In post-Soviet Russia, the destiny of the Southern Kuril Islands has been used by the political and intellectual elite to define and contest ideas of national identity. From the early 1990s these islands became a symbolic territory for elite groups attempting to define what kind of state the Russian Federation should become. The various geographical visions projected onto these islands are part of a struggle between elite groups to define national values and to claim the state for their own political ends. However, such visions are not smoothly inscribed onto these islands. Instead, any idea of state, nation and homeland is negotiated, contested and inflected at every geographical scale. The debates over these islands expose a deep tension over the political control of space in the Russian Far East and beyond. It is suggested that these islands are a kind of ‘hyper-border’: a site which is distant, and at times even beyond the state’s control, yet at the same time can be instantaneously linked to the destiny of the entire country. It is a term intended to capture the struggles, contestations and unequal power relations inherent in the ideological process of constructing national space and identity.

This case study examines the role of the political party United Russia in the rise of ‘dominant-power politics’, also termed ‘electoral authoritarianism’, that characterises the Putin period (2000-2008). Comparative literature identifies parties as important independent or explanatory variables in a range of regime outcomes, including the successful consolidation of democracy, but also in the establishment and consolidation of authoritarian rule. The impressive rise of United Russia in the Russian political system from late 2001 onwards, together with its co-occurrence with the growing strength of the Putin regime, suggests that the party was a factor in the outcome of the latter. This research first develops a theoretical framework to understand the role of parties in modern political systems and then applies this framework to explore the Russian case. Although a component of power in the Putin period, this research argues that the origins of United Russia in the ‘party of power’ phenomenon limit its value as an explanatory variable. Rather than a principal power in the emerging post-Yeltsin political order, United Russia is an agent of a powerful civilian executive, which remains beyond the control of any party. In this sense, the rise of United Russia in the Putin period is misleading. United Russia is an example of ‘virtual’ party hegemony; a reflection of the intentions and ability of non-party power-holders to project their power onto party-agents. This research contributes to existing literature on party politics in the post-Soviet space and Russian politics in the Putin period. In comparative terms, this study contributes to existing notions of party dominance and emerging literature on divergent regime trajectories in the post-Cold War period.

This dissertation challenges the view that Lev Kamenev lacked a clear socialist vision and had no discernible objectives. It contends that Kamenev had an ideological line and political goals shaped by Ferdinand Lassalle. Kamenev adopted Lassalle’s desire for a democratic socialist republic and his method to achieve end aims. Through dialogical discourse Kamenev aimed to gain allies by overcoming differences by focusing on points of agreement. This was his ‘Bolshevik Centrism’. Ideologically, Kamenev absorbed Lassalle’s concept of the ‘Fourth Estate’, which mandated proletarian culture first predominate in society before revolution could occur. This helps explain his opposition to revolution in 1905 and 1917, and sheds light on his assessment in the early 1920s that the Bolsheviks had not founded the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’, but the ‘dictatorship of the party’. In trying to overcome this reality he adapted Lassalle’s vision for an all-encompassing selfless state and endeavoured to merge the party, the state, and the masses into one. His aspiration to win over peasants and workers placed him in a centrist position, whereby he used his authority to challenge Trotsky and Bukharin’s leftist and rightist policies. However, under the one-party dictatorship his actions directly contributed to the rise of Stalin.

This thesis contributes to an in-depth understanding of the concept of soft power, which according to Joseph Nye indicates the ability to achieve foreign policy goals through cultural attraction. For the purposes of this study of Russian cultural influence in Ukraine, soft power is rearticulated to highlight the ability to engage in mean-making and cultural-ideational leadership on the international stage. A critique of Nye justifies a reframing of soft power, which is supplied by drawing on the analytical power of post-Marxist hegemony and discourse theory. The methodology through which this concept is operationalised empirically emphasises outcomes over inputs, thus appraisals of soft power must account for whether the discourses promoted by mean-making initiatives resonate favourably with target audiences. Desk-based and field research supports an argument that Moscow acknowledges the need for soft power, understood here in terms of ‘sovereignty of spirit’. This civilisational approach is explored further, and the target narratives advanced by significant proponents of the discourse, namely the Russkiy Mir Foundation, the Russian Orthodox Church and foreign policy officials, are identified. Insights into the activities of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate to promote spiritually-infused discourses are provided, and new developments observed. Finally, the extent of Russian ‘civilisational’ soft power is estimated through surveys and focus groups gauging audience reception to the ideational narratives promoted.

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The aim of this study is to show how liberal thinkers have responded to the problems liberalism as an ideology faces in Russia, and to the challenges which Russia is encountering as a country in transition. I will argue that liberals are constantly aware both of their marginalisation (which is seen as being cultural, historical and political) when they react to other ideologies and to those who hold political power, and also of the difficulty of shaping Russia's future along liberal lines. The liberal response to nationalism, therefore, provides a useful model in showing how liberals have reacted to ideologies which are typically regarded as being outside the liberal movement in Russia and also how they have sought to respond to many of the central questions relating to transition. I will show in this study that the response of liberals towards nationalism demonstrates a huge increase in the diversity of the liberal movement from the mid 1990's onwards, as the internal divides amongst liberals have become apparent under the impact of transition. Secondly, liberals have been torn between the possible strategic benefits of combining liberalism with non-liberal elements, weighed against the ideological problems these combinations cause. These dilemmas have left Russian liberalism as an essentially stagnant ideology which remains incapable of forming a united and coherent response both to its own marginalisation and to the challenges faced by Russia.

