The aim of this study is to develop an in-depth understanding of the relative importance of the factors driving change to remuneration policy decision making and the impact on organisations. A triangulated approach involving qualititative and quantitative analysis was adopted to derive answers to 5 main research questions. The study was split into 2 phases, namely a qualitative and quantitative phase. A qualitative study was undertaken to explore and identify key assumptions and characteristics identifying the main factors driving change to remuneration policies (Phase 1). The outcome of the qualitative phase formed the basis for the quantitative phase in which statistical analysis was used (Phase 2). Data from 148 organisations were analysed and subjected to rigorous statistical analysis. Sense was made of these resulting in answers to the research questions. The findings closed gaps in current knowledge and provided insight into the most powerful drivers of remuneration policy as well as the extent of change on each component of remuneration policy. How each component impacted on organisations is now understood and remuneration decision-makers are able to make more informed decisions based on empirical evidence. The results show that the most potent drivers of remuneration policy are retention of key staff, financial results and organisation strategy. The greatest changes to remuneration policy were in the areas of variable pay, merit/ performance related pay, market position, total package and job evaluation/ broadbanding policy. A strong correlation was found between the extent of change and impact on the organisation. This suggests that the greater the change the greater the impact on the organisation. There are distinct differences in the extent of change and impact across organisation structure and industry sector. / Dr. Deon Huysamen

Variable remuneration is an integral part of the management process, utilised to motivate participants to achieve business objectives. Many employers are actively seeking ways of increasing the value of variable remuneration in the employment process for the perceived benefits it would have for the business and participants. Over the past decade variable remuneration has become a significant component of the employment offer that contributes to the attraction and retention of highly sought-after employees. It has grown in importance, but simultaneously has also become a major employment cost. In the absence of a validated generic methodology, the variable remuneration methodologies applied by employers are intuitive and most often lack any scientific basis. The purpose of the study was to design and validate a variable remuneration methodology that will allow managers, or scheme designers, to develop variable remuneration schemes that will be able to deliver outcomes that would be attributable to the variable remuneration scheme and not to factors outside the control of the scheme participants or within the greater organisational context. Based on a literature survey covering three bodies of knowledge; motivational theory, variable remuneration concepts, and the variable remuneration life cycle, propositions regarding variable remuneration were formulated. These propositions were converted into 99 items making up a questionnaire dealing with variable remuneration constructs. The questionnaire was applied to thirty different types of variable remuneration schemes in a bank assurance group. Six hundred and thirty two scheme participants completed the questionnaire that assessed the thirty schemes. Independently from the scheme assessments, scheme owners and/or designers evaluated scheme outcomes. First and second order factor analyses were performed on the variable remuneration scheme questionnaire that produced three adequately determined factors. The factors had highly acceptable internal reliabilities. These factors were: Congruency, Instrumentality and Performing. The respective relationships between the Independent Variables: Congruency, Instrumentality and Performing, the Moderator Variables: Scheme Type and Job Level and the Independent Variable: Scheme Outcome, were investigated by means of Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), Multiple Analysis of Variance (MANOVA), Analysis of Co-Variance (ANCOVA) as well as Multiple Regression Analysis. An empirically determined generic variable remuneration methodology was arrived at, consisting of three constructs and eleven dimensions, which explained 34,5% of the variance of variable remuneration scheme outcomes and is depicted in the figure below. / Prof. Theo Veldsman Prof. Gert Roodt

Thesis (Ph. D.)--State University of New York at Binghamton, School of Management, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2006. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 157-166).

by Zhou Jun. / Includes "Chinese version of the questionaire". / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1993. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 43-45). / ABSTRACT / TABLE OF CONTENTS / ACKNOWLEDGEMENT / CHAPTER / Chapter I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter II. --- DEVELOPMENT OF PROPOSITIONS --- p.7 / Chapter III. --- METHODOLOGY --- p.19 / Chapter IV. --- DATA ANALYSIS --- p.25 / Chapter V. --- RESULTS --- p.30 / Chapter VI. --- DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION --- p.34 / APPENDICES / BIBLIOGRAPHY

Thesis (M.B.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 1997. / Includes bibliographical references (leaf 71-74).

published_or_final_version / Business Administration / Master / Master of Business Administration

Thesis, PlanB (M.S.)--University of Wisconsin--Stout, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references.

Orientation: In theory, effective remuneration contracts will link executive remuneration with organisation financial performance and provide strong incentives for executives to operate organisations and behave in ways that will be in the shareholders’ best interests. Many proclaim that this is not happening as CEOs continue to be rewarded even when their respective organisations are performing poorly. Research purpose: The purpose of this research study was to take advantage of the available information on executive remuneration data and establish the best link (correlation) between executive remuneration and organisation financial performance between 2008 and 2012. Motivation for the study: The motivation for the research study was due to the acknowledged challenge encountered by organisations in finding a balance between executive remuneration that will be enticing enough to keep executives in the employ of the organisation and not overpaying them, especially when organisation’s performance is not favourable. Research design approach and method: The research was a quantitative, archival study, conducted over a seven year time period. The primary statistical techniques used in the study included: multiple correlation analysis, bivariate regression analysis, multiple regression analysis and stepwise regression analysis. Main findings/results: The primary finding was that the relationship between executive remuneration and organisation financial performance has been experiencing a decline since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. The decline has predominantly been due to a move by executives away from performance related elements of the remuneration contracts, creating disconnect between what executives are being paid and the performance of the organisation. The findings point out to the fact that, to a large extent, remuneration contracts for executives are predominantly no longer shaped by what would be optimal for an organisation and its shareholders, but are also influenced by the natural propensity of executives to influence their own remuneration contracts. Practical managerial implications: The results suggest that there is a need for superior organisation performance measures and innovative remuneration policies that need to be developed which will be in synchronism with the longterm strategic plans of an organisation. Contribution/value add: The study provides a key insight with regard to the fact that without any performance based elements with the executive’s remuneration, it is going to be difficult to justify the high remuneration packages of executives. In the long run, a dilemma arises for board of directors as they become reluctant to either reward executives for superior performance or punish them for poor performance. / Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2013. / lmgibs2014 / Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) / MBA / Unrestricted

published_or_final_version / Business / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy