Univ., Diss.--Tübingen, 2007. / Literaturverz. S. 159 -166.

Univ., Diss.--Kiel, 2006. / Literaturverz. S. XXXVII - LIII.

Univ., Diss.--München, 2002. / Literaturverz. S. 241 - 250.

This thesis investigates the role of prior use in common and statutory trade mark law. In the United States a pertinent requirement is priority of use. In the United Kingdom and South Africa, a reputation must be present. In the United Kingdom a plaintiff is required to have goodwill in the country, but in the United States and South Africa it is not required. The conception of a mark does not qualify for protection. It is not required that a business must have actually entered the market. In the United States the general approach is that a plaintiff will not receive protection in a remote area, but regard must be had to zones of natural expansion. British and South African law is the same, and protection may be obtained in areas where there is no trading. Where a dual reputation exists, neither party will be able to act against the other. The mere fact that the user of a mark was aware of the use thereof by another person, does not exclude protection. A trade mark application can be opposed on the basis of another application, combined with use of a mark, or on the ground of prior use. In some instances the fact that a mark has been filed will influence the burden of proof. In general, a registration can be expunged on the same grounds as would constitute grounds of opposition. The concurrent use of a mark can form the basis for the registration of a mark. In the United States, the use must have taken place prior to the filing date of the other party, but in the United Kingdom and South Africa, prior to the own filing date. In the latter two countries, knowledge of a mark is not necessarily exclusionary. Prior use is generally accepted as a defence to an infringement action. It is, however, noted that in various countries, it is only use prior to the relevant date that will be protected, and there is not necessarily a right to extend the scope of use concerned. / Mercantile Law / LL.D. (Mercantile Law)

Si l‘indépendance des autorités de concurrence est souvent justifiée par le besoin d‘une expertise objective, ce besoin ne suffit pourtant pas à la légitimer. Créées en contradiction apparente avec le principe de séparation des pouvoirs, les autorités de concurrence « indépendantes » ne peuvent trouver leur légitimité que dans la conjonction de diverses garanties institutionnelles, et de différents mécanismes de contrôle et procédures. S‘interroger sur la place de l‘indépendance des autorités de concurrence en Colombie suppose alors l‘identification de ces garanties et mécanismes. Leur analyse sera menée à travers une étude comparative de leur statut au regard de celui des autorités de concurrence française et américaine, dont les modèles ont influencé la constitution des autorités colombiennes. Elle permet de constater que les composantes de l‘indépendance varient et qu‘il n‘en existe pas un seul modèle à travers le monde. La présente étude conduit aussi à relever que certaines garanties statutaires de l'indépendance, pourtant accordées aux autorités de concurrence française et américaine et leur permettant disposer d‘un grand degré de liberté décisionnelle, ne sont pas octroyées aux autorités colombiennes. Assurer un degré plus important d‘indépendance aux autorités de concurrence en Colombie, par l‘attribution de certaines de ces garanties, requiert un renforcement des mécanismes de contrôle, procédures et voies de participation des citoyens dans la prise des décisions. L‘étude de la construction de l‘indépendance des autorités de concurrence, dans ses dimensions organique et fonctionnelle, doit donc être suivie par celle de ces contrôles. Un équilibre dans les contrôles constitue un facteur non seulement de légitimité, mais aussi un moyen de sauvegarder leur indépendance vis-à-vis des éléments extérieurs susceptibles d‘y porter atteinte. / Although Competition Agencies‘ independence is commonly explained through the necessity of objective expert decision-making, such necessity is not sufficient to legitimize their isolation from the government. Absent of democratic foundations and in apparent contradiction with the principle of Separation of Powers, "Independent" Competition Agencies attain their legitimacy from the conjunction of multiple institutional guarantees, control mechanisms and procedures, none of which may overshadow the others. Any effort to determine the role that the idea of independence plays in the institutional design of Colombian competition agencies requires an examination of these guarantees and mechanisms, as well as a comparison of their status to that of French and American agencies; whose institutional arrangement has influenced the constitution of Colombian authorities. Whilst the components of the independence vary in every analyzed jurisdiction (as there is not a unique institutional scheme of ―Independent‖ Agency), this study reveals that certain institutional guarantees recognized to agencies in France and in the United States, which grant them vast discretionary decision-making power, are not present in the specific case of Colombian agencies. Assuring a higher level of independence for Colombian competition authorities, by conferring them some of these guarantees, lean on a simultaneous effort to reinforce control mechanisms, procedures and instruments for citizen participation in the regulatory process. The construction of the independence of Competition Agencies – in both its organizational and functional dimensions – commands the design of institutional constraints. Maintaining a balance over these constraints to agency discretion not only constitutes a source of legitimacy, but equally becomes an effective means to safeguard their independence from external factors.

Univ., Diss.--Bern, 2006.