Thesis (M.A.)--University of Oregon, 2008. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. "List of journalists interviewed": p. 88. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 104-109). Also available online.

Thesis (MPhil (Political Science))--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / Recent years have seen new ideologies and political factors being introduced into the Sudanese political landscape. The new war in Darfur has revealed that the traditional North-South conflict is not necessarily a religious war but rather a war that goes beyond religion and ethnicity. Several factors underpin the civil wars in Sudan; principally disputes over religion, identity, inequality, resources, governance, self-determination, autonomy and secession. The attempt is therefore to define the various actors, factors and issues underlying both the North-South conflict and the new war in Darfur, and to analyse and compare the differences and similarities between the two wars. Both the conflicts in Southern Sudan and in Darfur have their origin in the decay of the Sudanese state and in both cases did political marginalisation resulted in political exclusion. Another resemblance between the two wars is the acute identity crisis that resulted from the long history of stratification and discrimination. Both warring groups want to reassert their distinguishing characteristics in the respective conflicts where ‘Arab’ and ‘African’ have distinctive meanings and are used as racial, cultural, and political identities. The third similarity between the South and Darfur is the ethnic cleansing tactics and policies the Sudanese government has adopted. The differences between these two wars is that Southern Sudan has developed into a war over national resources while Darfur does not share the same strategic commodities. The second is secession. The South started as a secessionist war while neither of the rebel groups in Darfur have demanded any form of self-determination. Darfur has also seen relatively timely international attention compared to Southern Sudan. Comparing the two conflicts do reveal that neither religion nor race is at the heart of Sudan’s wars. Instead, the root of the insurgencies is largely founded upon culturally and regionally imposed economic and political marginalisation coupled with the politicization of ethnic identities. The challenge for Sudan will be to create a new consciousness of common identity and a new meaning of belonging that grants peace, dignity, development and fundamental human rights.

Thesis (M.S.)--George Mason University, 2008. / Vita: p. 113. Thesis director: Mark Goodale. Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Conflict Analysis and Resolution. Title from PDF t.p. (viewed Mar. 9, 2009). Includes bibliographical references (p. 107-112). Also issued in print.

"The international community is divided in respect of what actually occurred in Darfur. There are differenct views on the conflict. Some reports show that the conflict cannot be characterised as genocide, but rather atrocities, namely war crimes and crimes against humanity. Yet others indicate that, apart from crimes against humanity and war crimes, there was also genocide in Darfur. Still other reports indicate that the Darful conflict is characterised by 'ethnic cleansing'. Clearly there is a disagreement on what happened in Darfur. ... This study poses a critique to past studies on the Darfur conflict on the question of genocide. It analyses facts about the conflict in relation to the law on genocide so as to find out whether facts can meet the definition of the crime of genocide. The study is limited to the legal issue - whether genocide was committed in Darfur between 2003 and 2004. It does not intend to introduce the background to the conflict; rather, facts are only applied in the legal arguments. ... This work has four chapters. Chapter one is an introduction to the study. Chapter two discusses material elements of genocide and determination of a protected group. Chapter three discusses intent to commit genocide and poses a critique to past studies on Darfur. Chapter four shows conclusion and recommendations." -- Introduction. / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2005. / Prepared under the supervision of Dr. Paolo Comoane at the Faculty of Law, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo, Mocambique / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/academic_pro/llm1/dissertations.html / Centre for Human Rights / LLM

