Thèse remaniée de: Diss.--Recht--Heidelberg--Juristischen Fakultät der Universität Heidelberg, 1989. / Bibliogr. p. 314-328. Notes bibliogr. Index.

Akademisk avhandling--Filosofie doktorsexamen--Lund, 1987. / Résumé en anglais.

Nous sommes aujourd’hui confrontés, à travers les objets techniques comme la réalité virtuelle ou, plus quotidiennement les jeux vidéo, à un changement qui affecte non pas les objets de la perception mais la perception elle-même. Nous proposons de désigner ce changement et les problèmes qu’il soulève sous le terme de « perception artificielle ». Parce que l’artificialité de cette perception ne qualifie pas un objet mais la structure même de la perception, elle confronte la phénoménologie husserlienne, et plus précisément sa distinction entre présentation (Gegenwärtigung) et représentation (Vergegenwärtigung), à une impossibilité : penser le rapport entre perception, objet technique et imagination. En effet, que peut dire la phénoménologie husserlienne, elle qui disqualifie le problème de l’objet technique et qui pose une séparation intouchable entre présentation et représentation ? Que pouvons-nous dire de la perception artificielle et de ce triple rapport qui ne soit pas une dénonciation de la fusion entre réalité et imagination, de l’absorption de la faculté d’imagination dans des prothèses techniques toujours plus performantes ? Il y a là un impensé, une chance de dévoiler la richesse de la phénoménologie husserlienne en la ressaisissant à partir de sa postériorité (Derrida, Stiegler, Richir) et en travaillant des cas précis. / Nowadays, we are confronted with industrial objects like virtual reality or, on a more daily basis, video games, that cause a shift not so much in the perceptual objects but in the perception itself. We suggest naming this shift and the issues it raises « artificial perception ». Since the artificiality of this perception does not describe an object but the very structure of perception, it confronts husserlian phenomenology, more precisely its distinction between presentation (Gegenwärtigung) and representation (Vergegenwärtigung), with an impossibility : to ponder on the relation between perception, industrial object and imgination. Indeed, what could the husserlian phenomenology say about this relation when it disqualifies the problem of the industrial object and sets down an untouchable separation between presentation and representation ? What can we say about artificial perception apart from a denunciation of the merging between reality and imagination, of the takeover of imagination by industrial prosthesis still more impressive ? Here we find something to ponder about, a chance of unfolding the richness of husserlian phenomenology by broaching it through its posterity (Derrida, Stiegler, Richir) and working on precise cases.

Text in Afrikaans / Gebrokenheid, op geestelike sowel as liggaamlike vlak, is 'n fait primitif van menswees. Literatuurstudie bring aan die lig dat die tema ender bespreking op uiteenlopende wyses in die Ooste en die Weste probeer beantwoord word. Twee Westerse medikus-sielkundiges van hierdie eeu, Frankl en Jung, het elk met sy eie besondere teorie (Logoterapie en 'n Argetipe-teorie} 'n poging aangewend om die gebrokenheids= vraagstuk te probeer beantwoord. Gewetensvorming staan sentraal in Frankl se Logoterapie. Jung beklemtoon die rol van die irrasionele en sy Argetipe-teorie herinner aan wat Jaspers grenssituasies en Kant idees genoem het. Die Oesterling steun op eeue-oue stelsels soos Yoga, Boeddhisme en Tao1sme. Daar is tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat gewetensvorming, in die sin van gehoorsaming aan streng morele voorskrifte, ook in die genoemde stelsels sentraal figureer. / Brokenness on mental as well as physical level, is a fait primitif of being human. The study of related literature reveals that the theme under discussion is being answered in diverse ways by the East and the West. Two Western psychiatrists of this century, (Frankl and Jung} have each with his unique theory (Logotherapy and Archetypes) made an attempt to answer the question of brokenness. Conscience formation is central to Frankl's Logotherapy. Jung emphasizes the irrational and his theory of Archetypes reminds of what was termed boundary situations by Jaspers and ideas by Kant. The Oriental view is founded on centuries-old systems such as Yoga, Buddhism and Taoism. The conclusion has been reached that conscience formation in the sense of adhering to strict moral precepts is also central to the abovementioned systems. / Educational Studies / M. Ed. (Fundamentele Pedagogiek)

