Cette thèse, en s’attaquant à un problème central de la théorie financière contemporaine — la bonne gouvernance des sociétés — débouche sur la construction d’un indice actionnarial de bonne gouvernance à destination d’un public académique ou professionnel. En mettant en évidence les principaux problèmes observés en matière de gouvernance dans le monde (chapitre 1), une modélisation des interactions des agents conduit à la formulation d’un indice ad hoc (chapitre 2), qui peut être intégré à une stratégie internationale d’investissement en bonne gouvernance (chapitre 3). Une telle stratégie procure à l’investisseur un avantage pécuniaire, aussi bien en horizon long, qu’en périodes de turbulences (chapitre 4). / This dissertation, focusing on a prominent problem of modern finance theory — effectiveness of corporate governance — leads to the building of a corporate governance- based stock index, which can be very useful to the academic and business community. Thanks to a state of the art of governance problems around the world (chapter 1), a simple pattern of agents interactions is build and helps to design an ad hoc index (chapter 2). An international investment strategy based on this speci?c index provides consistent returns for the investor (chapter 3), as well in long run horizon as in turbulent time (chapter 4).

The following dissertation contains two distinct empirical essays which contribute to the overall field of Financial Economics. Chapter 1 titles as “Corporate Lobbying, CEO Political Ideology and Firm Performance”. We investigate the influence of CEO political orientation on corporate lobbying efforts. Specifically, we study whether CEO political ideology, in terms of manager-level campaign donations, determines the choice and amount of firm lobbying involvement and the impact of lobbying on firm value. We find a generous engagement in lobbying efforts by firms with Republican leaning-managers, which lobby a larger number of bills and have higher lobbying expenditures. However, the cost of lobbying offsets the benefit for firms with Republican CEOs. We report higher agency costs of free cash flow, lower Tobin’s Q, and smaller increases in buy and hold abnormal returns following lobbying activities for firms with Republican managers, compared to Democratic and Apolitical rivals. Overall, our results suggest that the effects of lobbying on firm performance vary across firms with different managerial political orientations. Chapter 2 titled as “Corporate Lobbying and Labor Relations: Evidence from Employee” Litigations. We utilize employee litigations and other work-related complaints to examine if lobbying firms are favored in judicial process. We gather 27,794 employee lawsuits (after initial court hearing) between 2000 and 2014 and test the relationship between employee allegations and firms’ lobbying strategies. We find that employee litigations increase the number of labor-related bills in our sample. We document that the increase in employee lawsuits may drive firms into lobbying to change policy proposals. We also find robust evidence that the case outcome is different for lobbying firms compared to non-lobbying rivals, which may protect the shareholder wealth in the long run. Our results present that lobbying activities may make a significant difference in employee allegations. Our findings highlight the benefit of building political capital to obtain a biased outcome in favor of politically-connected firms.

Short-termism and myopia on the part of corporate managers, analysts, and investors have created a business environment driven by the excessive focus on short-term results and the need to meet earnings targets at the expense of long-term value creation. These are accompanied by numerous consequences, including the potential for short-term-oriented firms, particularly in the U.S., to lag behind global long-term-oriented firms, as well as the potential for short-term mindsets in the corporate world to catalyze financial crises. In this paper, I demonstrate that the market generally assigns higher values to long-term firms rather than short-term ones. This is evidenced by the fact that firms characterized to be long-term according to various financial metrics have higher valuation multiples than their short-term counterparts. The results suggest that the market has a degree of sophistication that rewards investments for the future rather than earnings management and present gratification, and that the corporate world should therefore increasingly develop a long-term mentality.

In this dissertation, we first examine the relationship between performance of the bank holding company and several board characteristics. We use five proxies for bank performance including Tobin’s Q, ROA, loan loss reserve ratio, non-performing asset ratio, and net charge-offs ratio. Board characteristic variables we include are board size, proportion of outsiders, CEO power, CEO tenure and board tenure. We find that a large board enhances bank performance, as proxied by Tobin’s Q and loan quality variables. We find no evidence that board structure or CEO power influences firm performance. We see that CEO and board tenure have a positive effect on firm performance. We further employ a crisis dummy during the period 2007 through 2009 to determine if the relationships between firm performance and board characteristics changed during the crisis. Our crisis results show us that board size has a negative effect on Tobin’s Q and the non-performing asset ratio during the crisis. Further, we find that board structure decreases the non-performing asset ratio during the crisis. We next examine the relationship between risk-taking of the bank holding company and several board characteristics. We use four accounting based proxies for bank risk-taking including credit risk, liquidity risk, capital ratio and operational risk. We also use three market based proxies for bank risk including market beta, idiosyncratic risk and the standard deviation of its stock return. Board characteristic variables we include are board size, board independence, CEO duality, CEO tenure and board tenure. We find that a large board reduces both balance sheet and market risk. We further investigate the relationships between risk-taking and board characteristics changed during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. We find that our results are robust during the crisis.

