This study explored the political-economic dimension of corporate governance reform in South Africa. Such reform in South Africa is especially significant in view of the history of South African society. This study investigated the relationship between corporate governance institutions and systems on the one hand and the political, economic and historical context of South African society that produced these corporate governance institutions and systems on the other. The purpose of the study was to establish the political, economic and historical determinants of corporate governance reform, as they evolved in the course of South African corporate history. A literature review was done in order to provide a backdrop for the study, after which a number of documents in the public domain were observed, in particular, a number of historical sources, newspaper reports, internet resources, and analyses of selected statutes and South African case law. The study concluded that South African corporate governance reform and such reform in the Commonwealth economic systems have a lot in common in terms of their historical evolution. The outcome of the political process in South Africa, for very specific reasons, was that a specific shareholder model of corporate governance became the corporate governance system in South Africa. Copyright / Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2010. / Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) / unrestricted

Univ., Diss.--Lausanne, 2007.

Thesis (LLM (Mercantile Law))--University of Stellenbosch, 2009. / The worldwide increase of corporate failures on the scale of Enron and WorldCom has sparked a renewed international trend of corporate governance review. With the external company auditor blamed at least in part for many corporate failures, corporate governance reform also necessitates a review of the statutory regulation of the company auditor. In particular, the lack of auditor independence when auditing clients has been under the legislator’s spotlight. The problems associated with unregulated or poorly regulated auditors are well illustrated by the activities of auditing giant Arthur Andersen. In the US, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been promulgated in reaction to corporate failures, imposing many new legislative restrictions on the auditor. The UK has a more tempered, selfregulatory approach. South Africa, following international trends with its recently promulgated Auditing Profession Act and Corporate Laws Amendment Act, has also greatly increased the regulation of auditor independence. The question is now whether these new restrictions in the wake of corporate failures have been the right approach with which to prevent future failures and to provide adequate protection to shareholders. Although the general legislative increase in auditor awareness is welcomed, the efficacy of several provisions in South African legislation can be questioned. Widespread reform has taken place in the appointment and remuneration of the auditor, which now has to be independently determined by the audit committee. In particular, South Africa’s new regulation of non-audit services, and the lack of refined regulation on compulsory auditor rotation as well as the cross-employment of auditors by clients, needs a critical discussion. It is submitted that the discretion of a well-regulated audit committee, combined with increased disclosure and transparency, should be enough to regulate most of the key aspects of auditor independence. Care should be taken to not overlegislate in haste to reform. South Africa needs a flexible and customised approach in this regard.

This thesis examines responses to the problem of stock market short-termism ('SMST'). SMST is defined as investors preferring short-term financial returns over potentially more profitable longer-term investment opportunities. Such short-termism may result in serious real-world consequences. Company executives appear to respond to short-term pressures in ways that jeopardize the long-term sustainability of listed companies negatively impacting investors and other stakeholders including employees, customers and the community at large. This thesis provides an original contribution to the academic literature via an in-depth examination of all significant regulatory and financial industry efforts meant to reform SMST in major capital markets after the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. I hypothesize that the extensive discussion of the SMST issue has generated substantial reforms. Based on an analysis of the implemented reforms, I reveal that the anticipated surge of SMST reform has not occurred. I then explore why the widespread SMST discussion has not resulted in greater reform efforts. This examination reveals the complex nature of the SMST problem and the evidentiary issues inherent in viably identifying and measuring the harms of SMST. However, I determine that there is probable cause for concern justifying SMST reform measures. Further, I conclude that SMST issues arise because investors are biased towards short-term returns when calculating risk. This bias is evident in share pricing, meaning that share prices are not a reliable indicator of fundamental corporate value. Based on this conclusion, an original dual pathway for SMST reform is proposed. This dual pathway indicates that SMST reform measures must either: (1) reduce the actual or perceived excessive discounting of future returns by investors (i.e. make share prices better reflective of long-term value); or (2) cut-off the transmission mechanisms of SMST into the listed company (i.e. sever the link between share prices and corporate decision-making). Assessing the reforms against this dual pathway reveals that few of the reforms are conceptually effective. Of the few reforms that are conceptually effective, most are relatively 'light' touch. A 'light' touch approach may not be problematic, however, as such measures are easier to implement than 'hard' law. In the case of regulatory reforms, a 'light' touch approach provides scope for flexibility to minimize the many potential harms associated with 'hard' law measures. Consequently, this thesis concludes that SMST reform is more likely to occur if reformers pursue a 'lighter' touch approach meant to reduce excessive discounting of future returns and 'nudge' capital markets away from their harmful short-termism focus.