Over the last decade there has been an increasing trend by governments in Australia and throughout the world to use the skills and expertise of the private sector in developing and implementing infrastructure projects. The agreement for these projects must allocate responsibility for dealing with the risks which may arise to either the government directly, or on behalf of consumers, or to the private sponsor. / This thesis investigates risk allocation in the private provision of infrastructure, particularly in build-own-operate (BOO) and build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT) projects. Its primary objective is to identify a framework for efficient risk allocation so that decision makers can assess the efficiency of the risk allocation in past projects and can attempt to increase the efficiency of the risk allocation in future projects. / This thesis defines an efficient situation as one where the risk allocation cannot be varied without the total risk premium for the entire project being increased, and approach based on Pareto optimality. As it is almost impossible to determine the true risk premium charged by parties for risk bearing, risks should be allocated to the party best able to control and manage them. This is explained to mean the party which is best able to control or manage the likelihood of the risk occurring or the size of its consequences if it does occur. It also means the party with the best access to reasonable mitigation techniques and the party which is least risk averse. Those exogenous risks which are not easily allocated in this way should be shared so that both parties, the sponsor and the government, have an incentive to manage them. Some of the options for sharing these risks are examined. / The application of the theory of efficient risk allocation is simplified by using a categorical risk framework. This approach is then tested on seven case studies of recent Australian projects spanning several industry sectors. Finally, the theoretical hypotheses and assumptions are tested in a survey of key participants in the Australian private infrastructure industry. This survey not only confirms that the basic theory for efficient risk allocation is valid but also identifies the key areas of concern to the private sector when it considers project risk allocation. Risks of concern are identified and possible options for risk sharing are investigated. / This thesis concludes that it is possible to achieve efficient risk allocations in practice, and that by achieving this outcome transaction costs can be reduced, allowing cheaper infrastructure services to be supplied to the community. However, several hurdles to achieving this outcome are identified. These include the peculiar characteristics of banks and their position in projects funded using non-recourse project finance, and the fact that most private firms fail to value potential upside risks as highly as they fear potential losses due to downside risks. / More work is needed to understand and overcome these hurdles if efficient risk allocation is to be achieved in the real world. It is only then that governments can be sure that they are providing private sector infrastructure services to the community at the lowest overall cost.

Over the last decade there has been an increasing trend by governments in Australia and throughout the world to use the skills and expertise of the private sector in developing and implementing infrastructure projects. The agreement for these projects must allocate responsibility for dealing with the risks which may arise to either the government directly, or on behalf of consumers, or to the private sponsor. / This thesis investigates risk allocation in the private provision of infrastructure, particularly in build-own-operate (BOO) and build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT) projects. Its primary objective is to identify a framework for efficient risk allocation so that decision makers can assess the efficiency of the risk allocation in past projects and can attempt to increase the efficiency of the risk allocation in future projects. / This thesis defines an efficient situation as one where the risk allocation cannot be varied without the total risk premium for the entire project being increased, and approach based on Pareto optimality. As it is almost impossible to determine the true risk premium charged by parties for risk bearing, risks should be allocated to the party best able to control and manage them. This is explained to mean the party which is best able to control or manage the likelihood of the risk occurring or the size of its consequences if it does occur. It also means the party with the best access to reasonable mitigation techniques and the party which is least risk averse. Those exogenous risks which are not easily allocated in this way should be shared so that both parties, the sponsor and the government, have an incentive to manage them. Some of the options for sharing these risks are examined. / The application of the theory of efficient risk allocation is simplified by using a categorical risk framework. This approach is then tested on seven case studies of recent Australian projects spanning several industry sectors. Finally, the theoretical hypotheses and assumptions are tested in a survey of key participants in the Australian private infrastructure industry. This survey not only confirms that the basic theory for efficient risk allocation is valid but also identifies the key areas of concern to the private sector when it considers project risk allocation. Risks of concern are identified and possible options for risk sharing are investigated. / This thesis concludes that it is possible to achieve efficient risk allocations in practice, and that by achieving this outcome transaction costs can be reduced, allowing cheaper infrastructure services to be supplied to the community. However, several hurdles to achieving this outcome are identified. These include the peculiar characteristics of banks and their position in projects funded using non-recourse project finance, and the fact that most private firms fail to value potential upside risks as highly as they fear potential losses due to downside risks. / More work is needed to understand and overcome these hurdles if efficient risk allocation is to be achieved in the real world. It is only then that governments can be sure that they are providing private sector infrastructure services to the community at the lowest overall cost.

