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Finding the neural mechanisms of unconsciousness is a pursuit with significance to both the scientific study of consciousness as well as for the improvement of clinical diagnosis of patients with severe structural brain damage that has resulted in disorders of consciousness (DOC), such as coma or vegetative state . This literature review gives an account for what consciousness studies have contributed to the understanding of the neural mechanisms of unconsciousness, focusing on experiments using anesthetic agents to investigate the loss and return of consciousness. Mechanisms that frequently correlate with the loss of consciousness are modulation of the brainstem, the thalamus, and the cortex, but different anesthetic drugs act on different areas. According to a bottom-up approach unconsciousness can be induced by sleep-circuits in the brainstem, and according to a top-down approach unconsciousness can be induced by cortical and thalamocortical disruption. But the mechanisms involved during loss of consciousness are not the same as for return of consciousness, and this paper includes evidence for the mechanisms involved during the return being closer to what research should be further investigating. The mechanisms involved in return from anesthesia-induced unconsciousness resemble those mechanisms involved in recovery from DOC. Studying mechanisms of unconsciousness can further our understanding of consciousness, as well as improve the diagnosis and treatment of patients with DOC.

This study used qualitative research methods to analyze the ways in which difficult knowledge is represented in Ontario’s 2013 and revised 2018 history curriculum (Grades 7, 8, 10). Difficult knowledge promotes serious discussions about weighty topics – often entrenched in collective memory – and invites readers to reflect on the different values, beliefs, and perspectives around such topics. In this study, difficult histories refer to contested depictions of past violence and oppression as they appear in historical narratives and curricular frameworks (Epstein and Peck, 2017). Examining the curriculum using the lens of difficult knowledge allowed me to consider how educators might foster reconciliation through engagement with chapters in Canadian history. The content analysis considered the difficult knowledge topics in history curricula and the approaches proposed to encourage perspective-taking. The study used a critical sociocultural approach to explore how Ontario’s official curriculum represents difficult knowledge using multiple perspectives in general, and Indigenous perspectives, specifically. In an effort to gain a better understanding of the curricular resources currently available, this study contributes to knowledge growth by identifying entry points in the curriculum that serve to help teachers introduce difficult knowledge using disciplinary thinking and Indigenous epistemic themes. The main goal with this research is to provide recommendations to guide policy, research, and practice in the integration of Indigenous perspectives and knowledges in ways that are meaningful to learners.

The purpose of this thesis is to explore a thought-provoking consequence of the functionalist theory of mind. Given the current organizational structure of Earth and field theories of consciousness in neuroscience, Earth is probably conscious. The argument is explored through an examination of the current organizational structure of Earth and field theories of consciousness in neuroscience, which leads to the conclusion that Earth is conscious. Various theories of mind have been proposed by neuroscientists and philosophers alike in an attempt to qualify what consciousness is and what provides the basis for consciousness to occur. Support, in the form of data and information, for this thesis was found through reviews of philosophic and neuroscientific literature. Using a functionalist argument and field theories of consciousness, I argue for the possibility of Earth’s consciousness due to its organization. Based on the likelihood of human consciousness being spatially distributed, I illustrate how Earth’s organization is sufficiently similar. However, there is controversy surrounding functionalist theories of mind. This is detailed with Ned Block’s (1978) objection to functionalism, the Chinese Nation thought experiment. I place this objection in conversation with Paul and Patricia Churchland’s (1981) work on inverted qualia, absent qualia, and the method to identify systems with and without qualia. A further objection to my conclusion is explored with Kammerer’s (2015) Sophisticated Anti-Nesting Principle is addressed. Finally, this thesis draws some inspiration from Eric Schwitzgebel’s (2014) paper “If Materialism is True, the United States is Probably Conscious,” but the conclusion is projected to a larger scale, resulting in implications for morality, politics, and theories of mind.