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This study aimed to look at non-interference as a doctrine in China’s Africa Policy. This involved looking at the non-interference principle in general, not only in Beijing’s policies. The non-interference principle as contained in the policies of the African Union, United Nations and in the policies of Western and Asian states were discussed, noting a gradual shift away from strict non-interference towards non-indifference and humanitarian intervention. Beijing’s orthodox understanding of non-interference, on the other hand, is based on respect for the sovereignty of other states and a belief that, unless requested, no state should interfere in the domestic affairs of another state. The doctrine of non-interference, as understood by Beijing was then applied to the crisis in Darfur. In the case of Darfur, Beijing initially adhered to its understanding of non-interference, in spite of criticism that its behaviour was based solely on China’s own interests. China initially ignored international expectations to intervene in the affairs of Khartoum. In fact, Beijing continued to support Khartoum and abstained from UN Security Council resolutions on the matter. Initially the government in Beijing was not willing to make any adjustments to the non-interference doctrine, as the situation in Darfur did not seem to present any reason for Beijing to disregard its own policies. Yet Beijing gradually shifted in non-interference; seen in its pressure on Khartoum to allow the AU/UN hybrid peacekeeping force. The reasons for the shift are ascribed to various factors ranging from international pressure and even the possible reputational risk. China managed to balance its economic and political interests in Sudan with its duties and expectations of the Security Council. At the same time, Beijing continued to protect the sovereignty of the Khartoum government by adhering to its beliefs of the right of the state. The subtle shift away from Beijing’s orthodox understanding of non-interference can be seen as China changing its non-interference doctrine to suit its new role in the international community. It can also be seen as China still adhering to the non-interference doctrine, as it places emphasis on avoiding sanctions and still requires permission from the host state for external intervention. Another key element is that it adapted when its interests were at risk. It would seem probable that this trend will continue, resulting rather in Beijing implementing a form of ‘pro-active non-interference’ based on the situation. Such a position would indicate a shift in the doctrine of non-interference based on the situation and pressure, but according to certain core values of Beijing. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die navorser het ondersoek ingestel na die nietussenkomsleerstelling soos dit in China se Afrika-beleid vervat word. Die nietussenkomsbeginsel soos geformuleer in die beleidsdokumente van die Afrika-unie (AU), Verenigde Nasies (VN), en in die beleidsdokumente van die Westerse en Oosterse state is ook ondersoek. Die wegbeweging van die streng toepassing van die nietussenkomsleerstelling na ’n beleid van onverskilligheid en tussenkoms wat gebaseer is op die beskerming van menseregte was ’n geleidelike proses. Beijing se konvensionele begrip van hierdie beginsel was volgehou met die verstand dat soewereiiteit van ander state gerespekteer moet word en state nie moet inmeng by die interne sake van ander state nie, behalwe wanneer dit versoek word. Die klem word in beleidsdokumente eerder gelê op respek, gelykheid, samewerking en wedersydse voordeel. Die nietussenkomsleerstelling soos dit verstaan word deur Beijing word ondersoek aan die hand van die Dafoer-krisis. Dit toon Beijing het aanvanklik volgehou met die toepassing van die nietussenkomsleerstelling in China se buitelandsse beleid en optrede, ten spyte van die aantuigings dat hierdie gedrag slegs ter wille van eie belang is. Beijing het haar aanvanklik nie aan die internasionale gemeenskap se verwagting om in te gryp by die sake van Khartoum gesteur nie; China het aangehou om Khartoum te ondersteun en van die VN-veiligheidsraad te weerhou rakende hierdie kwessie. Beijing se optrede teenoor Khartoum het met tyd verander. Sjinese verteenwoordigers het druk op Khartoum begin plaas in 2006 om AU/VN-magte in Darfoer toe te laat. Verskeie redes kan aangevoer word hoekom Beijing uiteindelik haar beleid aangepas het. Van hierdie redes sluit in internasionale druk en die moontlikheid vir China om nie meer as gasheerland vir die Olimpiese Spele in 2008 op te tree nie. Dit kom voor of China daarin geslaag het om die land se ekonomiese en politiese belange in Soedan te balanseer met die verwagtinge wat ander lande van China as ’n permanente VN-lid gehad het. Beijing het gepoog om in so ’n mate in te gryp dat Khartoum se soewereiniteit steeds gerespekteer word. Aan die hand van hierdie subtiele veranderinge in China se beleid en optrede, kan die afleiding gemaak word dat Beijing nie die nietussenkomsleerstelling streng toegepas het nie, maar na die Darfoer-krisis eerder neig na ’n proaktiewe toepassing van die nietuseenkomsleerstelling. Byvoorbeeld, Beijing keur steeds nie die instelling van sanksies goed nie en vereis dat soewereinitiet van state gerespekteer word. Dit blyk dat China die buitelandse beleid aangepas het om steeds die land se belange te beskerm en om te voldoen aan die internasionale vereistes. Hierdie meer proaktiewe optrede blyk om net in sekere gevalle toegepas te word. Daar word bevind dat daar ’n aanpassing van die is met betrekking tot die oorspronklike posisie van die nietussenkomsleerstelling. Beijing sal egter voortgaan om getrou te wees aan aspekte van die oorspronklike leerstelling.

