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Following a period of rising costs, competitive tendering was introduced to the London bus industry in 1984. This thesis is an economic analysis of the impact of tendering on London bus services. Chapter 1 states the aims and objectives of the thesis in the context of the economics literature. The chapter is divided into two sections. In section 1 the literature is drawn upon to provide an economic interpretation of the state of the London bus industry prior to the introduction of tendering, and to provide an economic context for the introduction of tendering. In section 2 literature relating to the design of a tendering process is summarised. The focus is on the auction aspect of the tendering process and some important dimensions of contract specification. The impact of tendering on costs is analysed in chapter 2. Three questions are asked: What is the cost structure of the competitive London bus industry. Is there any evidence of strategic bidding behaviour as predicted by the auction theory literature. What level of cost saving can be attributed to tendering. The analysis is based on the full set of bid data from London bus tendering over the period 1985-1993 and is econometric in nature. The results are: there is no statistically significant difference in costs of operation between public and private sector operators under competition; bidding behaviour conforms to some features predicted by theoretical models; the estimated cost saving from tendering is 20%. Chapter 3 evaluates the impact of tendering on the demand for bus travel in London. The relationship between demand and service quality is estimated, gains to tendering are attributed in accordance with the increased service quality due to tendering. A statistically significant relationship between demand and service quality is found. The lowest estimate of revenue gained due to tendering is 9.6 million over the period 1987-1992 in 1992 prices. Chapter 4 estimates the welfare gain due to tendering, defined as the sum of changes in producer and consumer surplus due to tendering. The estimated welfare gain due to tendering is between 90 and 380 million over the period 1987-1992 in 1992 prices. An appendix to this chapter analyses the relationship between welfare and the type of contract upon which tendering is based. It is argued that a cost contract is preferable to a bottom line contract. Chapter 5 is based on an in depth series of interviews with key actors in the London bus industry. The aim here was to find out things that cannot be inferred from the data. Areas discussed include: the extent to which tendering as opposed to other factors led to change in the London bus industry; the source of cost savings; the impact of tendering on Labour; problems associated with tendering. Interviews suggested that: cost savings stemmed from wage reductions and productivity gains; there are some problems with the bidding process; there is a tension between bus planners and some bus company managers. In certain cases the tendering authority offered contract for tender in bundles. Chapter 6 analyses this policy from theoretical and empirical perspectives and asks was it optimal for the tendering authority. It is concluded that the policy should not be used by London Transport. Finally, in chapter 7, an overall assessment of the tendering process is presented. The focus is on results and policy implications for bus tendering in London and competitive tendering in general.

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In the last decade, local authority leisure managers of the United Kingdom have operated in a constantly changing environment brought about by legislation, an ongoing increase in competition and increasing consumerism. Public sector leisure professionals have had to develop management strategies that not only allowed them to conform to legislative changes, but were flexible enough to respond to rapid increases in competition and customer expectations. One of the responses to this changing context has been the introduction of quality programmes into the management of public leisure facilities. This thesis establishes and investigates the rationale for the use of quality management as a management strategy within the public leisure sector. The research has three key objectives. (1) To establish what senior local authority leisure professionals consider to be the influences on the use of quality and quality programmes in local authority leisure facilities. (2) To establish how senior local authority leisure professionals conceptualise quality and quality management. (3) To establish what role these professionals played in the adoption of quality programmes within their local authority leisure facilities.

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The principal aim of this thesis is to establish the extent of the impact of the introduction of CCT on the changing role of the local authority leisure professional. CCT was introduced into the management of local authority leisure facilities in phased stages between January lst 1992 and January 1st 1993, following the publication of the Parliamentary Order (Competition in Sports and Leisure Facilities, November 1989). As a policy it was one of a series of measures implemented by the Government in the 1980s and early 1990s to reduce the power of local authorities and reform the processes, systems and structures of these institutions. Change initiated at this structural level, stimulated change at the operational and individual levels of the policy process and it is at this individual or `agency' level that this thesis is most concerned. The empirical work undertaken to identify the impact of CCT at the agency level was based on 26 in-depth qualitative surveys administered on local authority leisure professionals who had worked in leisure services between the mid 1980s and 1998. At the individual level, the research considered in detail the role of the leisure professional as s/he was both a participant and spectator in the implementation of CCT. Individual officers' responses to the implementation were mediated by factors such as training, background, previous work experiences and the contextual local authority situation within which they found themselves. The findings demonstrate that the dominant values in the institutional environments within which leisure professionals operated, changed significantly with CCT as `goal governance' and `competitive individualism' came to the fore. Within this often aggressive and competitive environment, the implementation of CCT resulted in staffing restructuring and realignment of responsibilities and there was severe pressure to achieve the policy requirements. Relationships between colleagues became strained and some elements of leisure provision suffered as a result. Terms and conditions of employment deteriorated and many staff became de-motivated and disillusioned. However, in some instances CCT was seen as beneficial as it gave officers opportunities for career enhancement, it led to the development of generic leisure managers and heightened the profile of the leisure professional. Thus, CCT had a huge impact on local authority leisure professionals, as it imposed significant constraints and inhibitions on officers in their working relationships and environment. However, it also enabled some officers to advance within the leisure management industry and benefit from improved employment opportunities and heightened status. CCT as a policy both constrained and enabled leisure professionals. It was at the individual level that these constraining and enabling effects were most felt although previous research has given scant recognition to the human resource implication of CCT implementation through statistical analyses of outcomes. This research, however, recognises that one should use statistics `for support rather than illumination" (Lang as quoted in Cohen, 1960) and in so doing underlines the importance of the `bottom up' approach to policy analysis where the emphasis is on the role of the individual in the policy process.

O presente trabalho tem por objetivo analisar os processos licitatórios para a concessão do transporte coletivo municipal por ônibus, ocorridos na cidade de Porto Alegre, durante o ano de 2014, visando identificar o porquê de ambos processos terem restado desertos. Para tanto, buscou-se, ao longo desse estudo de caso, subsídios que justificassem o desinteresse, por parte da iniciativa privada, em prover estes serviços. Através de pesquisa a literatura e da análise de casos de Londres (UK), França e Japão, buscou-se reunir tais subsídios. A conclusão que se obteve é de que as grandes barreiras de entrada; o grande tempo de contrato a ser firmado; o risco de receita ao operador privado, em um contexto em que o poder público determina as especificações dos serviços a serem prestados; a ausência de informações completas sobre os serviços a serem prestados; as indefinições sobre a integração tarifária do sistema metropolitano, e sobre a implantação do metrô e do BRT; podem estar entre as justificativas do desinteresse da iniciativa privada em concorrer nos certames ofertados pelo Poder Público. / This study aims to analyze the bidding process for the granting of the municipal public transport by bus, occurred in the city of Porto Alegre during the year 2014 to identify why both processes have no bidders. Therefore, we sought, throughout this case study, subsidies to justify the lack of interest on the part of the private sector in providing these services. Through research the literature and analysis of cases of London (UK), France and Japan, we sought to gather such subsidies. The conclusion obtained is that large entry barriers; the big time contract to be signed; the risk of revenue to the private operator, in a context in which the government determines the specifications of the services to be provided; the absence of complete information on the services to be provided; the uncertainties on tariff integration of the metropolitan system, and for the implementation of the metro and BRT; may be among the reasons of the private sector unwillingness to compete in contests offered by the Government.