Thesis (Doctoral)--Ruhr-Universität Bochum, 1982.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Bowling Green State University, 1987.

Thesis (DPhil)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In this dissertation I enquire into the status, scope and limits of human knowledge, given the fact that our perceptual and cognitive faculties are the product of evolution by natural selection. I argue that the commonsense representations these faculties provide us with yield a particular, species-specific scope on the world that does not ‘correspond’ in any straightforward way to the external world. We are, however, not bound by these commonsense representations. This particular, species-specific view of the world can be transgressed. Nevertheless, our transgressing representations remain confined to the conceptual space defined by the combinatorial possibilities of the various representational tools we possess. Furthermore, the way in which we fit representations to the external world is by means of our biologically determined epistemic orientation. Based on the fact that we are endowed with a particular set of perceptual and cognitive resources and are guided by a particular epistemic orientation, I conclude that we have a particular cognitive relation to the world. Therefore, an accurate representation for us is a particular fit (our epistemic orientation) with particular means (our perceptual and cognitive resources). / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis handel oor die aard, omvang en limiete van kennis, gegewe dat ons perseptuele en kognitiewe vermoëns die resultaat van evolusie deur middel van natuurlike seleksie is. Eerstens, word daar geargumenteer dat die algemene voorstellings wat hierdie vermoëns aan ons bied ‘n partikuliere, spesie-spesifieke siening van die wêreld aan ons gee, wat nie op ‘n eenvoudige manier korrespondeer aan die werklikheid nie. Ons is egter nie gebonde aan hierdie voorstellings nie. Hierdie partikuliere, spesie-spesifieke siening van die wêreld kan oorskry word. Ons is egter wel beperk tot die konseptuele ruimte wat gedefinieër word deur die kombinatoriese moontlikhede van die voorstellingsmiddele tot ons beskikking. Verder word die manier waarop ons hierdie voorstellings aan die wêreld laat pas deur ons biologies gedetermineerde epistemiese oriëntasie bepaal. Dus, gegewe dat ons ‘n spesifieke stel perseptuele en kognitiewe vermoëns het en deur ‘n spesifieke kognitiewe epistemiese oriëntasie gelei word, staan ons in ‘n spesifieke kognitiewe verhouding tot die wêreld. ‘n Akkurate voorstelling (m.a.w. kennis vir ons) is om spesifieke vermoëns (perseptuele en kognitiewe vermoëns) op ‘n spesifieke manier (epsitemiese oriëntasie) aan die wêreld te laat pas.

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Dissertation--Marburg--Universität, 2003. / Bibliogr. p. 255-273.

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The series of papers in this dissertation are aimed at testing evolutionary hypotheses concerning the adaptive advantages of religious values or experiences, a gender difference in purpose in life and the evolutionary relationship between deception and self-deception. Explanations are argued for in terms of their consequences for evolutionary fitness contributing to individual survival within the human species. Darwin's theory of natural selection within the framework of evolutionary psychology provides the theoretical background for the study. In psychology as well as in other social sciences, Darwinian theories of natural and sexual selection have been undergoing a revival with a significant upsurge of an interest in evolutionary psychology as a unifying paradigm for the understanding of human functioning as a living organism, optimising its fitness to survive the exigencies of environmental and social selection pressures. The broad or covering hypothesis addressed is that religious values or experiences, purpose in life, deception and self-deception each involve a kind of consciousness or strategic cognitive process that has evolved through the operation of natural selection due to its importance and worth for the survival of the individual. The study is empirical, conducted by using the technique of secondary analysis on the data yielded by the World Values Survey collected in 43 countries in its second wave of 1990 to 1993 as well as on a South African dataset containing variables of interest to the second and third papers of this dissertation. National aggregate data has been obtained from the United Nations Development Reports for the corresponding years under study. Findings showed a significantly positive relationship between religious values and evolutionary fitness promoting factors derived by factor analysis; a significantly greater purpose in life in females as compared to males; and a significantly positive relationship between deception and self-deception. However, the relationship between deception and evolutionary fitness promoting factors, derived by factor analysis, was inconclusive. / Thesis (M.Sc.)-University of Natal, 1999.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duquesne University, 2008. / Title from document title page. Abstract included in electronic submission form. Includes bibliographical references (p. 285-298) and index.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--West Virginia University, 2009. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains vi, 256 p. Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 244-256).