This thesis focuses on trafficking in human beings, particularly in women, to Turkey after the dissolution of Soviet Union. The study analyses legal responses and their reflections on Turkey's policy making mechanism to find a comprehensive and victim-oriented anti-trafficking strategy at two levels, international and national. The research is structured into eight chapters, proceeding from the general background of human trafficking, particularly female trafficking, to the development of the framework of anti-trafficking measures in Turkey's domestic structure. From the literature review it is found that human trafficking is a multi-faceted problem, which needs a more comprehensive approach to tackle it. Despite the recognition of all forms of human trafficking, trafficking for sexual exploitation in Turkey of female victims from former Soviet republics is the focus of this study. While doing so, the study analyses and compares the legal, political, and administrative differences between two specific periods: from the dissolution of the Soviet Union to 2002; and from 2002 to 2016. In the first period, the study focuses on the political and sociological transformations' effects on trafficking in women as push factors in source countries, and the domestic responses of Turkey in prevention, prosecution, and protection. After these analyses, the study examines how the political, regional, and international aspirations of the AKP governments affect the transformation of legal measures on human trafficking in the Turkish legal system. In addition to these analyses and criticisms, the study utilizes the relevant parts of the US Department of State Trafficking Reports and EU Regular and Progress Reports to highlight the positive and negative sides of the domestic transformation of Turkey's anti-trafficking strategy. Concerning the development of Turkey's anti-trafficking measures, this study explores what could be changed for a comprehensive anti-trafficking model for Turkey as the future of their anti-trafficking strategy. The study critically analyses previous and current legal, political, and social mistakes against victims in the processes from identification to protection, to build up a preventative and victim-oriented strategy by means of legal instruments and their effects on political measures. The study highlights the weaknesses, problems, and deficiencies to demonstrate the current situation, and also evaluates the influences of international instruments on Turkey's domestic legal and political structures.

This thesis investigates the dual transnationalism of ancestral return migrants, that is to say people “returning” to the territory where their ancestors had once migrated from. Dispersed from their homeland in the second half of the 19th century, the Adyge-Abkhaz diaspora has been involved in a variety of transnational practices in relation to their homeland in the Caucasus; and some, with considerable effort, have been settling there especially in the last two decades. The transnational involvement of this diaspora, most of whom live today in Turkey, is motivated by their search for belonging. Many who go back and forth between Turkey and the Caucasus are involved in transnational diaspora associations and take an active role in the formation of a transnational ethno-political-cultural environment for new generations growing up in the diaspora. The majority of those who have “return migrated” to their homeland in the Caucasus, in this study to two republics, Adygeya (an autonomous republic under the Russian Federation) and Abkhazia (a republic with contested independence), develop new transnational links to their diaspora communities in Turkey. This thesis is the product of a multi-sited, multi-method research project that combines theories related to transnationalism, diaspora and return, as well as migrant adaptation. Using life-history interviews, semi-structured interviews and participant observation, fieldwork for the research took place in rural diaspora settlements and urban diaspora organisations in Turkey as well as in the Caucasus, thereby enabling the researcher to study both ends of the migration route. Existing studies on ancestral return migration focus on pull and push factors, which hitherto have focused on sending and receiving countries separately. This thesis argues that their dual transnationalism, both in the diaspora (in Turkey) looking back towards the diasporic homeland, and after return looking back towards the diaspora, turns them into the “diaspora of their diaspora”.

Crusading and the military orders have, at their roots, a strong focus on place, namely the Holy Land and the shrines associated with the life of Christ on Earth. Both concepts spread to other frontiers in Europe (notably Spain and the Baltic) in a very quick fashion. Therefore, this thesis investigates the ways that this focus on place and landscape changed over time, when crusading and the military orders emerged in the Baltic region, a land with no Christian holy places. Taking this fact as a point of departure, the following thesis focuses on the crusades to the Baltic Sea Region during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. It considers the role of the military orders in the region (primarily the Order of the Teutonic Knights), and how their participation in the conversion-led crusading missions there helped to shape a distinct perception of the Baltic region as a new sacred (i.e. Christian) landscape. Structured around four chapters, the thesis discusses the emergence of a new sacred landscape thematically. Following an overview of the military orders and the role of sacred landscpaes in their ideology, and an overview of the historiographical debates on the Baltic crusades, it addresses the paganism of the landscape in the written sources predating the crusades, in addition to the narrative, legal, and visual evidence of the crusade period (Chapter 1). It then proceeds to a chapter-by-chapter analysis considering specific sacralising elements expressed in the sources, which structure the definition of sacred landscape used in this thesis (outlined in the Introduction). Chapter 2 considers the role martyrdom in sacralising the landscape, followed by a discussion of the role played by relics (Chapter 3), ritualization, and sacred space (Chapter 4). By incorporating Geographical Information Systems (GIS) into the analysis of the texts, a new spatial map of the Baltic campaigns emerges from the present study, providing a fresh approach to studying contemporary views of holy war in a region with no holy (i.e. Christian) shrines.

The thesis examines the Communist Party in Moscow between 1925 and 1932. Its structure, role and membership are studied, together with its relationship with the population of Moscow. A study is also made of politics in the period, with special reference to the oppositions of the 1920's. Four broad problems are discussed. The first is the relationship between the central Party leadership and the Moscow Committee. Second is the role of the grassroots activist in political life. Thirdly, the failure of the oppositions is studied in detail. Finally, popular influence over the Party is examined with a view to discussing how far the revolution had been 'betrayed' in this period. It is found that the Moscow Committee was less autonomous than other regional organs, but that grassroots initiative played an important part in political life. In general, people were reluctant to engage in formal opposition. This largely explains the defeat of the Left and Right oppositions, who failed to attract significant support. The majority of Muscovites remained apathetic or hostile to the Party, but a core of committed activists within it was responsible for many of the period's achievements. To the extent that they supported and even initiated policy, Stalin's 'great turn' included an element of 'revolution from below'.