Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Pennsylvania.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2006. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

The education in History has for a long time been strongly criticized for being based on simple facts, which makes it difficult for students to succeed in the curriculums requirements for using historical consciousness. Research points out that the students themselves have to create history in order to achieve the purpose of history education, as it becomes more alive to them if they themselves can create it. The pure faculty learning comes too far from their own experiences, which historical consciousness is based on. This study is a qualitative survey where students from grade nine in Swedish secondary school have had a free conversation in a group of five students based on a historical text. The research situation is based on parts of the Anglo-Saxon history-didactic research for historical consciousness, focusing on historical thinking and the ability to interconnect the three time dimensions, the past, present and future. The conversations was analyzed from the theoretical point of view of the study, chosen from the research situation, and suggested that the students constructed thematic categories based on the historical story, where deeper analysis could be conducted on the students' ability to reason history using history consciousness. The study's conclusion showed two characteristics of history consciousness where the students showed weak ability to one and good ability on the other. Through this, the study also provided a contribution to the subject topic History that could develop the teaching in history consciousness. This contribution could make it clear to the students what the concept of historical awareness means, through the use of history that the students themselves have been involved in and created.

Although scholars have begun to identify individual level predictors of panethnic group consciousness, we still do not have a full understanding of how it develops among Latinos (Padilla1985; Masuoka, 2006, 2008). This study seeks to add to the literature by determining if contextual factors affect panethnic group consciousness. Does the presence of many different Latino country of origin groups affect the development of Latino group consciousness? Relying on previously literature on intergroup relations, I argue that Latino intra-group diversity will lead to two possible outcomes. First, as Latinos of different country of origins subgroups come into more frequent contact this will have a positive effect on panethnic group consciousness because individuals would have developed shared experiences. An alternative possibility is that dominant subgroups (Mexican, Cubans and Puerto Ricans) will react negatively to an increase in out-subgroups due to perceived threat. This in turn would undermine Latino group consciousness. The 2006 Latino National Survey and the 2005-2007 American Community Survey were used to test the proposed relationship between context and group consciousness. Findings suggest that contextual factors do have an effect on group consciousness but only for certain components and country of origin groups.

This thesis addresses the question of divine action in the mind: Is human consciousness a uniquely nonphysical causal joint wherein divine intentions meet natural realities without contravening lawlike physical processes? It is argued that consciousness is not uniquely spiritual but wholly natural (and possibly physical). However, this need not lead to the conclusion that divine action in the mind does not occur. Rather, this thesis argues that noninterventionist causal joint programs (such as those privileging the mind as uniquely open to divine action) are both scientifically implausible and theologically insufficient, resting on questionable metaphysical presuppositions that are not necessitated by either theology or the natural sciences. By discarding the God-nature model implied by contemporary noninterventionist divine action theories, one is freed up to explore theological and metaphysical alternatives for understanding divine action in the mind (and elsewhere). It is argued that a theologically robust theistic naturalism offers a more compelling vision of divine action in the mind than that offered by standard causal joint theories. By affirming that to be fully natural is to be involved with God’s active presence, one is then free to affirm divine action not only in the human mind, but throughout the natural world. This thesis is divided into two parts. Part One engages with the scientific and philosophical literature surrounding human consciousness, and uses debates about the nature of the mind to offer a sustained analysis and critique of what is termed the “standard model” of divine action. It is argued that the noninterventionist, incompatibilist model of divine action that has spurred the development of various causal joint theories is scientifically and theologically insufficient, and that this is seen particularly clearly in recent theories locating (and constraining) divine action in the emergent human mind. Chapter 2 analyses the contemporary divine action scene, arguing that the standard model presumes noninterventionism, incompatibilism, and a high view of the laws of nature. However, the God-world relationship implied by this model is theologically insufficient. Chapter 3 examines Philip Clayton’s divine action theory, which locates divine action in the emergent human mind and is the latest manifestation of the causal joint model described in Chapter 2. After using emergence theory itself to critique Clayton’s approach, the thesis then examines the philosophy and science of consciousness, in Chapters 4 and 5. It is suggested that a physicalist understanding of the mind is a well-supported position. Part Two of the thesis reframes divine action in the mind within an explicitly theological framework. The thesis does this by analysing what is termed the “theological turn” in divine action debates – the recent tendency to react against standard causal joint theories by rejecting the idea that science can say anything about how and whether divine action occurs. Proponents of the theological turn instead understand divine action from explicitly theological perspectives, affirming compatibilist models in which God is seen to work in, through, and with natural processes – precisely because God is never absent from nature in the first place. Such an approach allows theologians to accept physicalist explanations of the mind, precisely because all the natural world is necessarily involved with God. Chapter 6 introduces this theological turn by exploring various versions of naturalism, ultimately suggesting that neither philosophy nor science mandates the sort of metaphysical naturalism assumed not only by those who deny divine action, but (ironically) noninterventionist divine action theorists as well. Chapters 7, 8, and 9 then introduce, compare, and contrast three different versions of strong theistic naturalism: Thomism, panentheistic naturalism, and pneumatological naturalism. While each of these explicitly theological frameworks is distinctive, they share an affirmation of the intimate relationship between God’s immanent, active presence in the natural world, and suggest the naturalised mind as a relatively intense locus of divine action, as human minds actively participate in and with God. It is concluded that the participatory ontology supported by these theistic naturalisms does, after all, suggest the mind as a locus of intensified divine action – but for very different reasons than those motivating causal joint theorists.

