Th.--Paris, 1951. / Bibliogr. p. 128-129. Index.

Th.--Droit. / Bibliogr. p. 521-546. Index.

Text in Afrikaans / Gebrokenheid, op geestelike sowel as liggaamlike vlak, is 'n fait primitif van menswees. Literatuurstudie bring aan die lig dat die tema ender bespreking op uiteenlopende wyses in die Ooste en die Weste probeer beantwoord word. Twee Westerse medikus-sielkundiges van hierdie eeu, Frankl en Jung, het elk met sy eie besondere teorie (Logoterapie en 'n Argetipe-teorie} 'n poging aangewend om die gebrokenheids= vraagstuk te probeer beantwoord. Gewetensvorming staan sentraal in Frankl se Logoterapie. Jung beklemtoon die rol van die irrasionele en sy Argetipe-teorie herinner aan wat Jaspers grenssituasies en Kant idees genoem het. Die Oesterling steun op eeue-oue stelsels soos Yoga, Boeddhisme en Tao1sme. Daar is tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat gewetensvorming, in die sin van gehoorsaming aan streng morele voorskrifte, ook in die genoemde stelsels sentraal figureer. / Brokenness on mental as well as physical level, is a fait primitif of being human. The study of related literature reveals that the theme under discussion is being answered in diverse ways by the East and the West. Two Western psychiatrists of this century, (Frankl and Jung} have each with his unique theory (Logotherapy and Archetypes) made an attempt to answer the question of brokenness. Conscience formation is central to Frankl's Logotherapy. Jung emphasizes the irrational and his theory of Archetypes reminds of what was termed boundary situations by Jaspers and ideas by Kant. The Oriental view is founded on centuries-old systems such as Yoga, Buddhism and Taoism. The conclusion has been reached that conscience formation in the sense of adhering to strict moral precepts is also central to the abovementioned systems. / Educational Studies / M. Ed. (Fundamentele Pedagogiek)

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Dept. of Philosophy, June 2002. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

The Charter grants to everyone, in s.2(a), the “fundamental …freedom of conscience and religion.” Yet the interaction between the two operative terms, “religion” and “conscience” remains largely unexplored. What, for example, is meant by “conscience”? By conscience in contradistinction to religion? Does s. 2(a) make a distinction between the state’s respect for religion and that of conscience? Can freedom of conscience be elevated to a freestanding right? Can conduct motivated by conscience be exempted from general laws in the way that some religious conduct has? Should the state take action to ensure conscience is protected? After more than 25 years of Charter commentary and jurisprudence, these remain deep questions, only partially answered. This project considers the possibility of building a case for an independent and robust “conscience” branch of s. 2(a), which will protect a broader range of freedoms, at the same time as allowing other disputes to be cast in more neutral tones (by taking them out of religious-based language, where possible) and allowing still others more room to develop in a more analytical and principled basis (as purely “religious” disputes more commonly associated with religious norms). In my view, there is, despite some opposition, sufficient justification in history, theory and doctrine to establish a separate and independent concept of freedom of conscience. At the same time, freedom of religion will always remain relevant as an acknowledgement of the distinct communal aspects of religion. Thus, a broad approach to freedom of conscience could include individual religious claims where the religious belief is based on a matter of conscience, and those conscience-based claims that lack a communal dimension, such as the prisoner who cannot eat meat or the whistleblower who feels compelled to report a supervisor. By exploring the origins of conscience and religious freedom, the basis behind the inclusion of conscience in many human rights documents, and the need for a theory that encompasses both as equal and complementary aspects of liberty, the dissertation sets out some possible ways in which freedom of conscience could be invoked and present a potential framework for assessing constitutional freedom of conscience claims.

The Charter grants to everyone, in s.2(a), the “fundamental …freedom of conscience and religion.” Yet the interaction between the two operative terms, “religion” and “conscience” remains largely unexplored. What, for example, is meant by “conscience”? By conscience in contradistinction to religion? Does s. 2(a) make a distinction between the state’s respect for religion and that of conscience? Can freedom of conscience be elevated to a freestanding right? Can conduct motivated by conscience be exempted from general laws in the way that some religious conduct has? Should the state take action to ensure conscience is protected? After more than 25 years of Charter commentary and jurisprudence, these remain deep questions, only partially answered. This project considers the possibility of building a case for an independent and robust “conscience” branch of s. 2(a), which will protect a broader range of freedoms, at the same time as allowing other disputes to be cast in more neutral tones (by taking them out of religious-based language, where possible) and allowing still others more room to develop in a more analytical and principled basis (as purely “religious” disputes more commonly associated with religious norms). In my view, there is, despite some opposition, sufficient justification in history, theory and doctrine to establish a separate and independent concept of freedom of conscience. At the same time, freedom of religion will always remain relevant as an acknowledgement of the distinct communal aspects of religion. Thus, a broad approach to freedom of conscience could include individual religious claims where the religious belief is based on a matter of conscience, and those conscience-based claims that lack a communal dimension, such as the prisoner who cannot eat meat or the whistleblower who feels compelled to report a supervisor. By exploring the origins of conscience and religious freedom, the basis behind the inclusion of conscience in many human rights documents, and the need for a theory that encompasses both as equal and complementary aspects of liberty, the dissertation sets out some possible ways in which freedom of conscience could be invoked and present a potential framework for assessing constitutional freedom of conscience claims.

Diss.--Universität Trier, 1997. / Bibliogr. p. 315-340.

Texte remanié de: Doktorarbeit--Geisteswissenschaftliche Facultät der Universität Wien, 1999. Titre de soutenance : Jñānaśīrimitras Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāya Kapitel I (Pakṣadharmatādhikāra) : kritische Ausgabe, Übersetzung und Analyse.

Tesis--Universidad de Valencia, 2000. / Bibliogr. p. 467-483.

Texte remanié de: Diss.--Fachbereich Philosophie und Geisteswissenschaften--Berlin--Freie Universität, 1999. / Bibliogr. p. 450-460. Index.