Ce travail propose une revue ciblée, philosophique et psychologique, des études de l’attention sélective au cours de la seconde moitié du XXé siècle. Il prend pour cible principale la thèse du débordement phénoménal proposée par Block: selon cette thèse, le contenu phénoménalement conscient est plus riche que le contenu effectivement disponible pour la formation de croyances et d’intentions d’action, et l’attention n’entre pas dans les ingrédients de base de la conscience.L’attention module l’accès conscient, le fait que certains contenus fassent l’objet de croyances ou soient remarqués. En me basant sur le phénomène de la cécité inattentionnelle, et en critiquant la conception du contenu mobilisée par Block, j’attaque la thèse du débordement phénoménal et argumente en faveur d’une conception dépendantiste de la conscience phénoménale, dans laquelle l’attention est le facteur qui conditionne la promotion de certains contenus vers la conscience, de manière à procurer une expérience phénoménale. Par ailleurs, j’examine un effet phénoménal remarquable associé à l’attention: celui de la saillance attentionnelle. Je défends une compréhension représentationnaliste de cet effet, en faisant de l’attention focale un modulateur de la résolution des représentations mentales conscientes. Ce travail s’inscrit dans une perspective naturaliste, et choisit de prendre au sérieux les contributions récentes des sciences cognitives à l’étude de la conscience:selon l’approche que je défends, la conscience est empiriquement manipulable - j’avance qu’elle ne l’est pas indépendamment de l’attention. / This work is a selective review of consciousness and attention studies over the last century. Itfocuses primarily on Ned Block’s ‘overflow thesis’. I argue against Block, by showing thatattention is a constitutive component of phenomenal consciousness: I defend a ‘dependency thesis’regarding attention and consciousness. This thesis is vindicated by a careful examination of Block’sempirical data, and by a criticism of his conception of content. I also tackle the issue of‘phenomenal salience’ - one of attention’s most typical effects - and provide a representationalaccount of this phenomenon: focal attention enhances the resolution of conscious content, therebylinking the phenomenal difference to a representational difference: focusing on an aspect of aperceptual scene changes what is consciously represented. This work is a first step in naturalizingthe mind; it relies heavily on the contributions of cognitive science to the study of consciousness.According to the accounts I favor, manipulations of consciousness are manipulations of attention.

The overall purpose of this thesis is to investigate whether there is an association between “stress of conscience” — that is, stress related to a troubled conscience — and burnout, and to obtain an enhanced understanding of factors related to stress of conscience and burnout in healthcare. Of the four “studies” included, one uses qualitative research methods and the others use quantitative research methods. The data are based on cross-sectional questionnaire studies (I, II, and IV) and open-ended interviews (III). We could find no existing suitable instrument for measuring troubled conscience in healthcare, and so we constructed and tested the “Stress of Conscience Questionnaire” (SCQ) (I), a nine-item instrument for assessing stressful situations and the degree to which they trouble the conscience. We included 164 participants in the pilot studies, an additional 444 in the main analysis, and 55 in the test-retest verification. Participants had various occupational backgrounds and were recruited from different parts of Sweden. Our findings suggest that the SCQ is a valid and reliable measurement for use in various healthcare contexts. Cronbach’s α for the overall scale was 0.83, ensuring internal consistency. Explorative factor analysis identified and labelled two factors: “internal demands” and “external demands and restrictions”. To investigate factors related to stress of conscience and burnout (II, IV) we used a sample of 423 healthcare personnel from various specialities and with various occupations, from a district in northern Sweden. Multiple regression analysis showed that the factors related to stress of conscience (II) were: perceiving that conscience warns us against hurting others while at the same time not being able to follow one’s conscience at work, and having to deaden one’s conscience in order to keep working in healthcare; and also moral sensitivity items belonging to the factor “sense of moral burden”. In addition, deficient social support from superiors, low levels of resilience, and working in internal medicine wards were all associated with stress of conscience. The model explained 40% of the total variance. Interviews were conducted with 30 healthcare managers, to illuminate their explanatory models of the sources contributing to burnout in healthcare settings (III). The data were analysed using qualitative content analysis. The findings indicate that continuous reorganisation and downsizing of health care has reduced resources, while at the same time demands and responsibilities have increased. These problems are compounded by high ideals and expectations, making staff question their own abilities and worth. All in all this throws healthcare employees into a spiralling sense of inadequacy and an emerging sense of pessimism and powerlessness. Multiple regression analysis showed that having to deaden one’s conscience, stress of conscience from lacking the time to provide the necessary care, the work being so demanding that it influences one’s home life, not being able to live up to others’ expectations, low social support from co-workers, and low levels of resilience were all related to emotional exhaustion. Other factors that had an impact were being female, being a physician or being other healthcare professional and working in geriatric care or a primary healthcare centre. The full model explained 59% of the variance. Factors contributing to depersonalisation were: having to deaden one’s conscience, stress of conscience from not being able to live up to others’ expectations and from having to lower one’s aspirations to provide good care, deficient social support from co-workers, and being a physician; however, the percentage of variation explained was smaller (30%) (IV). The findings indicate that burnout is related to being unable to live up to one’s moral convictions; thus, it is a consequence of healthcare employees’ feeling that they are not acting on their values and for the wellbeing of the patients.

