I defend an understanding of Kant's theory of Geschmacksurteil as detailing an operation of the faculties that does not violate the cognitive structure laid out in the first Critique, even though one would not easily anticipate it from the standpoint of that work, nor would one initially expect aesthetic judgment to be of transcendental interest to Kant. My orientation is primarily epistemological, elaborating the determinations that govern the activity of pure aesthetic judging so as to specify it as a bestimmte type of judgment without transforming it into einem bestimmenden Urteil. I focus on identifying how the logical functions from the table of judgments operate in the pure aesthetic judgment of taste to reveal “the moments to which this power of judgment attends in its reflection” (Critique of the Power of Judgment, §1, 5:203). In the course of doing so, a picture emerges of how the world is not just cognizable in a Kantian framework but also charged with human feeling, acquiring the inexhaustible, inchoate meaningfulness that incites “much thinking” (Critique of the Power of Judgment, §49, 5:315). The universal communicability of aesthetic pleasure serves as the foundation that grounds robust intersubjective relations, enabling genuine connection to others through a shared a priori feeling. / McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts; / Philosophy / PhD; / Dissertation;

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / In the Critique of the Power of Judgment Kant is concerned with the problem of Beauty s transcendental philosophy, seeking the possibility of a universally valid, a priori and necessary aesthetic judgment. The strategy adopted by the author starts by defining what the Beauty is not (in this case, a judgment of knowledge). Among other things, the complacency in Beauty is distinguished from complacency in Good, being the former disinterested, whereas the latter has an interest in the existence of the judged object. This difference is already made in the opening paragraphs of the first book of the Analytic of the Beauty. Nevertheless, insofar as Kant advances in his analysis of the feeling of the Beauty (and later, the Sublime), the author suggests that the separation between an aesthetic judgment (of the Beauty) and a moral judgment (of the Good) is not necessarily abrupt and sometimes such judgments constitute an ambiguous relationship. The work to be done intend to investigate the sinuosity of the Kantian discourse developed along the third Critique about the problem of the Beauty and the Good, especially the apparent change in Kant s argument at the §§16 and 17, and affirmation of the "Beauty as a Symbol of Morality" [KU, B253] in § 59 of this book. / Na Crítica da Faculdade do Juízo Kant preocupa-se com o problema da filosofia transcendental do Belo, buscando a possibilidade de um juízo estético universalmente válido, a priori e necessário. A estratégia adotada pelo autor inicia por definir o que o Belo não é (no caso, um juízo de conhecimento). Dentre outras coisas, distingue-se o comprazimento no Belo do comprazimento no Bom, sendo aquele desinteressado, ao passo que este contém um interesse na existência do objeto ajuizado. Esta diferença é feita já nos parágrafos iniciais do primeiro livro da Analítica do Belo. Não obstante, na medida em que Kant avança em sua análise sobre o sentimento do Belo (e posteriormente, do Sublime), o autor deixa transparecer que a separação entre um juízo estético (do Belo) e um juízo moral (do Bom) não é necessariamente abrupta e, por vezes, tais juízos constituem uma relação ambígua. No trabalho a ser realizado pretendo investigar a sinuosidade do discurso kantiano desenvolvido ao longo da terceira Crítica acerca da questão do Belo e do Bom, em especial a aparente mudança na argumentação de Kant a partir dos §§16 e 17, e afirmação da Beleza como Símbolo da Moralidade [KU, B253] no § 59 desta obra.

Since the post-positivist turn in critical political theory, many scholars of political science have tried to reimagine the discipline through feminist, Marxist, and postcolonial critiques. However, even critical scholars often overlook that all forms of critique are aesthetic- as is the mainstream of political science that they criticize. Despite these proliferating critiques, much of political science is still shaped by a robust epistemological orientation towards scientific aspirations, which I describe as a scientific epistemic mode. The argument of this thesis is that the dominance of a scientific epistemic mode in political science orients this discipline erroneously against aesthetic receptivity and production. The relationship between political science and aesthetics is often characterized by affects of discomfort and shame, so that aesthetic qualities in research are associated with unscientific, and therefore illegitimate outcomes. The claim that aesthetics is not suited to the study of politics is longstanding, but not necessarily legitimate. Rather than conceive of aesthetics and science as essentially opposed, this thesis considers how this dualism can be understood as a discursive formation. The notion of aesthetics as a threat to science exists as far back as Plato’s Republic, where poetry is banished for the sake of philosophy. Contra Plato, Kant acknowledges aesthetics as a relevant epistemic mode in The Critique of Judgment, but determines aesthetics to be irreconcilable with a reason-based, scientific epistemology. Finally, in The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche’s reading of Attic Tragedy suggests that, like the figures of Dionysus and Apollo, aesthetics and science can be thought of as two forces in a relation of productive antagonism rather than mutual exclusion or domination. In response to the naturalized, scientific epistemic mode in political science, an aesthetic epistemic mode acknowledges the fusion of aesthetics and science in the production of political analysis. Following Isabelle Stengers, this thesis tries to slow down the sense that aesthetics is inferior, excluded and dominated by science, suggesting that political science begin to cultivate a receptive awareness of its own aesthetic value. In making aesthetics a legitimate focus in political science, an aesthetic epistemic mode is practised by seeking out relevant questions rather than demanding immediate, “scientific” answers. / Graduate / 0615 / 0422 / anctil.laura@gmail.com