Thesis (doctoral)--Heidelberg, Universiẗat, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 263-276).

Zugl.: Heidelberg, Universiẗat, Diss., 2009.

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This dissertation presents a legal and economic history of the change in method of incorporation from special corporate charters via legislative act to general incorporation laws which make corporate privileges available to all who meet certain, minimal procedural requirements. Prior to the mid-1800's, corporate privileges were allocated by special legislative act in a market for corporate privileges. In this market, legislators had monopoly control over the use of corporate privileges within their respective jurisdictions. Thus, the issue examined is why the legislators relinquished their monopoly control. The thesis of this dissertation, stated briefly, is that legislators in both the United States and Great Britain abandoned the market for special corporate charters because events beyond their control made it difficult or impossible for them to continue to create and capture rents through the passage of special acts of incorporation. Exogenous legal and economic changes are identified and shown to be reliable predictors of the demise of special corporate chartering. In England, changes through the common law courts produced an inexpensive alternative to the corporate form and lowered the rates of return to legislators from passing special acts. In the United States, the growth of interstate commerce and an important Supreme Court decision, Paul v. Virginia, changed the legislative market for corporate privileges from one of localized monopolies into a competitive, national free market in corporate privileges. The historical experience suggests that the passage of a national incorporation law could lead to the same type of abuses that occurred prior to the development of the national free market in incorporation laws and the passage of liberal state general incorporation laws. / Ph. D.

Text in Afrikaans / The Companies Act, 1973 ("the Act") contains no specific provision dealing with the relationship between a nominee shareholder and its principal, the beneficial shareholder. The Act merely contains a variety of references to this unique relationship without specifying the content thereof or elaborating on the rights of the beneficial shareholder. It is clear from the Act that no legal connection exists between the company and the beneficial shareholder and a company is only obliged to recognise its registered members. It has become apparent that beneficial shareholders need more protection than is currently afforded to them in terms of our common law. Currently beneficial shareholders have a common law right to claim return of their shares from any person (even bona fide third parties) in the event of the misappropriation of such shares by their nominee shareholders. Beneficial shareholders are unprotected if their nominee shareholders were to act contrary to their instructions, for example by not voting at the general meeting in accordance with the instructions of the beneficial shareholders. Having regard to the fact that the relationship between the beneficial shareholder and the nominee shareholder is based on agency or trusteeship, the beneficial shareholder will be entitle to compel its nominee to transfer the shares to another person. This may, however, have stamp duty implications and if the nominee refuses to give its cooperation in respect of such transfer, costly legal action may be the only solution for the beneficial shareholder. In deciding which section of the Act should be adapted to include the rights of beneficial shareholders, the following sections have been considered: Section 266 (statutory derivative action), section 252 (statutory remedy in the event of prejudice), section 440K (compulsory acquisition of securities of minorities) and section 344(h) (liquidation on grounds of equity). The only one of these sections which provides the court with a wide enough discretion to afford the required protection is section 252. An important point in this regard is that section 252 cannot effectively be extended to beneficial shareholders unless they also acquire the right to have access to the same company information as the members of the company would receive. In an attempt to create a balance between the needs to greater protection of beneficial shareholders and the avoidance of unnecessary cumbersome administrative obligations on companies, it is suggested that a register of beneficial shareholders be created and that companies be obliged to inform all beneficial shareholders appearing on such register of the same company information as is provided to registered members. The Act must make it clear that : • a beneficial shareholder can only be recorded in the register with the assistance of its nominee shareholder; • the relevant nominee shareholder must satisfy the company secretary that the person which is recorded in the register is in fact its principal; • the only two instances where the company secretary will be entitled to remove the beneficial shareholder is in the first instance where the beneficia] shareholder consents to such removal and secondly where the shares held by the registered member is transferred. The latter ground will avoid continued provision of company information to persons not involved with the company. No duty will be placed on companies to ensure that the names and addresses of beneficial shareholders are correct. This will be the responsibility of beneficial shareholders. The improved flow of company information will facilitate the improved awareness by beneficial shareholders of relevant events and together with the appropriate extension of section 252, will go a long way in improving the much needed protection of beneficial shareholders. / Mercantile Law / LL.M. (Handelsreg)

published_or_final_version / Business Administration / Master / Master of Business Administration