Diss.--Theologische Fakultät--Vallendar--Philosophisch-Theologische Hochschule, 2001. / Bibliogr. p. 312-330.

Texte remanié de: Dissertation--Fachbereich Philosophie und Geisteswissenschaften--Berlin--Freie Universität, 2003. / Bibliogr. p. 251-270.

Thesis--Catholic University of America. / Vita. Bibliography: p. 291-297.

L'étude des passions au XVIIe siècle , oscillant entre philosophie morale et théories psychologiques, dévoile une tension flagrante qui caractérise la naissance de l'idée moderne du "moi". En équilibre instable entre exigences de connaissance et exigences de contrôle, l'étude des passions est l'expression d'une tension intime entre philosophie pratique et théorétique, qui se déploie dans les antinomies entre éthique et psychologie, prescription et description, manuels de préceptes et "art de connaître les hommes". Cette recherche concerne principalement deux attitudes différentes, dont l'opposition mutuelle va rendre possible le discernement de l'action de cette tension entre philosophie morale et théorétique qui constitue un caractère fondamental de l'étude des passions. D'une part, on considère le thème de la construction, dans l’Éthique de Spinoza, d'une 'théorie' des affects, analysée par rapport au rôle de la raison et à sa disposition taxinomiste. Cette disposition de la raison spinozienne jaillit d'une évidence complexe de contrôle au sein de laquelle la gnoséologie et l'éthique finissent par se résoudre organiquement l'une dans l'autre, dans le contexte d'une action cognitive qui ne peut pas faire abstraction de sa nature 'éthique'. De l'autre, on analyse les Pensées de Pascal, avec leur refus ambigu de l'autoportrait comme moment de la construction d'une image du "moi", accompagné par la naissance d'une notion - paradoxale et 'négative' - de conscience de soi. Dans ce cadre, donc, on s'interroge sur les résultats de la tension entre philosophie théorétique et pratique, entre étude et "histoire" du moi. / Theories of passions in Seventeenth century, throughout the never-ending tension between moral and psychological issues, do reveal the contradictions and difficulties characterising the birth of the modern idea of the Self. Within its precarious balance between control and knowledge, the art of studying passions is the actual expression of an intimate tension between practical and theoretical philosophy, developed through the antinomies of ethics and psychology, prescription and description. This study deals with two different attitudes toward the idea of a "theory" of passions.The mutual opposition between those two attitudes reveals the strenght of the contrast between moral and theoretical philosophy characterizing the construction of any paradigm of interpretation and study of the passions. On the one hand, the subject of the making of an actual "theory" of passions in Spinoza's Ethics is taken into account. Such enterprise is analysed through Spinoza's notion of reason and the taxonomic structure of the Ethics system, resolving ethics and theory of knowledge into a wider cognitive act, which is conceived as constitutively ethic, and supposedly combines the self-consciousness acquired through emotional experience with the actual knowledge of a causal-related world. On the other hand, Pascal's Pensées are examined, paying special attention to their ambiguous rejection of any autobiographical temptation, their construction of a negative yet brand-new image of the Self (the 'moi') endowed with a "negative" notion on self-consciousness which cannot be described in the language of reason, but could only be dramatically "performed" in the mimetic semantics of emotions.