Military mutinies are occurring more frequently in the last two decades than ever before. Mutinies impact every region of the world. Given that they are occurring more frequently, impact every region, and often have disastrous implications, scholars must answer the foundational question: why do mutinies occur? What are the proximate domestic conditions that give rise to military mutinies? This project makes three contributions. First, I set out to formally define mutinies and collect a new dataset that will allow scholars to examine mutinies empirically. Second, I present a theoretical framework that explains when and why mutinies will occur. Finally, I present three novel empirical tests of the theory. The first portion of this dissertation defines mutinies and describes the data collection process. I present the Military Mutinies and Defections Databases (MMDD). Using news articles from various sources, I code 460 mutiny events from 1945 – present day. I code a number of other variables that give users details about the event, such as: whether or not violence was used, whether or not civilians were killed, and whether or not soldiers defected from the military apparatus. Next, I utilize a nested principal agent model to describe when mutinies are likely to occur. Agent models describe hierarchical relationships of delegation. A nested structure allows for multiple agents and multiple principals in a given model. I apply this nested structure to the military to generate three various nests. The first examines foot soldiers as an agent of the military leadership. In this nest, policy failures (e.g., bad strategy) secured by the military leadership will drive foot soldier mutinies. The second nest explores foot soldiers as agents of the executive, a civilian principal. In this nest, I expect that situations that place soldiers in conflict with the executive will generate shirking. The final nest considers foot soldiers and military leadership as collective agents of the executive. I theorize that risk aversion and divergent preferences will drive shirking, or mutinies, in this nested structure. The final nest presents an interesting trade-off for a coup-worried leader. I argue that while executives can utilize regime securing strategies, such strategies might actually agitate the military and drive low level military rebellions. Coup proofing, a common practice among executives that are worried they will be ousted by the military, effectively wards of coups but can generate unintended consequences. Specifically, I expect that counterbalancing measures and other coup proofing tactics should spur mutinies because the intended purpose of these measures is to create coordination challenges which likely spur military splintering. The first empirical chapter sets out to explore the relationship between civil conflict and the likelihood of mutinies. I expect that when civil wars are extremely bloody or long lasting, mutinies will be more likely as war-weary soldiers no longer want to invest in the war effort. I find evidence that indeed civil war intensity and duration contribute to the probability of a state experiencing a mutiny. The second empirical chapter explores scenarios that pit foot soldiers preferences against the executive’s. I expect that scenarios that impose steep costs on foot soldiers, yet provide some benefit to the executive are likely to spur mutinies. I find evidence that protest events and divisionary conflict spur mutinies. The final empirical chapter explores the military apparatus as a whole. I find that coup proofing measures increase the likelihood of mutinies. Additionally, I find that scenarios that are likely to spur widespread dissent among military actors will increase the likelihood of a mutiny in the context of steep coordination challenges that stifle coup activity. The final chapter concludes by providing policy recommendations. I offer recommendations for leader states (e.g., major powers and democratic leaders in the international system) and for states experiencing mutinies. I conclude by discussing the many possible extensions for this project. This section seeks to emphasis the fact that this is a young, novel research program with many promising avenues for future research.

This study develops a leader-centric theory of civil-military relations that expands upon three broad areas of research. Specifically, the study suggests that leaders will evaluate multiple threats to their political survival and will ultimately implement strategy that is most likely to keep them in power. While Downs (1957) has noted such a tendency in democracies, this study expands this rationale to authoritarian regimes by focusing on the primary means of authoritarian removal: the military coup. In contrast to the state-centric nature of traditional international relations theory, this dissertation finds that leaders frequently undermine the power of the state in order to accomplish the self-interested goal of political survival. First, the study carefully describes a number of coup-proofing strategies that leaders can implement. These are broadly defined in terms of influencing either the military’s willingness or its ability to attempt a coup. In addition to testing the effectiveness of these strategies, this study also theoretically explores the implications of coup-proofing for other political development of the state: interstate and intrastate conflict. Second, the study considers the influence of coup-proofing on interstate conflict. This study builds on the diversionary literature by investing coup risk as an incentive to use diversionary tactics as well as coup-proofing as a potential disincentive. The latter can both undermine the necessity of diversion as well as military capabilities, making leaders less capable of utilizing international conflict as a political tool. Third, the dissertation considers the influence of coup-proofing on intrastate conflict. The theory argues that the capability-reducing practice of coup-proofing can have important domestic consequences. Specifically, the practice can increase the mobilizational potential of would-be insurgents, can reduce the mobilizational capacity of the state, and leaders that are particularly fearful of a coup will likely tolerate the rise of an insurgency.

