Thesis (Ph. D.)--Lehigh University, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 150-156).

published_or_final_version / Law / Master / Doctor of Legal Studies

Why has Xi Jinping, the President of the People’s Republic of China, launched one of the most aggressive anti-corruption campaigns in the history of the country? To answer this question, I constructed a database of over 100 high-level officials who have come under investigation during the campaign. I find that the campaign is disproportionately targeting officials from certain provinces. To understand why, I test a hypothesis that states: Xi is targeting corrupt officials from specific geographical regions for reasons unrelated to combating pervasive corruption, indicating factional politics are driving at least a part of the campaign. I find mixed support for the hypothesis. Out of the four provinces tested against the hypothesis, Sichuan is the only one that Xi appears to be targeting under the guise of anti-corruption. I put these findings in comparative perspective and find that the basic characteristics of Xi’s campaign are similar to Jiang Zemin’s 1995 anti-corruption campaign. This finding further supports the hypothesis that factional politics are driving at least a part of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign. I conclude that Xi’s anti-corruption campaign—though exceptional in its intensity—is hardly a departure from China’s historical factional politics. / text

<p>Despite being mentioned in most international anti-corruption instruments, trading in influence appears only rarely in the spotlight of legal practice and literature. This paper aims to shed some light on the issue. The main objective is to highlight the different forms of trading in influence stipulated in various international agreements and national laws in order to draw a comprehensive picture of this offence. Furthermore, by identifying and critically appraising the core issues connected with trading in influence, this paper aims to provide recommendations which may be of use to states obliged to implement or to consider implementing this offence.</p>

This thesis examines informal and corruptive activities agents may pursue within organisations. Chapter 1 is a brief introduction to the general theme and the related literature. Chapter 2 develops a simple theory of non-monetary collusion, where agents collude by exchanging favours. It examines the optimal use of supervisory information in a simple hierarchy under potential collusion. It is shown that when only the supervisor's information about the agent is used, collusion does not arise, since favours can not be exchanged. Secondly, it is analysed whether the agent's information about his superior should be used. In this case collusion is possible, and there is an interesting trade-off between the benefits of using additional information and the costs of collusion. It is then shown that sometimes the principal may be better off when using less than all available information. Chapter 3 considers task assignment and whistle-blowing as measures a principal may use to break collusion. The principal's response to potential collusion is to allocate less time to monitoring, and he breaks collusion with money. It is shown that the principal may also break collusion by hiring a third worker, and the decision how to break collusion optimally is endogenously determined. Breaking collusion by task assignment is costly, and therefore we consider whistle-blowing as a collusion breaking device. It provides the principal strictly higher welfare than the collusion-proof solution. It is also shown that under reasonable conditions, the collusion-free outcome will be achieved with no further cost. Chapter 4 develops a model of blackmail, where a piece of information an agent prefers to keep private may facilitate blackmail when another agent, namely a blackmailer, threatens to reveal that information. The crucial feature of the blackmail game is the commitment problem from the blackmailer's side. The blackmailer can not commit not to come back in future to demand more despite the payments received in the past. The chapter outlines conditions under which successful extortion may arise, and shows that there is a unique Markov Perfect Equilibrium, which gives a precise prediction how much money the blackmailer is able to extort from the victim. It is also shown that the blackmailer receives a blackmail premium that compensates the blackmailer for not taking money from the victim and revealing information anyway.

Thesis (M. Phil.)--Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 43-45). Also available in electronic version.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Also available in print.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2007. / Adviser: R. Kent Guy. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Kiel, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 322-346).

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Kiel, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 322-346).