Depuis plus d'un siècle, les psychologues étudient les mécanismes sous-jacents de l'apprentissage. Il existe actuellement deux théories principales qui peuvent être distinguées :les théories de la formation d'associations et les théories propositionnelles. Selon les théories propositionnelles, l'apprentissage est le produit d'inférences et de raisonnements sur des représentations propositionnelles. En revanche, selon une approche à double processus, l'apprentissage est guidé par le renforcement progressif de l'association qui pourrait être influencée par le raisonnement et interagir avec celui-ci si les participants disposent de suffisamment de temps. L'objectif principal de cette thèse est de contribuer au débat opposant ces deux théories en se focalisant sur une différence centrale entre les deux cadres théoriques :la conscience. Selon les modèles doubles d'apprentissage, ce processus de mise à jour graduelle ne dépend pas nécessairement de la conscience, tout en n'excluant pas qu'il puisse éventuellement aboutir à de telles représentations conscientes. Cependant, selon les modèles propositionnels, l'apprentissage se produit grâce à la capacité de former une représentation consciente de la relation entre les stimuli.Dans la présente thèse, cinq études seront présentées pour répondre à cette question. Dans la première étude, nous nous sommes intéressés à étudier comment le comportement et la conscience changent au cours de l'apprentissage et à démontrer les dissociations entre l'apprentissage conscient et inconscient. Dans une seconde étude, nous avions l'intention de reproduire et d'étendre un paradigme de conditionnement instrumental subliminal (Pessiglione et al. 2008). Les troisième et quatrième études ont utilisé la tâche Temps de réaction sériels pour explorer deux problèmes différents. Dans la troisième étude, nous avons étudié l'accès des participants à leurs ressources cognitives en manipulant l'intervalle entre la réponse du participant et la présentation du stimulus suivant. Dans la quatrième étude, nous avons étudié la relation entre le taux de clignement des yeux, qui est un marqueur indirect de l'activité dopaminergique, et l'apprentissage des séquences. Enfin, le but de notre cinquième étude était d'examiner si les nourrissons étaient sensibles à la force des probabilités transitionnelles ou s'ils extrayaient certains morceaux du flux d’information présenté. / Doctorat en Sciences psychologiques et de l'éducation / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