This dissertation seeks to explore the principle of complementarity, its advantages and its success so far through the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) self-referral to the International Criminal Court (ICC). It seeks also to investigate whether there are loopholes in the principle of complementarity, especially with regard to referrals by the Security Council involving states that are not parties to the Rome Statute. In particular the dissertation seeks to explore whether states can use this principle to hamper the efforts of the ICC to bring justice to victims of the most serious crimes of international concern and to end impunity / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2008. / A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Law University of Pretoria, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree Masters of Law (LLM in Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa). Prepared under the supervision of Dr Raymond Koen of the Faculty of Law, University of Western Cape, South Africa / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/ / Centre for Human Rights / LLM

Cette thèse identifie et analyse les revendications de légitimité des organisations régionales de sécurité par rapport à leurs actions et leur existence en tant que sites d’autorité relativement nouveaux. En effet, la recherche explore le contexte normatif qui sert de base au régionalisme sécuritaire entre le niveau global et le niveau national. A cet égard, la thèse propose un cadre conceptuel et théorique pour l’étude de l’autolégitimation qui est ici conçue comme un processus social dynamique et intersubjectif de justification du droit de gouverner. Ce cadre théorique combine les littératures sur la sécurité, le régionalisme, et la légitimité politique. Son objectif principal est l'identification des arguments de légitimation qui peuvent justifier des relations de pouvoir inégales entre gouvernants et gouvernés. Les études de cas de cette thèse sont les missions de sécurité et les politiques de gestion de crise de l'Union Africaine et de l'Union Européenne en réponse à la crise au Darfour (2003-) et les zones adjacentes, telles que le Tchad et la République Centrafricaine. A partir du concept d’autolégitimation et de l'analyse des documents produits par les deux organisations régionales, la partie empirique identifie quatre modes principaux de légitimation qui sont appelés « images du régionalisme sécuritaire ». Ces images sont le régionalisme bénéfique, le régionalisme nécessaire, le régionalisme inévitable, et le régionalisme multilatéral. Les images du régionalisme sécuritaire montrent que la légitimation des politiques et des actions, d'une part, et la légitimation des organisations régionales et de leur position au sein de la gouvernance de la sécurité, d’autre part, sont indissociables. En outre, elles révèlent également que, plus que la légitimation des actions, c’est souvent la légitimation de l'inaction qui est cruciale pour le rôle de ces organisations en tant qu’acteurs de sécurité. Enfin, les arguments de légitimation faisant référence au caractère multilatéral et collectif des actions entreprises par ces organisations régionales démontrent une tendance vers leur reconnaissance mutuelle et, par conséquent, contribuent à leur légitimation. / This thesis identifies and analyses the legitimacy claims of regional security organizations in relation to their policies and their existence as relatively new sites of authority. Hence, it explores the normative context underpinning security regionalism between global and national levels. In this regard, it proposes a conceptual and theoretical framework for the study of self- legitimation, which is understood as a dynamic and intersubjective social process of justification of the right to rule. This framework is based on the intersection between the literatures on security, regionalism, and political legitimacy. Its main focus is the identification of the arguments of legitimation that can justify the unequal power relations between rulers and ruled. This thesis’ case studies are the security missions and policies of crisis management of the African Union and the European Union in response to the crisis in Darfur (2003-) and adjacent areas such as Chad and Central African Republic. Building on the framework of self-legitimation and on the analysis of documents produced by both regional organizations, the empirical part identifies fours large patterns of arguments, which are called ‘images of security regionalism’. These images are the beneficial regionalism, the necessary regionalism, the inevitable regionalism, and the multilateral regionalism. The images of security regionalism show that the legitimation of policies and actions, on the one hand, and the legitimation of regional organizations and their positions within security governance, on the other, are indissociable. Moreover, they also reveal that, more than the legitimation of actions, it is often the legitimation of the perceived inaction that is crucial to the organizations’ role as a security actors. Finally, the patterns of arguments referring to the inter-organizational relations and to the multilateral and collective character of the organizations’ policies point to a trend of mutual recognition and, by consequence, mutual legitimation among regional organizations. / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished