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Cartesian sceptical scenarios are traditionally understood as posing problems in epistemology. For example, if I cannot know I am not a brain in a vat, all empirical knowledge comes under threat. In this study, I argue that the problematic nature of Cartesian sceptical scenarios cannot be understood in epistemological terms alone; whereas both ancient and Cartesian sceptical arguments pose a global threat to empirical knowledge, the latter also pose a threat to the idea of engagement with the world. I explain this idea in terms of agency, self-constitution, social relations, and ethical life (chapter 1). In chapter 2, I argue that contemporary epistemology is by and large ill-equipped to deal with this threat, and that as a consequence it has not been given systematic treatment by contemporary philosophy. Finally, I adumbrate an alternative response, drawing on disjunctivist ideas in the philosophy of perception (chapter 3).

Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學. / Manuscript. / Includes bibliographical references. / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue.

There is perhaps no epistemological theory more universally rejected, by modern philosophers and commentators, than transcendent apriorism. In fact, the notion that the pure human intellect, purged of sensory contamination, can somehow transcend the limits of all possible experience is now disdainfully regarded as an obsolete Platonic fantasy. In the latter half of the eighteenth century Immanuel Kant had vilified those who defended such extreme versions of rationalism as, "dogmatic champions of supersensible reason". Regrettably, during more than two centuries of philosophical inquiry, this derogatory attitude has hardened into an obstructive prejudice. It is certain that the process has done much to impede, truly objective modern research into transcendent apriorism's basic epistemology. In fact, even foundational issues relating to the definition and categorization of the theory have been neglected, or only superficially considered. As a result, numerous misleading "straw man" versions of the doctrine have been promulgated, by the Logical Positivists and others, and then very enthusiastically denigrated. The consequent defective analysis and the prejudice that engendered it have seriously distorted modern appraisals of the theory's epistemological legitimacy. Similarly, contemporary studies of transcendent apriorism's philosophical history have been infected with damaging errors. This contamination is particularly transparent in the flawed theory of K. Ajdukiewicz that "radical apriorism" had adherents "almost entirely among ancient thinkers". The aim of this thesis is to provide a new and comprehensive analysis of transcendent apriorism that remedies such prevalent misconceptions. The principle objective will be to remove the encrusting layers of prejudice, error and confusion that blight conventional epistemological and historical treatments of the subject. Ultimately, this procedure will function to disclose the doctrine's essential nature, its origins and the true course of its historical development. In the light of this analysis, we will be in a better position to determine whether extant arguments claiming to refute or undermine transcendent apriorism are legitimate or erroneous.

Zugl.: Giessen, Univ., Diss., 2005

Zugl.: Giessen, Univ., Diss., 2005

Universiẗat, Diss., 2005--Giessen.

Universiẗat, Diss., 2005--Giessen.

Thomas W. Malone, Kevin Crowston. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 37-45). / Research supported by Digital Equipment Corporation. Research supported by the National Science Foundation. IRI-8805798 IRI-8903034 Research supported by the MIT International Financial Services Research Center. Research supported by General Motors/Electronic Data Systems.