The first essay examines the impact of investor protection, market monitoring, and liquidity on the firm-level and country-level earnings management using a sample of 432 firms from 34 countries cross-listed in the U.S. The major findings are as follows: First, cross-listed firms from countries with strong legal system, strong outside investor rights, more institutional investors, and higher financial transparency are less likely to engage in earnings management. In addition, in countries with strong investor protection or market monitoring, the level of earnings management is more pronounced for illiquid firms as compared to liquid firms. Second, cross-listed firms following IFRS have lower propensity in earnings management than those following the U.S. GAAP. Third, the degree of earnings management for cross-listed firms is greater in the home country than in the U.S. market. Fourth, cross-listed firms have higher earnings management in the pre-listing period than in the post-listing period. Fifth, foreign firms listed in U.S. major markets have lower propensity to engage in earnings management than those listed in the OTC market. The findings remain robust with the inclusion of industry fixed effects and GMM estimation. All findings are largely consistent with my hypotheses that better investor protection, greater market monitoring, and higher liquidity reduce the extent of earnings management. The second essay examines the relative contribution to price discovery process of EURO/USD currency futures traded on two major exchanges: Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), using the intraday data in 2010. The relative contribution to price discovery is estimated using the information share approach of Hasbrouck (1995). Empirical findings indicate that CME accounts for approximately 87% of price discovery in the EURO/USD market and its contribution is substantially larger in the morning than that in the afternoon. This study also examines the effect of trading characteristics, including volume, quoted bid-ask spread, and price volatility, on information share. CME’s price discovery leadership is attributed to its high trading activity, low transaction costs, and lower volatility. The results support the liquidity hypothesis that a market with greater liquidity contributes more to price discovery.

In the first chapter of this dissertation, I examine the relationship between hedging and diversification effects on CEO compensation in the Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) industry. The REIT industry is suitable for this investigation for various reasons; primarily being that the REIT sample represents a relatively clean sample to study the effects of diversification and hedging on compensations. I find a positive and significant relationship between the interaction variable which reflects the effects of both hedging and diversification and CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity. This is consistent with the notion that managers are in a better position to manage firm risk if they use all the available tools and instruments, including hedging and diversification. I also find a positive and significant relationship between hedging and CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity, indicating that CEO compensation is more short term oriented because hedging is a relatively short term risk reduction strategy. The second chapter of this dissertation examines the relative contribution of regular and e-mini futures market to price discovery of EUR/USD futures contracts on the CME, using intraday data in 2010. The relative contribution to price discovery is estimated using the information share approach proposed by Hasbrouck (1995) and Gonzalo and Granger (1995). Empirical findings indicate that regular futures market accounts for approximately 66.5% of price discovery in the EURO/USD market. This study also examines if the regular future’s information share (IS) can be explained by the positioning of commercial and non-commercial traders. The results support the conclusion that the IS of regular futures can be better explained by non-commercial traders (speculators) than commercial traders (hedgers).

Abstract 1: In this paper, we investigate the effects of internal corporate governance on the length it takes to remove a CEO after the initial sign of poor firm performance. We find that firms that have a better quality of internal corporate governance are quicker to remove poor-performing CEOs. This result persists after controlling for other factors that might influence the CEO removal decision. Abstract 2: Employing a sample of voluntary CEO turnovers selected from S&P 500 firms over the period 2004-2009, I investigate the impact prior firm performance on a CEO’s potential of being hired on an equivalent job in a similar company. I find that the better the performance of the previous firm, the quicker is CEO being hired. In other words, the better the previous firm performance, the better is the CEO’s potential to a land a similar job faster. The result prevails even in the presence of control variables, such as the CEO’s education, tenure, age and gender. The better performers in previous firms also seem to yield greater improvement in performance of their new employers.

