasing press freedom is also perceived as an existential threat, and so the government’s basic interests contradict each other. This paper examines the literature on information management in authoritarian and democratic regimes to determine the functions of the media in more free and less free contexts. It then examines the information systems of two successful case studies, China and Singapore, to locate applicable lessons for the Vietnam case. The paper finds that while Vietnam should adopt some elements of China’s media demobilization strategies, both the Vietnamese regime and the Vietnamese people are better served by moving towards a Singaporean-style social contract between the public and the regime.

This dissertation addresses the question how democracies defend themselves from political parties and groups which profess antidemocratic values and use violence as one of the means to achieve their goals. In particular this dissertation analyses the range of formal-legal measures and provisions that democracies have at their disposal to constrain their non-democratic groups and political parties, looking at eight advanced European democracies Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. These measures and provisions are identified in constitutional documents, civil law, criminal law, in electoral laws, and other pertinent legal sources passed by the legislature and issued by courts of these countries, pertaining to the regulation of political freedoms, public order, and homeland security. On this basis, the thesis provides an encompassing and systematic assessment of differences and similarities between these democracies and thereby assesses their relative formal-legal democratic defensiveness.

While people all over the world are vulnerable to natural disasters, the available data clearly demonstrate a great deal of cross-country variance in the impact of catastrophic events. For example, while Hurricane Mitch took an estimated 13,000 lives when it struck Honduras and Nicaragua, the stronger Hurricane Andrew took only 26 lives when it impacted the United States. What factors explain this difference? Thus far, disaster researchers have emphasized economic and social vulnerability as determinants of disaster impact; the conventional wisdom accepts that poor and underdeveloped countries are more vulnerable than wealthy, developed countries. I argue that the political institutions of a country also matter and then examine the relative importance of political vulnerability as a determinant of disaster impact. I present evidence from case studies and large-N statistical analysis that demonstrates that, like social and economic vulnerability, political vulnerability is an important determinant of the impact of a natural disaster.

Thesis advisor: David A. Deese / My research builds upon the resource curse and external democracy promotion literatures to assess the prospects of transparency advocacy in non-democratic resource-rich countries. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan are all rich in hydrocarbons; however, in the last two decades, they have shown significant variation in terms of the transparency of oil revenues and expenditures. While Azerbaijan undertook substantial reforms to make its government revenues from oil almost completely transparent, Turkmenistan refrained from disclosing its revenues from natural gas exports. Finally, Kazakhstan, while undertaking some reforms, lagged behind Azerbaijan in pursuing a fully transparent revenue management policy. In authoritarian countries, transparency-related governance reforms are shaped by an interaction between international and domestic factors. Transparency in natural resource revenues is promoted by global actors including states, international financial institutions, and transnational networks as a measure to prevent or minimize corruption and mismanagement of revenues. In all three of my cases, the lack of public accountability and limited civil society activism prevented domestic agents from carrying out successful institutional reforms. In each case, the preferences of the elites have been important determinants of the degree of economic reform. I argue that transparency promotion from outside is expected to lead to institutional reform when it is matched with strong incentives for compliance. These incentives are created mostly by external actors, including states, international organizations, and international companies; yet they are also conditioned by the domestic economic and political landscape. Three cases from the Caspian region fully demonstrate the potential for different institutional outcomes among resource-dependent countries. A comparison of these countries' experiences will not only shed light on our understanding of the resource dependency and institutions, but also explain the institutional variance among the many non-democratic countries. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2012. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

My PhD thesis concerns trade union responses to austerity in Belgium, Greece and Ireland (2008-2016). It explores the power resources trade unions in Europe have drawn on during these crisis years, and seeks to establish if unions are cultivating new sources of power and influence, as traditional sources wane. My research points to unions being under sustained pressure, but it also presents evidence of effective union revitalisation, including through the formation of new coalitions with civil society actors, through the use of innovative legal approaches to problem-solving, and with unions reaching out to new, often atypically-employed, groups of workers. Notably however, the national level remains the primary concern for unions, and the European Union (EU) level of action remains adjunct to what unions do.

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The World Health Organization states that 462 million adults are considered underweight, and malnutrition accounts for almost 50% of deaths for children under the age of 5. Economic, political, and medical consequences of malnutrition are severe for individuals, families, countries, and the world. The objective of this thesis is to develop a causal theory to ending malnutrition. This thesis undertakes a comparative case study analysis of Peru and Brazil to outline what factors led to their success. It synthesizes two bodies of political science literature on social movements and development to argue for the importance of civil society and social welfare policy implementation. It concludes that in democracies, a link between civil society and the state is crucial to implement necessary policies and programs that combat malnutrition. The most important of these policies are related to healthcare, maternal education, child education, and food security.

How a single party and personal dictatorship survive has been a question of much debate among scholars. Geddes (1999, 2003) creates a model to determine which survives the longest. Within her model, she finds that a single party dictatorship – one with a party apparatus – survives longer than a personal dictatorship – one where a single person has sole policymaking ability. She argues that the fundamental difference between the two is how each treats the opposition. The party apparatus allows a single party dictatorship the means to silence the opposition by coopting it into the party structure whereas a personal dictatorship must rely on the wealthy and military to keep any opposition at bay. With a single party dictatorship being able to coalesce the opposition, this dictatorship is more stable and survives longer. I agree with Geddes’ reasoning and seek to clarify how this situation works in Sub-Saharan Africa. I argue that a single party dictatorship can silence and use religious leaders in the opposition to gain support from the religious leaders’ followers. This additional support from the religious leaders and the followers makes single party dictatorships survive longer than personal dictatorships in Sub-Saharan Africa. In this research, I explain the importance of religion as a variable for dictatorship survival research in Sub-Saharan Africa. I show that religious leaders have a certain level of control over followers and if coopted by a dictatorship, religious leaders’ control garners support among followers. I further explain how religious leaders are in the opposition and therefore can only be coopted by a single party dictatorship. I conclude by showing that religious leaders increase a single party dictatorship’s survival likelihood.

Understanding how these networks and opportunities formed and the effect of these relationships on social movements and global politics is crucial for the future of the dam resistance movement. I hypothesize that the formation of networks and the larger role of civil society in decision-making has altered institutional decision-making, thus allowing for the development of new counter-hegemonic ideas of development and methods of organizing. Through a broad analysis of the dam resistance movement and specific dam resistance campaigns, this thesis examines how and under what circumstances transnational networks provide new opportunities for participation and greater influence over national policy and multilateral institutions. I will seek to answer the questions - how do anti-dam advocacy networks affect national and international policy and under what conditions are these networks successful?

This paper examines China’s policy towards human rights internationally with the intent of discerning real support for human rights. It compares China’s responses to two cases of mass human rights violations (the Darfur and Israel-Palestine conflicts) in which it has a serious interest (energy in particular). It finds that China treats human rights self-interestedly, but also has some support for them when its interests are not at stake.