M.Phil. / In the changing world of today, individuals experience a lack of meaning and direction in their lives. Personal leadership is an approach that enables individuals to achieve a deeper self-insight and form a more distinct vision of their future. The objective of this study was to investigate the contribution of self-awareness to personal leadership. With a view to gain a better understanding of self-awareness, a word and concept analysis of self-awareness was conducted in Chapter two by means of dictionary explanations as well as consulting viewpoints of experts from different perspectives. The relevant information gleaned from psychology and sociology was categorized to describe the ontological (essential nature), teleological (purpose), sociological (social nature) and methodological (methods) dimensions of self-awareness. Based on this analysis, self-awareness can be described as a psychological state or condition of attending to one's physical, spiritual, emotional and/or mental qualities by means of reflection, introspection and/or inner speech. It is thus an on-going process of seeing things both as they are and as they could be, as well as to form a perception of what is real. Furthermore, it was determined that self-awareness provides the key to a person's being, as it enables one to achieve: • self-knowledge or a candid assessment of personal strengths, limitations, needs, abilities, values and beliefs; • a solid self-concept or an awareness of the dominant thoughts, perceptions and feelings one has about oneself and thus to alter any unrealistic beliefs; • self-acceptance or insight into and understanding of oneself, which culminates in accepting oneself and others; • self-regulation or an awareness of one's internal states and values enabling one to manage oneself and to be flexible in adapting to change; • self-actualization or an awareness of one's unique nature, abilities and purpose enabling one to fulfil one's needs, realize one's potential and achieve meaning in life. In addition, it was also discovered that self-awareness could be achieved and/or developed through various methods like self-analysis, personality instruments, meditation, mentoring, and/or facilitation courses. Chapter three focused on the contribution of self-awareness to personal leadership. It was indicated that personal leadership is a process in which a person takes control of his/her own life. By consulting views of various authors on the subject, it was also established that the underlying foundation of personal leadership is an 'inside-out' approach, which means to start first with one's own perceptions, character and motives. As this approach involves a proactive attitude that is character-based and centred on principles and values, it enables one to achieve personal mastery. The role of self-awareness in each phase in the process of personal leadership was investigated. It was found that self-awareness enables the individual to gain knowledge of his/her different qualities, potential and core values, which is vital for understanding "Who am I?" in the first phase of personal leadership. Furthermore, it was also established that an awareness of one's unique nature, abilities and core values culminates in creating a personal vision, which is crucial to the second phase of "Where am I going?" in the personal leadership process. The last phase in this process addresses the question of "How am I going to get there?" and, consequently, an awareness of one's values, purpose, roles and conscience plays a vital role in taking certain steps to ensure that one realizes one's dreams. Based on the contribution of self-awareness to various aspects of personal leadership, the conclusion of this study was that self-awareness is a condition for personal leadership.

How is a process of serial drawing understood to record the phenomenological stream of consciousness that underpins it? This research question emerges from a hypothesis driving the research: that when considered as a form of expression which speaks in a particular way (Tormey, 2007), drawing re-presents ( records ) the stream of consciousness underpinning it in a rather fundamental manner. The purpose of this first person, practice-led research is to question how this hypothesis is understood, treating it as an assumption to be tested via practice and theory combined. Within the research this hypothesis is linked to both the wider assumption that drawing records thought (Rosand, 2002) and to the contemporary idea that drawing is a form of perpetual becoming (Hoptman, 2002; de Zegher & Butler, 2010) given the temporality which underpins the act of drawing. To help facilitate investigation of the hypothesis, the assumption that drawing records thought is duly suspended (bracketed) for the duration of the research, allowing the structure and process of serially developed drawing (Chavez, 2004) in conjunction with first-person methods for approaching phenomenal consciousness (Varela & Shear, 1999; Depraz, 1999) to investigate it in practical terms. The significance of the research resides in a scrutiny of the drawing process, undertaken in close relation to Husserl s (1931/2012; 1950/1999) Phenomenology. As a result, the phenomenon of drawing is re-described as a self-temporalizing phenomenon, emphasising how the appearance of drawing (noun) not only re-presents the prior act of drawing (verb) which produced it, but also provides the practitioner with a look ahead, indicating the hope and expectation of drawings not yet made. This claim emerges via the specific manner in which my serially developed drawings demonstrate re-presenting the streaming of consciousness described (in Husserlian terms) as the self-temporalization of consciousness, experienced within the duration of now. This phenomenological description of how drawing operates builds upon Rawson s (1969/1987) statement regarding the special charm of drawing - the underlying quality of movement that drawings (noun) exhibit on the basis they were drawn. Husserl s protentional focus on hope and expectation (de Warren, 2009) allows the research to expand upon this idea, describing the underlying movement within drawing as a form of self-temporalization that also points ahead to what is not yet drawn. This forward looking, practitioner centred claim is intended to compliment the focus on trace and memory that a proportion of the current critical discourse on drawing remains engaged with (Newman M, 1996; Tormey, 2007; Newman & de Zegher, 2003; Derrida J, 1993).