The problem of self-consciousness and recognition is one of the most crucial and central issues in Hegel&rsquo / s Phenomenology of Spirit. The purpose of this study is to expose and investigate this problem in accordance with the unity of Phenomenology through which Hegel examines the experience of consciousness in terms of its own criterion. The emergence of self-consciousness as an explicit issue becomes the truth of movement of consciousness, and self-consciousness essentially takes the form of desire. In this process, self-consciousness evolves from the natural desire to desire for recognition, and recognition by the other arises as the condition of self-consciousness. Besides, the only form of recognition that makes the satisfaction of self-consciousness or desire possible is the reciprocal recognition. Hegel exposes consciousness&rsquo / experience of recognition as the struggle for recognition and the dialectic of master and slave. On the other hand, the process of recognition in the Phenomenology does not culminate in the master-slave dialectic or in the liberation of slave. Rather, the servile consciousness takes another shape that emerges from its contradictory nature and it changes into the freedom of thought. That is, Hegel&rsquo / s concept of recognition cannot be reduced to the master-slave dialectic / the process of recognition persists in the subsequent movement of consciousness and it evolves into certain recognitive relations in the &lsquo / Spirit&rsquo / . For this reason, the problem of self-consciousness and recognition has a determining or constitutive role through the whole movement of consciousness in the Phenomenology.

Thesis (M.S.)--Northern Illinois University, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [82]-85). Also available online (PDF file) by a subscription to the set or by purchasing the individual file.

Some unanswered questions about consciousness as a biological phenomenon lie in its evolutionary origin and distribution among living organisms. Which animals are conscious and when did consciousness appear in the history of life on earth? The purpose of this thesis is to shed light on these long-standing questions by reviewing the literature on the evolutionary approaches to the fundamental concept of phenomenal consciousness. In agreement with the “Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness,” this study aims to introduce three recently developed theories, with a particular emphasis on examining one model. The “Cellular Basis of Consciousness” (CBC) is a reductionist, cellular-based model that argues all organisms from unicellular to humans are sentient. Another theory based on neuroevolutionary arguments is called the “Neurobiological Naturalism.” It suggests that consciousness first appeared duringthe Cambrian period about 550 million years ago. This model considers vertebrates, arthropods and cephalopods as conscious animals. An alternative framework, which is the main focus of this thesis, is the “Unlimited Associative Learning” (UAL). The UAL model employs a novel method to formulate a transition marker as an indicator of consciousness. Although the UAL framework is a promising method for tracing the evolution of consciousness, it also has significant limitations. Nevertheless, the literature review reveals that as an innovative framework, UAL has the potential to generate fruitful research programs. Rather than providing a final answer, it can be considered a significant starting point for unraveling the origin of consciousness.

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Proceeding from the assumption that psychoanalytic theory has yielded insightful literary interpretations, I propose that equally legitimate readings result from analyzing consciousness in literature. William James' "Stream of Thought" offers a psychological theory of consciousness from which I develop a literary theory that counterbalances the Freudian emphasis on the unconscious. Examining two works by Henry James, I demonstrate how assessing the elements of a character's consciousness leads to conclusions at which other theories do not arrive. This analytical approach leads to not only an alternative critical agenda but also a fuller understanding of the psychological function of the character's and, by extension, the human mind. / Master of Arts

The speech category approach of mainstream narratology does not give an adequate account of the form or the function of presentations by narrators to readers of fictional characters' minds. It: privileges the apparently mimetic categories of direct thought and free indirect thought over the diegetic category of thought report; views characters' minds as consisting only of a private, passive flow of consciousness, because of its overestimation of inner speech; and neglects the thought report of characters' states of mind. I suggest a radical reconceptualization, using the parallel discourses of Russian psycholinguistics and the philosophy of mind to fill the gaps left by narratology. For example, Vygotsky, Luria, Volosinov and Bakhtin show that inner speech is social in origin, dialogic in nature, and directs and regulates our day-to-day behaviour. Also, the philosophy of mind emphasises the importance of dispositions to behave in certain ways. A functional, teleological approach to fictional presentations of the whole mind, both states of mind and inner speech, analyses the purposive nature of characters' thought: their motives, intentions and resulting behaviour and action. It also shows how readers read plots as the interaction of characters' 'embedded narratives': their perceptual and conceptual viewpoints, ideological worldviews, and plans for the future. The embedded narrative approach is a theoretical framework which: considers the whole of a particular fictional mind, thereby avoiding the fragmentation of previous approaches; views characters' minds, not just in terms of passive, private inner speech presented in direct or free indirect thought, but in terms of the narrator's positive linking role in presenting characters' social, engaged mental functioning, particularly in the mode of thought report; and highlights the role of the reader in constructing the plot by means of a series of provisional conjectures and hypotheses about characters' embedded narratives.