La présente thèse a été essentiellement conduite sous la supervision de M. Théodore McLauchlin, mon directeur de thèse. Toutefois, des contributions extérieures d'autres enseignants du département, ainsi que certains collègues et ami(e)s, m'ont été d'une utilité inestimable. La thèse s'est construit au travers d'un long séjour de terrain (8 mois), en vue de la collecte de données empiriques pertinentes, fait de rencontres et de découvertes très instructives et inspirantes Au final, cette thèse porte un regard critique additionnel à la problématique générale des résilience autoritaires, notamment en Afrique, sur le fondement des interventions politico-militaires des leaders politiques intéressés par la "longue durée". Ces interventions sont analysées, suivant le concept du politicien investisseur de Lacam, comme des investissements porteurs de retombées qui contribuent au renforcement ou à la suppléance des stratégies internes de survie du leader. Aussi, contribuent-elles à une certaine garantie, ou du moins gestion, de la "longue durée" de ce dernier. / Comment les investissements politico-militaires internationaux contribuent-ils à la survie des leaders personnalistes en Afrique ? L’analyse du règne de tels leaders révèle un double constat : les menaces à leur survie sont essentiellement de nature irrégulière (les coups d’État, les rébellions, les insurrections populaires, etc.) ; et leurs principales stratégies internes de survie politique, la cooptation et le coup-proofing, semblent moins aptes à les protéger contre celles-ci sur le long terme. Aussi, leurs politiques internationales, fondées sur les interventions militaires directes en appui aux États et/ou les alliances transnationales en appui aux groupes armés, constituent-elles des ressorts stratégiques au service de leur gestion de la « longue durée ». Suivant la thèse du politicien investisseur de Lacam (1988), nous appréhendons ces deux actions politico-militaires internationales susmentionnées comme des investissements porteurs de retombées (politiques, économiques et militaires), dont la captation stratégique par le leader affecte positivement sa survie politique de deux façons distinctes : directe et indirecte. Il y a impact direct, lorsque les retombées à l’œuvre suppléent les stratégies internes de survie du leader à l’occurrence d’une menace ; et indirect, lorsqu’elles les renforcent plutôt à l’occurrence ou non d’une menace. A contrario, le refus ou encore l’incapacité du leader à s’investir dans de telles actions politico-militaires le priverait de soutiens extérieurs décisifs dans la gestion de sa survie politique, et lui ferait subir, généralement, des ingérences extérieures directes et/ou indirectes à sa chute du pouvoir. À travers une approche comparative des présidents Déby et Compaoré, notre recherche repose sur le theory building process-tracing, pour analyser leur « longue durée », respectivement 30 et 27 ans, contrairement à leurs prédécesseurs immédiats, Hissène Habré et Thomas Sankara, 8 et 4 ans. Mots clés : Leaders personnalistes, survie politique, politicien investisseur, investissements politico-militaires internationaux, alliances transnationales, coup-proofing. / How do international politico-military investments contribute to the survival of personalist rulers in Africa? The analysis of the reign of such leaders reveals a double observation: the threats to their survival are essentially of an irregular nature (coups, rebellions, popular insurrections, etc.); and their main internal strategies for political survival, cooptation and coup-proofing, seem less able to protect them against these in the long term. Also, their international policies, based on direct military interventions in support of States and/or transnational alliances in support of armed groups, constitute strategic drivers at the service of their management of the “long-term”. Following the thesis of the politician investor of Lacam (1988), we apprehend these two international politico-military actions reported as redemptive investments (political, economic and military), whose strategic capture by the leader positively affects his political survival in two distinct ways: direct and indirect. There is a direct impact, when the content at work supplements the leader's internal survival strategies in the event of a threat; and indirect, when they are reinforced rather with the occurrence or not of a threat. Conversely, the leader's choice, refusal or even inability to invest in such politico-military actions would deprive him of decisive external support in the management of his political survival, and he could generally suffer external direct and/or indirect interference to his fall from power. Through a comparative approach of Presidents Déby and Compaoré, our research is based on theory building process-tracing, to analyze their " long duration ", 30 and 27 years respectively, unlike their immediate predecessors, Hissène Habré and Thomas Sankara, 8 and 4 years. Keywords: Personalist leaders, political survival, politician investors, international politico-military investments, transnational alliances, coup-proofing.