Since the late 1970s, the world has experienced a wave of microeconomic reform that has resulted in the privatisation of many previously State-owned assets, as well as other reforms directed at improving the efficiency of government business enterprises. This dissertation focuses on one important instrument of reform: outsourcing of public-sector service provision. Despite the prevalence of outsourcing, there has been relatively little empirical work analysing the effects of outsourcing at the contract level. This dissertation addresses three important empirical issues related to outsourcing. First, analysis of the magnitude and sources of cost savings associated with outsourcing was undertaken using a present value costing framework. Unlike other studies, this study includes transaction costs and considers how costs change over the life of the contract. The results indicate that savings of 37 per cent were achieved in the first year of contract operation ?savings that were achieved through a combination of reductions in pay and conditions, labour-saving technological change and reductions in inefficiency. Secondly, the dissertation considered why the level of savings achieved fell to 24 per cent following contract variations at the end of year 1. Some evidence indicated that this may have been due to opportunistic behaviour or hold-up: that the contract service provider may have taken advantage of contractual incompleteness and increased its price during the course of contract renegotiations. Although hold-up is an important theme in the literature on contracts, little empirical work has been undertaken in verifying its existence. Thirdly, the impact of contract design on the efficiency of outsourcing arrangements was analysed. It is well known that contract theory predicts a trade-off between incentives and risk. Using the standard principal-agent framework, a simple model is developed to analyse the effects of demand uncertainty on the risk-incentive trade-off. This model is then tested using data from maintenance services contracts at two corporatised water retailers in Melbourne: an environment that is characterised by high levels of both cost and demand uncertainty. Using a general linear regression model, the results obtained indicate that the moral hazard effect dominated the risk premium effect.

Since the late 1970s, the world has experienced a wave of microeconomic reform that has resulted in the privatisation of many previously State-owned assets, as well as other reforms directed at improving the efficiency of government business enterprises. This dissertation focuses on one important instrument of reform: outsourcing of public-sector service provision. Despite the prevalence of outsourcing, there has been relatively little empirical work analysing the effects of outsourcing at the contract level. This dissertation addresses three important empirical issues related to outsourcing. First, analysis of the magnitude and sources of cost savings associated with outsourcing was undertaken using a present value costing framework. Unlike other studies, this study includes transaction costs and considers how costs change over the life of the contract. The results indicate that savings of 37 per cent were achieved in the first year of contract operation ?savings that were achieved through a combination of reductions in pay and conditions, labour-saving technological change and reductions in inefficiency. Secondly, the dissertation considered why the level of savings achieved fell to 24 per cent following contract variations at the end of year 1. Some evidence indicated that this may have been due to opportunistic behaviour or hold-up: that the contract service provider may have taken advantage of contractual incompleteness and increased its price during the course of contract renegotiations. Although hold-up is an important theme in the literature on contracts, little empirical work has been undertaken in verifying its existence. Thirdly, the impact of contract design on the efficiency of outsourcing arrangements was analysed. It is well known that contract theory predicts a trade-off between incentives and risk. Using the standard principal-agent framework, a simple model is developed to analyse the effects of demand uncertainty on the risk-incentive trade-off. This model is then tested using data from maintenance services contracts at two corporatised water retailers in Melbourne: an environment that is characterised by high levels of both cost and demand uncertainty. Using a general linear regression model, the results obtained indicate that the moral hazard effect dominated the risk premium effect.

Thesis (D. Min.)--Phoenix Seminary, 2007. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 211-223).

Thesis--Kutztown University of Pennsylvania, 1990. / Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 45-06, page: 2923. Abstract precedes thesis as 5 preliminary leaves. Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 106-114).

Thesis (M.S.)--Rochester Institute of Technology, 2008. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 150-151).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2008. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 154-162).

Thesis (M. Hous. M.)--University of Hong Kong, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.P.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 104-106).