In the first chapter, we analyze the role of market development, risk premium, and transparency as factors influencing the value of cash in firms listed as American Depository Receipts. Based on the method by Pinkowitz and Williamson (2002), our primary results are as follows. The market value of cash is greater on average for ADR firms than for U.S. firms, and within the ADR sample the value of cash is greater for firms based in less developed countries after 2007 financial crisis but not before. Together, the results suggest that the market development is especially important during more volatile periods. Further, the value of cash is negatively associated with the market risk premium. In addition, the relation between insider trading law execution and the value of cash is statistically insignificant for all periods, but corporate-level transparency as measured by the number of analysts is weakly negatively related to ADR firms’ cash value before 2007 after controlling for the fixed effects. The second chapter attempts to assess the relative importance of superior information and hedging in institutional trading in equity index futures in the Taiwan Futures market for the sample period of January to June 2012. Based on the methodology by Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2002), we find that, for the market as a whole, significant informed trading or hedging frequently occur, and the opening minutes tend to be associated with a greater portion of trading motivated by hedging. More important to our purpose, for foreign institutions the absolute value of institutional order imbalance tends to be greater on days when the overall market’s informed trading is greater in the cases of regular contract on Taiwan composite index futures and electronic index futures, but for the dealer and domestic fund groups trading is not correlated with the overall market’s informed trading or hedging. An additional analysis of the relation between past institution trades and current returns provides some evidence implying institutions are informed, but the evidence can also be interpreted as their trades, which account for more than half of the overall trading, having an impact on subsequent trades.

This dissertation consists of 2 essays in the area of corporate finance. The title of my first essay is “Impact of Institutional Investors on Firms’ Financial Constraint and Liquidity”. We can find ample evidences in existing literature which show that institutional investors play a vital role in the corporate world. Many researchers have linked institutional investors to activism, monitoring benefits, mitigating the cost of debt using government bond, spin off activities and improving information asymmetry problem. In the first essay, I would like to add another dimension to institutional investors’ literature by examining institutional investors’ role in mitigating financial constraint problem in the firm. Institutional investors have large financial networks and make large financial investment in firms. Their presence might help firms attract external capital. I am using 2 financial constraint measurements; KZ index (Lamont, Polk, Saa-Requejo, 2001) and bank line of credit (Sufi, 2009). I am also adding additional measurement for financial constraint using notes payable. I find evidences to support the hypotheses that institutional investors’ presence and ownership mitigate financial constraints. The title of my second essay is “Long- and Short-Term Institutional Investors and Payout Policy”. In the second essay, I examine the relationship between the firms’ payout policy and the presence/ownership of certain type of institutional investors. I classify the types of institutional investors using Bushee’s (1998, 2001) classification of institutional investors. I find that the presence and the magnitude of long term institutional investors positively affect the likelihood and the magnitude of dividend. I also find that the presence and the magnitude of short term institutional investors positively affect the likelihood and the magnitude of share repurchases. This study suggests that the presence of different types of institutional investors can affect certain type of payout policy. Keywords: Transient; dedicated; monitoring; trading

For more than a decade, to reduce the agency problem, various ways have been examined on how to align the interest of manager with shareholders. Evidence and empirical findings are conflicting on the agency problem. Recently, deferred compensation as one incentive compensation draws the attention as a means to incentivize CEOs to make them work for the firm. However, it is still not evident if deferred compensation has effect on aligning CEOs with the firm’s goal possibly due to the issue on data. Therefore, the first essay investigates if deferred compensation has the effect on the agency problem and on the firm performance improvement after dealing with the data issue. This paper mainly aims to investigate if there is the non-linear relationship between the investment choice problem and the deferred compensation as Jensen and Meckling (1976) claim. This paper concludes that deferred compensation from NQDC table has positive and significant effect on the firm performance and the investment choice problem. More importantly, following McConnell and Servaes (1990), this paper finds the curvilinear relationship between Tobin’s Q and the deferred compensation and can confirm Jensen and Meckling (1976) theoretical application. The second essay aims to clarify the understanding on the relationship between the firm’s cash holdings and its causes by introducing the more detailed relationship between cash holdings and macroeconomic uncertainty. While previous literature tries to explain the level of cash holdings mainly by the firm-level variables, this study considers the full impact of the macroeconomic uncertainty on the level of cash holdings by introducing the firm’s heterogeneous exposure to macroeconomic uncertainty to see if the heterogeneity can tell the difference in the change in the level of cash holdings. This paper finds that macroeconomic uncertainties measured by difference macroeconomic condition variables are significant and contribute to the change in cash holdings. Additionally, this paper shows that the firms’ different level of exposure to macroeconomic uncertainty can cause the different degree of cash holdings and that firms with the higher level of exposure have the higher level of cash holdings.