This dissertation studies three different aspects linked to the literature on self-enforcing dynamic contracts. Namely, this dissertation examines how a solution to this type of economic models may be obtained numerically, how important enforcement issues might be for a common question in economics, and how the presence of self-enforcing constraints may be investigated empirically. It is composed of three essays. The first essay develops a numerical method designed to approximate the solution of models with self-enforcing constraints using a dynamic programming approach. This method may also be used to approximate the solution of general dynamic models with occasionally binding inequality constraints. It complements standard value function iteration algorithm with an interpolation scheme which preserves the concavity and the monotonicity of the value function. It has the advantage over usual value function iteration algorithms of procuring a reasonable degree of accuracy at a relatively lower computational cost. The second essay uses dynamic contract theory to analyze the joint behavior of investment decisions and financial flows when contracts between lenders and borrowers are subject to enforcement constraints. In contrast to the usual belief that financing constraints lead firms to underinvest, this essay shows that firms are likely to overinvest. While overinvestment is shown to be consistent with the empirical finding that investment spending is excessively sensitive to variations in internal funds' abundance, it does not give rise to a financial accelerator. The key feature of this model is that firms' production and financial capacities are simultaneously determined. Firms overinvest when external funds are relatively inexpensive if they apprehend the possibility of becoming financially constrained in the future. By increasing their production capacity in such a way, firms alleviate eventual shortages of funds arising from the fact that external finance has become limited. Finally, the third essay studies how a common implication arising from the literature on self-enforcing contracts may be tested empirically. A key feature of a long-term self-enforcing contract is that the quantity subject to its terms evolves over time according to a simple updating rule; it is set to its full-enforcement level whenever doing so does not induce one of the agents to renege. Otherwise, it is set to a self-enforcing level. Using the example of Thomas and Worrall's (1988) labor contract model (to which productivity growth is added), it is shown that this updating rule may be expressed as an endogenous switching-regression model. Panel data may be used to estimate this model. When there are measurement errors, Monte-Carlo experiments show that the switchingregression model usually has a poor goodness of fit in small data sets. However, despite this finding, tests of the null hypothesis that conventional contract models generate the data under scrutiny still have a high power against the alternative hypothesis that this data is characterized by the presence of enforcement constraints. / Arts, Faculty of / Vancouver School of Economics / Graduate

Before considering in detail that portion of the cost of a Civil Engineering project associated with the employment of a contractor, one should take an overall look at the total cost of an average project. This would usually include the following items a) cost of the land on which the project was to be built; b) legal expense incurred in drawing up conditions of contract, etc.; c) financial expense including interest on bank loans or the cost of issuing bonds; d) cost of construction itself; e) cost of employing consulting eng1neers to design and supervise the project; f) loss of interest that could be earned by capital tied up during the construction period; g) contingencies. It is clear that while construction costs do not constitute the complete cost of a project, they nevertheless form a very large part. Hence, once the consultants have been appointed, they theoretically expend a great deal of time and energy in choosing an optimal design in close co-operation with the promoter.

This dissertation deals with the aspect of pre-incorporation contracts and the uneven distribution of the liability in instances where a pre-incorporation contract is not ratified by the directors, whether partially or fully, or where the company is not incorporated. The legislature went from one extreme to the next in its attempt to correct the disparity regarding who bears the liability in these transactions. Under the previous Companies Act 61 of 1973, in cases of non-incorporation of a company or non-ratification of a pre-incorporation contract, the third party bore all the risk and liability when these contracts fell through. This position was unfairly skewed in favor of the promoter and the pre-incorporation company, as they were left with the option of contracting with various persons and not having to honor their obligations when the company was indeed incorporated. This left the third party with no sustainability and assurance. Legislature shifted from a position in law where the third party bore all the liability in these instances to a position to where the promoter bears all the liability, and the company is not even considered regarding bearing some of the liability. This great disparity needs to be addressed in our law. Under the new Companies Act 71 of 2008, legislature shifted the liability onus completely onto the promoter who now is placed in the position where he would bear the full liability in these instances. This new position again does not promote equality or fairness as the third party and company now bear no responsibility. The promoter is in effect forced to bear the liability for a pre-incorporation company that has mandated him to act on their behalf, and in most cases are not related to the company itself. There needs to be a proper control mechanism and/or distribution of liability which would require a fact-based inquiry as to who is responsible for the non-incorporation of the company and/or non-ratification of the concluded contract, especially in instances where the promoter is completely independent of the company. The objective of my research is to conduct an investigation into the essence of a pre-incorporation contract, under the old and the new Companies Act, together with the essential elements thereof to find a workable solution to a variety of the problems we face in the practical aspects of the conclusion of these types of contracts. There will be a specific concentration on the liability aspects in cases of non-ratification and non-incorporation to equalize the playing field of all the relevant parties. After having ascertained the proper position under South African law, I will turn to comparative research regarding how foreign jurisdictions are addressing the problems that we face, to shape and produce a workable proposal for these instances. / Mini Dissertation (LLM (Corporate and Commercial Law))--University of Pretoria, 2021. / Mercantile Law / LLM (Corporate and Commercial Law) / Unrestricted

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

by Asano Masashi. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1997. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 97-98). / ABSTRACT --- p.ii / TABLE OFCONTENTS --- p.iii / LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS --- p.iv / LIST OF TABLES --- p.v / ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS --- p.vi / Chapter / Chapter I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter II. --- METHODOLOGY --- p.7 / Chapter III. --- PROFIT MARGIN ANALYSIS --- p.22 / Chapter IV. --- SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS --- p.39 / Chapter V. --- COST ESTIMATE ANALYSIS --- p.48 / Chapter VI. --- INDUSTRY PROFITABILITY ANALYSIS --- p.76 / Chapter VII. --- CONCLUSION --- p.87 / APPENDIXES --- p.89 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.97

Univ., Diss.--Freiburg (Breisgau), 2001.

No description available.