I den här uppsatsen undersöker jag det rationella i att tro på Jesu uppståndelse. Då uppståndelsen är en central del i den kristna läran kan man tänka sig att det är viktigt för troende kristna att bevisa att det inte är irrationellt att tro på den. En sådan troende kristen är Stephen T Davis och det jag särskilt tittar på här är huruvida denne lyckas bevisa det rationella i att tro på uppståndelsen. I en debatt mellan honom och Michael Martin försöker Davis visa att uppståndelsen är sannolik. Martin kommer i sitt svar med invändningar, där han förklarar att uppståndelsen är osannolik. Båda använder sig av ett förnuftsresonemang då de försöker avgöra det rationella i att tro på Jesu uppståndelse. Jag frågar mig om man verkligen kan bedöma det rationella i att tro genom att använda sig av förnuftsresonemang. Jag frågar mig också om Davis med sitt inlägg verkligen lyckas bevisa något, och om inte, om han hade kunnat göra det på något annat sätt. Det jag kommer fram till, efter att ha gått igenom bl a vad rationalitet och tro innebär, är att Davis, om han vill försvara det rationella i att tro på Jesu uppståndelse, inte kan bygga sitt försvar på ett sannolikhetsresonemang. Tro är, menar jag, något annat än kunskap baserad på empirisk erfarenhet, den tillhör en annan verklighet än vår vanliga verifierbara och kan knappast ligga till grund för sannolikhetsbedömningar. Man kan inte heller utifrån sannolikhetsresonemang bedöma tron, eller huruvida det är rationellt att ha den. Jag menar att Davis inte lyckas bevisa det rationella i att tro på Jesu uppståndelse, tvärtom lyckas han bevisa det irrationella i att göra det, eftersom han angriper problemet på fel sätt. Han borde istället ha låtit tron vara kvar i den verklighet där den hör hemma. Det är inte, vad jag kan se, irrationellt att ha olika religioner, eller andra uppfattningar och normer som vi fått oss förmedlade av kultur och samhälle, och därför inte heller irrationellt att utifrån en sådan tro anse att uppståndelsen skulle kunna ha inträffat trots att den, enligt vad vi vet om den vanliga världen utifrån empirisk erfarenhet och sannolikhetsbedömningar, inte är sannolik.

This work considers the strategic value of the 1935 London Naval Conference to the United States Navy and the American Government. It addresses longstanding historiographical debates on interwar American foreign policy, including the nature of isolationism under the Roosevelt Administration, the degree of Anglo-American cooperation in the 1930s, and the strategic vision of the United States Navy in the Pacific in the interwar period. Taking into account in equal degrees the perspectives of the uniformed naval officers and the civilian diplomats in the State Department, this thesis will argue that American participation in the 1935 London Naval Conference shows a degree of international participation and a commitment to the international order that is often overlooked by historians in this field.

Arriving in the United States as an immigrant in 1881, James J. Davis worked as an iron puddler and tin worker before entering upon a business career early in the twentieth century. In 1906 he joined the Loyal Order of Moose and as Supreme Organizer built up that nearly defunct fraternal order to over half a million members by the end of World War I. This achievement led to his appointment as Director General of the Moose in 1919. Davis's national reputation in fraternal circles and his brief experience as a labor leader placed him in contention for the Labor Department portfolio in 1920. However, even though he was a staunch Republican and had actively supported Warren G. Harding in the presidential campaign, his selection as Secretary of Labor was not expected.James J. Davis served as Secretary of Labor for nearly ten years. His first few months were difficult because there was a nationwide depression and several labor disputes occurred during this period. Davis demonstrated a measure of ability and tact in heading off a threatened strike in the meatpacking industry and then proceeded to deliver innumerable speeches for the remainder of 1921 in an attempt to create a climate of optimism to counter the negative atmosphere resulting from the economic slump. During this time Davis functioned primarily as a public relations agent for the Harding Administration.Secretary Davis played a significant role in helping the Administration settle a major coal strike in 1922 and also contributed in a lesser degree to the ending of a nationwide railroad strike which occurred the same year. At this time, however, Davis labored in the shadow of the more influential Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover. This subordinate status became even more evident after Calvin Coolidge became President in 1923.Throughout his career as Secretary of Labor, James J. Davis expended most of his energy on the subject of immigration. He supported the Quota Act of 1921 and waged a personal campaign to make the 1924 Immigration Act reflect a more selective immigration policy. Davis was only partially successful in these efforts. When Coolidge was in the White House Secretary Davis continued to push for selective immigration. His advocacy of some measures brought Davis into disagreement with the foreign policy aims of Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes and then his successor, Frank B. Kellogg. Davis's fight for selective immigration also placed him in conflict with such congressmen as Fiorello H. La Guardia who opposed the resrictionist measures of the decade.Although Secretary Davis was unable to persuade Congress to adopt many of his legislative proposals on immigration, he did bring about considerable change in the operation of the Immigration Service. Under Davis the Bureau of Immigration was reorganized and streamlined to meet the demands of the changing immigration policy of the United States during the 1920's.James J. Davis got along well with the three presidents whom he served. His relations with Harding were especially cordial. Coolidge, too, found Davis to be amenable and called on him to campaign for the party ticket in 1924 and 1928. Davis was used by Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover as an emissary to labor groups. These Republican Presidents counted on Davis to placate labor.After the 1929 stock market crash Davis was pressed into service defending the efforts of the Hoover Administration to cope with the ensuing depression. In 1930 Secretary Davis became a candidate for the United States Senate from Pennsylvania by winning the Republican primary election. He then gained that office with a landslide vote. After weathering a challenge of his credentials because of alleged excessive campaign expenditures, Davis took his seat as the junior United States Senator from Pennsylvania.

Thesis (D.Min)--Abilene Christian University, 2006. / Abstract and vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 66-68).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 282-287). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1936. / Typescript. Includes abstract and vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 303-311).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1955. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 195-197).

Thesis (M. Sc.)--University of Hong Kong, 1991.

Thesis (Ph.D. in Civil and Environmental Engineeering)--University of California, Davis, 2008. / Text document in PDF format. Title from PDF title page (viewed on August 26, 2009). "September 2008." Includes bibliographical references (p. 150-154).

Thesis (M.S. in Civil and Environmental Engineering)--University of California, Davis, 2007. / Text document in PDF format. Title from PDF title page (viewed on August 28, 2009). "Received by ITS-Davis: November 2007"--Publication detail webpage. Includes bibliographical references (p. 110-115).