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:12:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 3194.pdf: 1092027 bytes, checksum: b9e4747baa254d43d40a9db814e269e4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-04-14 / Anxiety has been a well-studied subject for centuries. Nevertheless, as a circumscribed pathology, anxiety only appears in medical reports at the end of the 19th century, with the works of Sigmund Freud. From clinical observations, Freud detached Angstneurose ( anxiety neurosis ) from neurasthenia, also separating chronic anxiety from anxiety attacks. Although psychoanalytic classifications of anxiety were well-accepted until the mid 1900 s, in the following decades different factors contributed to re-orientate Psychiatry, particularly towards Biology. One important factor was the development of Psychopharmacology. With the so-called psychopharmacological revolution , which began in the 1960 s, the modern descriptive and operational - classifications of mental disorders appeared. The DSM-III (Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, in its third version), published in 1980, inaugurates a new relationship between Psychiatry and Psychopathology, although its conception of mental disorder is not a very clear one. The birth of panic disorder as a nosological category is particularly related to this change in perspective, since it takes place from the pharmacological observation of the therapeutic effects of a new drug, imipramine. In this sense, the purpose of the present study is to investigate the concepts of anxiety adopted in Psychiatry, particularly from the second half of the 19th century until the development of the DSM-IV. At first, the present study will focus on the development of Angstneurose as a clinical entity, by Freud. For that, a brief examination of the clinical terms adopted to designate anxiety states before Freud s time will be performed. Also, the transformations of the Freudian ideas concerning anxiety will be discussed, from a conceptual and diagnostic stand point. In a second moment, the historical evolution of what the diagnostic manuals for mental disorders call anxiety disorders will be investigated, emphasizing the reorganization that these new classification systems bring to the understanding of the concept of anxiety. An attempt to establish a parallel between these new nosological entities and the Freudian categories will be performed. At last, possible points of intersection between Psychiatry and Psychoanalysis, which might contribute to a better understanding of mental phenomena, will be discussed, on the basis of Freud s incursions into Biology. / A ansiedade tem sido objeto de interesse do pensamento ocidental há séculos. Entretanto, enquanto quadros patológicos, os chamados estados ansiosos apenas adquiriram proeminência na Psiquiatria, a partir dos trabalhos de Sigmund Freud, no final do século XIX. Ao estudar a ansiedade clínica, Freud separou a Angstneurose ( neurose de ansiedade ou neurose de angústia ) da neurastenia, e a ansiedade crônica, dos ataques de ansiedade. Embora as classificações clínicas propostas pela Psicanálise tenham sido relativamente bem aceitas no meio psiquiátrico até a primeira metade do século XX, nas décadas que se seguiram, alguns fatores contribuíram para reorientar o curso da Psiquiatria, em especial em direção à Biologia; dentre estes se destacam os avanços na área da psicofarmacologia. Com a chamada revolução psicofarmacológica, que tem seu início a partir da década de 60, constata-se o surgimento das abordagens nosográficas operacionais , em Psiquiatria, que permanecem até os nossos dias. Surgem, a partir daí, sistemas classificatórios padronizados como o DSM-III ( Diagnostic Statiscal Manual of Mental Disorders , em sua terceira versão), que irão inaugurar uma nova era de relações entre a Psiquiatria e a Psicopatologia, muito embora os modelos explicativos imanentes a estes sistemas nem sempre se encontrem explícitos. O nascimento do transtorno do pânico enquanto categoria nosográfica está intimamente ligado a esta mudança de perspectiva, tendo em vista que se dá a partir da observação dos efeitos terapêuticos de uma droga, a imipramina, sobre alguns dos sintomas do quadro clínico. Nesse sentido, o objetivo geral do presente trabalho será examinar criticamente alguns dos conceitos de ansiedade vigentes na Psiquiatria, em particular a partir da segunda metade do século XIX até a criação do DSM-IV, dando ênfase aos possíveis modelos teóricos encontrados, subjacentes às diferentes concepções. Em uma primeira etapa, o trabalho focalizará essencialmente o momento histórico fundamental da construção do diagnóstico de Angstneurose por Sigmund Freud. Para tanto, será traçado um breve histórico dos termos clínicos utilizados até a época de Freud e que de alguma maneira influenciaram o surgimento desta nova entidade nosológica. Serão discutidas também questões relativas às transformações sofridas pelo conceito freudiano de ansiedade, tanto segundo um critério diagnóstico quanto conceitual, a partir de uma análise dos principais textos de Freud sobre o tema. Em um segundo momento do trabalho, será dada atenção especial ao estudo da evolução histórica daquilo que os manuais de diagnóstico psiquiátrico têm chamado de transtornos de ansiedade , enfatizando a reorganização que estes novos sistemas classificatórios impuseram à compreensão dos fenômenos ansiosos. Um paralelo será também traçado entre as proposições iniciais de Freud e as novas entidades nosológicas, encontradas nos manuais de diagnóstico em Psiquiatria. Finalmente, serão discutidos possíveis pontos de interseção tendo por base a relação de Freud com a Biologia - entre as duas disciplinas hoje entendidas por alguns como tão diversas, Psicanálise e Psiquiatria, pontos que possam contribuir para uma compreensão mais ampla dos fenômenos mentais.