This essay presents evidence that the institution of the corporation has its origins and its main developmental 'epochs' in Judaeo-Christian theology. The notion of the nahala as the institutional symbol of the Covenant between YHWH and Israel is a primal example of the corporate relationship in its creation of an identity independent of its members, its demand for radical accountability on the part of its members, and in its provision of immunity for those who act in its name. On the basis of the same Covenant, St. Paul transforms an ancillary aspect of Roman Law, the peculium, into the central relationship of the Christian world through its implicit use as the institutional background to the concept of the Body of Christ. The exceptional nature of this relationship allows the medieval Franciscans and the papal curia to create what had been lacking in Roman Law, an institution which can own property but which cannot be owned. This relationship is subsequently theorized as the Eternal Covenant by Reformed theologians and successfully tested in one of the greatest theological/social experiments ever recorded, the 17^th century settlement of North America. The alternative 'secular' explanation of the corporation provided by 19^th century legal philosophy relies implicitly on the theological foundations of the corporation and remains incoherent without these foundations. The theological history of the corporation was recovered in the findings of 20^th century social scientists, who also identified corporate finance as the central corporate activity in line with its Levitical origins. Although the law of the corporation is secular, the way in which this law was made a central component of modern life is theological. Without a recovery of this theological context, the corporation is likely to continue as a serious social problem in need of severe constraint.

La jurisprudence de la Cour de justice de l'Union européenne en matière de libertés de circulation a, depuis la fin des années quatre-vingt-dix, connu des développements substantiels. La liberté d'établissement et la libre circulation des capitaux ont fait l'objet d'une jurisprudence fournie en matière de droit et de fiscalité des sociétés. En effet, les sociétés sont des opérateurs économiques dont l'activité transfrontalière est facilitée par le marché intérieur. La liberté d'établissement et la libre circulation des capitaux s'adressent spécifiquement à elles. En l'absence d'harmonisation, et donc lorsque les États membres exercent leur compétence retenue, les libertés de circulation ont été établies afin d'éviter que des obstacles à la mobilité des biens et des personnes ne soient créés par des nonnes nationales. Cette thèse se propose d'analyser méthodiquement chaque élément de raisonnement de la Cour de justice lorsqu'elle est confrontée au contrôle de compatibilité d'une nonne nationale aux libertés d'établissement et de circulation des capitaux. L'exemple tiré du droit et de la fiscalité des sociétés permet de mieux comprendre le contrôle exercé par la Cour à chaque stade de son raisonnement ainsi que les objectifs poursuivis par l'interprétation téléologique des dispositions du Traité sur le fonctionnement de l'Union européenne. Une telle analyse apparaît nécessaire dès lors que la Cour s'est octroyée le pouvoir de désactiver une nonne nationale, c'est-à-dire d'interdire aux magistrats nationaux d'appliquer une règle de droit national qu'elle juge contraire aux libertés, peu important sa place dans la hiérarchie des normes. / The Court of justice case law in the field of free movement has been substantially developed since the end of the 90's. Since then, the freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital regarding company law and direct taxation became an important part of the case law. This is understandable because companies are the main market operators and the internal market uncorks their cross-border activity. Company law and direct taxation specifically concerns the freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital. When Member states maintain their competence, ie in absence of harmonization, the four freedoms have been designed to avoid restrictions, created by national law, to the movement of assets and persons. This thesis proposes an analytic method of each test composing the Court's reasoning while reviewing the compatibility of a national provision with the free movement of capital or the freedom of establishment. The accent will be put on the company law and direct taxation because this case law enables a better understanding of the control exerted by the court upon national law and the aim of the teleological interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union. This analysis is made necessary because the power by the Court to deactivate a national statute, ie the interdiction made to the national judges to apply a national statute whatever its position in the hierarchy of legal norms, self-created by the European judges.

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Includes bibliographical references.