With the growth experienced in the Building Industry, it is increasingly important to have a contract document that can be used on projects that is reasonably acceptable to all parties concerned. The objective of the research was to determine the effectiveness of the Joint Building Contracts Committee Series 2000 Principal Building Agreement (JBCC 2000 PBA)(Edition 4.1, March 2005) currently used in the Building Industry. The literature reviewed and results of quantitative research amongst contractors formed the basis of this study. The study revealed that the JBCC 2000 PBA is the most favourable contract document used by contractors in the Building Industry. With the inclusion of a range of construction guarantee alternatives in the contract document in lieu of the retention clause, more than half of the respondents have indicated that they are in favour of a retention clause to be included in the contract document as an alternative security option. The study also showed that there are still areas of concern with regards to the difficulty in interpreting and implementing numerous clauses of the document and that amendments were made to the document without legal advice, resulting in disputes. The research further also revealed that developing building contractors experience difficulties in general where the JBCC 2000 PBA is used as contract document on projects. There also seems to be no balance of risk between the employer and contractor in most cases where this contract document is used. The research concluded with proposals on revisions to some clauses to ensure a better contract document that will be acceptable to all contractors in the Building Industry and ultimately to be an internationally acceptable document.

LL.M.

Thesis (M.S.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Civil Engineering, 1982. / MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND ENGINEERING. / Bibliography: leaves 134-135. / by Roscoe Dillard George III. / M.S.

© 2015 Springer. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26529-2_11© 2015 ACM, Inc. http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2676726.2676996 / 京都大学 / 0048 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(情報学) / 甲第19863号 / 情博第614号 / 新制||情||107(附属図書館) / 32899 / 京都大学大学院情報学研究科通信情報システム専攻 / (主査)教授 五十嵐 淳, 教授 山本 章博, 教授 岡部 寿男 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Informatics / Kyoto University / DFAM

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Common law, basically afforded employees the right to choose their employers. This freedom to contract was normally visible in instances of transfers of undertakings and it, therefore, meant that an employer could not transfer an employee‘s employment contract without the latter‘s consent. When an undertaking went insolvent on the other hand, employment contracts also terminated and the notion of ―advantage to creditors‖ meant that employees were left with little to nothing to show for their years of employment. Consequently, employees found themselves out of jobs and struggling to make ends meet. However, the legislator implemented section 197 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995which was ultimately amended in 2002 to regulate the transfer of a business, trade or undertaking, where such are transferred as a going concern. This therefore meant that employment contracts are transferred automatically upon such transfers. The enactment of section 197A together with the amendment of section 38 of the Insolvency Act meant that the notion of advantage to creditors was dealt away with; hence protection was afforded to employees. The aim of this piece is to examine the effects of transfer of undertakings on employee rights in both labour law and insolvency law. In this field of transfers, South Africa has followed England for some time. This has been evident before the enactment of section 197 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. In Roshall v Design Three1989 10 ILJ 1127 the court acknowledged the common law position stated in Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd1940 AC 1014 (HL).The court in this case stated that one‘s right to choose an employer is ―the main difference between a servant and a serf‖. This piece will, therefore, compare the position in South Africa with one of England. A further comparison will be made with the European Union law, because problems experienced in South Africa and England were encountered by the European Union (hereafter-EU) as well. The aim of this piece is to draw similarities and differences between South Africa, England and European Union as a whole and establish whether employees do get protection from Labour and Insolvency legislation upon transfer of undertakings that are both insolvent and solvent. / LLM (Labour Law), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2015

Common law, basically afforded employees the right to choose their employers. This freedom to contract was normally visible in instances of transfers of undertakings and it, therefore, meant that an employer could not transfer an employee‘s employment contract without the latter‘s consent. When an undertaking went insolvent on the other hand, employment contracts also terminated and the notion of ―advantage to creditors‖ meant that employees were left with little to nothing to show for their years of employment. Consequently, employees found themselves out of jobs and struggling to make ends meet. However, the legislator implemented section 197 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995which was ultimately amended in 2002 to regulate the transfer of a business, trade or undertaking, where such are transferred as a going concern. This therefore meant that employment contracts are transferred automatically upon such transfers. The enactment of section 197A together with the amendment of section 38 of the Insolvency Act meant that the notion of advantage to creditors was dealt away with; hence protection was afforded to employees. The aim of this piece is to examine the effects of transfer of undertakings on employee rights in both labour law and insolvency law. In this field of transfers, South Africa has followed England for some time. This has been evident before the enactment of section 197 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. In Roshall v Design Three1989 10 ILJ 1127 the court acknowledged the common law position stated in Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd1940 AC 1014 (HL).The court in this case stated that one‘s right to choose an employer is ―the main difference between a servant and a serf‖. This piece will, therefore, compare the position in South Africa with one of England. A further comparison will be made with the European Union law, because problems experienced in South Africa and England were encountered by the European Union (hereafter-EU) as well. The aim of this piece is to draw similarities and differences between South Africa, England and European Union as a whole and establish whether employees do get protection from Labour and Insolvency legislation upon transfer of undertakings that are both insolvent and solvent. / LLM (Labour Law), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2015

published_or_final_version / Business Administration / Master / Master of Business Administration

The main objective of this study is to examine the behavior of sellers in a sealed offer market in three distinct environments. The dissertation examines the mechanism to determine its competitive characteristics when sellers are unable to engage in overt communication. Next, the market setting is changed in order to consider the ability of sellers to form stable and effective cartels when the subjects are given the opportunity to conspire. Finally, the consequences of antitrust enforcement is considered. First, by reducing the number of communication episodes between sellers and second, by separately introducing random monetary penalties whenever the observed winning offer was greater than sellers cost. A secondary but significant contribution of this research was the use of prison inmates as subjects in economic experiments. Therefore, the financially motivated behavior of student subjects could be contrasted with prisoner subjects in a laboratory environment. This contrast proves extremely interesting when an antitrust environment, using randomly imposed monetary penalties, was introduced. The results of my research indicate, given equal constant cost suppliers, the sealed offer auction mechanism has the potential to generate very competitive behavior by sellers when communication between subjects is prohibited. However, in an identical environment, when conspiratorial opportunities exist prior to every auction, one observes very stable and effective cartels. These first two conclusions are insensitive to the subject pool under consideration (i.e., student versus prisoner subjects). When the frequency of communication is reduced (i.e., as a result of antitrust enforcement) the market is still conducive to effective collusion. However, in comparison to the experiments where subjects were allowed to communicate prior to every auction, the cartel in this environment were more unstable and less effective at extracting monopoly profit from the market. Finally, when antitrust enforcement is introduced by imposing random monetary penalties whenever the observed winning offer is greater than seller cost, the behavior of sellers is extremely sensitive to the expected returns from collusion as well as the dispersion of these returns. Also, the cartels collusive behavior indicated that students were risk averse, responded more to changes in the severity of the penalty specification (the penalty amount) while the prisoner cartels were risk takers, being more sensitive to changes in the certainty of the penalty specification (the detection level).