I defend physicalism about phenomenal consciousness against recent epistemic arguments for dualism. First I argue (as against Kripke) that psychophysical identities can be a posteriori (and apparently contingent, and conceivably false). Their epistemic status is due to the analytic independence of phenomenal and physical-functional terms. Unlike Kripke's own explanation of a posteriori necessity, analytic independence is consistent with - indeed explained by - the direct reference of phenomenal terms, so Kripke's argument against psychophysical identities fails. I then argue (as against White and Chalmers) that direct reference does not itself make identities a priori. Next I endorse the 'a priori entailment thesis': if physicalism is true, phenomenal truths follow a priori from a complete statement of the facts of physics. I argue that physicalists must accept a priori entailment if we are to avoid brute or 'strong' a posteriori necessities. I show that a priori entailment is consistent with analytic independence, and so make room for what Chalmers calls 'type-C' physicalism. Jackson's 'Mary', who knows all the physical facts, would be able to deduce the physical-functional reference of phenomenal terms, and so the truth of psychophysical identities, without appealing to analytic connections. The 'knowledge' argument for dualism therefore fails. The lack of such connections does, however, help explain why Mary's deduction seems intuitively impossible. A priori entailment makes zombie scenarios inconceivable, so Chalmers's 'conceivability' argument fails. It also closes Levine's 'explanatory gap' between physical and phenomenal truths. Though it may not satisfy all demands for explanation, any remainder poses no threat to physicalism. I then defend type-C physicalism against some recent objections to the 'phenomenal-concept strategy'. I close by observing that while the view I defend can rebut epistemic arguments for dualism, it leaves the question of whether consciousness has a physical basis as a matter for empirical investigation.

Si la conscience semble d’abord poser un ensemble de problèmes philosophiques, l’étude de la conscience est aussi un domaine florissant des neurosciences cognitives. Au lieu d’un travail de philosophie de l’esprit visant à déterminer a priori si la conscience est explicable scientifiquement, cette thèse offre une analyse détaillée des pratiques scientifiques impliquées dans l’étude de la conscience, et d’un ensemble de problèmes philosophiques surgissant de l’intérieur même de ce programme de recherche. Cette nouvelle approche, relevant de la philosophie des sciences, donne toute sa place à un problème identifié comme central dans la constitution des sciences de la conscience, celui de développer des procédures permettant de déterminer si les sujets ont des états mentaux conscients, ou non, c’est-à-dire, des procédures de détection de la conscience. Parce qu’elle présente une synthèse complète des procédures de détection de la conscience utilisées par les scientifiques, et des problèmes impliqués par l’utilisation de ces procédures, cette thèse s’adresse tout à la fois aux philosophes soucieux de comprendre la façon dont les scientifiques étudient la conscience, et aux scientifiques à la recherche des fondements épistémologiques de leur discipline. Les sceptiques, enfin, y trouveront un ensemble de réponses à leurs arguments, fondées pour la première fois sur une épistémologie cohérente des sciences de la conscience. / Although consciousness might appear as a primarily philosophical topic, the scientific study of consciousness has been an integral part of cognitive neuroscience for about thirty years. Instead of a work in philosophy of mind, debating whether or not consciousness can be explained scientifically, this dissertation provides a detailed examination of the scientific practices involved in the scientific study of consciousness, and of a wide variety of philosophical problems arising from within the science of consciousness itself. Through its original philosophy of science approach to the scientific study of consciousness, this dissertation focuses on one of the most central problems in the field: that of developing procedures for determining whether subjects have conscious or unconscious mental states, namely, procedures for detecting consciousness. As the first detailed epistemological analysis of the detection procedures used in consciousness science, and the problems they face, this dissertation is of interest for philosophers who want do understand how scientists study consciousness, aswell as for scientists who desire to reflect on the epistemological foundations of their field. Those who are skeptical about the prospects of the scientific study of consciousness will also find, for the first time, answers to their arguments based on a coherent epistemology of consciousness science.