Cette thèse de doctorat vise à répondre à une question qui a été largement négligée par la littérature sur les crises des régimes autoritaires : pourquoi les forces armées tolèrent-elles ou répriment-elles les mouvements d’opposition en faveur de changements du régime ? L’hypothèse principale stipule que l’attitude conciliante ou réfractaire des forces armées dépend de la nature des mesures adoptées par le régime autoritaire afin de s’assurer de leur loyauté et prévenir des coups d’État. Lorsque ces mesures de préventions des coups d’État contribuent à créer des divisons au sein de l’armée, les factions marginalisées sont enclines à tolérer les mouvements d’opposition, si ces derniers offrent une alternative crédible au régime, en raison de leur capacité à s’unir autour d’une plate-forme commune de revendications modérées, réalistes et acceptables pour les militaires. À l’inverse, lorsque les mesures de prévention des coups d’État favorisent la cohésion interne de l’armée et son attachement au régime, les militaires adoptent une attitude répressive à l’égard des forces contestataires. Ces hypothèses sont vérifiées à l’aide d’une analyse comparative des différentes mesures de prévention des coups d’État adoptées par les régimes autoritaires du Bénin et du Togo et de leurs impacts sur le succès, dans le premier cas, et l’échec, dans le second cas, des mouvements d’opposition dans les deux pays, au début des années 1990. Cette analyse est effectuée à l’aide de deux approches méthodologiques : le traçage de processus ainsi que la comparaison de deux études de cas. / This Ph.D. dissertation analyzes the factors that influence armed forces’ decisions to tolerate or suppress opposition movements demanding political reforms which could lead to regime change. This dissertation helps to fill a large gap in the literature as only a few scholars have attempted to explain military behaviour during regime crisis. It does so through an analysis of how anti-coup policies and opposition forces’ characteristics lead to the formation of marginalized military cliques and their potential support for regime change. It theorizes that the head of state’s survival strategy, specifically coup-proofing measures, influences military factions’ willingness to preserve the status quo. Reliance on loyalists leads to armed forces with a powerful core loyal to the incumbent regime and willing to use repression, while the strategy of counterbalancing leads to armed forces largely unattached to the maintenance of the regime. Under these circumstances, opposition forces can foster regime defection when they offer a viable alternative to the incumbent government, if the opposition can unify around a moderate platform that provides realist demands vis-à-vis regime forces. The main argument, on the influence of divergent coup-proofing policies on military actions, is assessed through a comparison of Benin and Togo. In each state, authoritarian regimes responded to the challenge of opposition mobilization by initiating negotiation processes. Divergences in coup-prevention techniques and credible commitment capacity of the opposition explain why the opposition campaign in the beginning of the 1990s was successful in Benin but failed in Togo. This research is based on two methods: process-tracing and the comparative method.