Thesis (LL.M.)--University of the Witwatersrand, Faculty of Law, 1998. / This thesis explores the democratic legitimacy of the power of judicial review. It discounts the countermajoritarian dilemma on the basis that constitutional democracy means more than majoritarianism, it entails judicial protection of other characteristics fundamental to democracy from invasion even by a majority government. Such characteristics include political processes and values which ensure the continuation of democratic rule. The Court may, however, be criticised if it exercises its power of judicial review in a manner which is undemocratic. I argue that the Court is obliged to exercise its power in a manner which respects the doctrine of separation of powers. In interpreting the Constitution, the Court is therefore obliged to show deference to Parliament by giving effect to the purpose of a constitutional provision. I conclude that the Court may only have recourse to the values which the legislature chose to include in the Constitution, except when the Court protects those political processes and values which ensure the survival of constitutional democracy.

The author explores the traditional approaches to interpretation in a constitutional democracy, with specific emphasis on Bill of Rights interpretation. The approaches adopted by the court in India and Canada, are briefly outlined with a view to gleaning from the experience of these countries, a theory which will inform a proper approach to interpretation in a South African context. He concludes that the value-based approach is most appropriate to concretise the rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights, and specifically the so-called second and third generation rights. Addressing the fear that this may lead to an undisciplined judiciary, he concludes that there are sufficient disciplinning mechanisms to ensure that the courts do not encroach upon the other branches of government. / Constitutional, International & Indigenous Law / LL.M.

The author explores the traditional approaches to interpretation in a constitutional democracy, with specific emphasis on Bill of Rights interpretation. The approaches adopted by the court in India and Canada, are briefly outlined with a view to gleaning from the experience of these countries, a theory which will inform a proper approach to interpretation in a South African context. He concludes that the value-based approach is most appropriate to concretise the rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights, and specifically the so-called second and third generation rights. Addressing the fear that this may lead to an undisciplined judiciary, he concludes that there are sufficient disciplinning mechanisms to ensure that the courts do not encroach upon the other branches of government. / Constitutional, International and Indigenous Law / LL.M.

This study examines the effect of judicial protection of minority rights on the Constitutional Court’s legitimacy. The framing of the Marriage Act shows that Parliament intended marriage to be between a man and a woman. By nullifying section 30(1) of the Act and making the order above, the Court fulfilled its constitutional mandate of upholding fundamental human rights. At the same time, it negated the intention of Parliament which represents majoritarian interests. The Constitutional Court is, in contra-distinction with Parliament, unelected. By voiding section 30(1) of the Marriage Act and arousing public opposition to legal recognition of same-sex unions, it raised a ‘countermajoritarian difficulty.’ This ‘countermajoritarian difficulty’ has elicited intense scholarly debate.17 The study examines how the Court’s negation of majoritarian interests in order to protect minority rights affects its legitimacy. / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2007. / A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Law University of Pretoria, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree Masters of Law (LLM in Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa). Prepared under the supervision of Associate Prof. Tamale Sylvia of the Faculty of Law, Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/ / Centre for Human Rights / LLM

Comment expliquer que des juges non élus puissent écarter la volonté des représentants élus et responsables devant le peuple ? La critique principale adressée à l’encontre du contrôle juridictionnel de constitutionnalité des lois renvoie ainsi à sa dimension anti-démocratique, puisque les conceptions classiques de la démocratie mettent l’accent sur l’élection. Aux États-Unis, cette « difficulté contre-majoritaire » est encore accentuée en raison des origines prétoriennes du "judicial review". Cette étude, centrée sur la Cour suprême, ne vise pas à résoudre la difficulté contre-majoritaire, au demeurant insoluble. L’objectif est d’étudier comment a opéré, et continue d’opérer, la critique contre-majoritaire, à analyser les causes structurelles de la prégnance du débat, et à voir s’il peut être relativisé. Il est en effet possible d’apprécier la dimension majoritaire du "judicial review", au sens où il traduit les aspirations majoritaires du corps social. Entre le « noble rêve», celui d’une Cour héroïquement contre-majoritaire qui protègerait les droits des minorités, et le « cauchemar », celui d’une Cour tyrannique imposant sa volonté, il existe un espace dans lequel on peut envisager la réalité de ce que font les juges. La mise en lumière de l’influence de l’opinion publique sur la Cour ouvre la voie à une appréciation réaliste de ce qu’est le "judicial review", ce qui suppose de s’éloigner des modèles formalistes. Cette relativisation de la difficulté contre-majoritaire n’est pas une résolution de la question. Parce que les travaux de légitimation tendent à banaliser un pouvoir qui doit rester l’objet de discussions, il n’est même pas souhaitable que la question soit résolue / Why should nine unelected judges be able to disregard the will of elected officials accountable to the people ? The main criticism against judicial review highlights its anti-democratic dimension since democracy has long been defined by reference to the majoritarian principle. In the United States, this countermajoritarian difficulty is particularly accentuated in light of the origins of judicial review. This research does not aim to solve the countermajoritarian difficulty, which is in fact unsolvable. The goal is rather to study how the countermajoritarian criticism deployed itself in the course of American history and continues to operate today, to analyze the structural factors explaining the salience of the debate and to consider whether the difficulty can be put into perspective. A careful analysis of the Supreme Court’s case law reveals its majoritarian dimension, in the sense that the Court’s decisions tend to reflect the state of public opinion. Between the «noble dream» of a Court heroically protecting minority rights, and the « nightmare » of a Court tyrannically imposing its will, there is a space in which the reality of the actions of the Court can be analyzed. The evidence of a correlation between public opinion and the Supreme Court paves the way for a more realistic assessment of judicial review and reinforces the need to escape from formalistic modes of reasoning. However, this relativization of the countermajoritarian difficulty does not amount to a resolution of the difficulty. In fact, it is because legitimating efforts tend to normalize a power which should remain a source of discussion that it is ultimately not desirable that the question be solved