Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2016-10-18T17:02:20Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Luciana Saab.pdf: 1431454 bytes, checksum: 91d3dd276795e9f3636f53ff43c68b3e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-10-18T17:02:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Luciana Saab.pdf: 1431454 bytes, checksum: 91d3dd276795e9f3636f53ff43c68b3e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-08-26 / This paper refers to the signing of the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinians in September 1993 from the understanding that the necessary terms in order to solve the historical conflict are not discussed in the peace process. The reading of the first document to be signed, the Declaration of Principles (DOP), reveals that the contents of the peace proposal and the bilateral negotiations formula do not alter the existing asymmetry of power between Palestinians from the PLO and the State of Israel, which makes the uneven process extremely favorable to the continuation of the Israeli military occupation over the territories of Gaza and the West Bank. The paper therefore focuses its analysis on the negotiation process previous to the signing of the DOP and the political and economic context of those responsible for Oslo, in order to establish what were the interests involved and how they influenced the drafting of the terms of the Declaration. During the research, it becomes clear that the Oslo agreements only benefited the actors involved in secret negotiations in Norway, namely the PLO and Israeli Labor Party, which allows us to state that the peace process was not representative of the various Palestinian and Israeli political sectors. The study also reveals that the peace proposal made to the Palestinians in Oslo is an Israeli formulation, that refers back to the beginning of the peace process in the Middle East in 1978, whose main goal was the normalization of diplomatic relations between Israel and the Arab neighboring states . Thus, the conditions discussed in Oslo were based on an old assumption that regional peace does not imply in the creation of a Palestinian state, but only the right to self-representation of the Palestinian residents in the occupied territories. These conditions were accepted by Yasser Arafat as a strategy to gain political prestige and return to the territory of Palestine. We conclude therefore that the Oslo peace process was not a legitimate initiative to establish a fair and equal peace in the region, as claimed by Israel and the United States, but an agreement made between the Israeli Labour Party and the PLO, drafted to enabled the Israeli territorial expansion over the West Bank and Gaza, to dismiss the question of refugees and not recognize the Palestinian’s right to national self-determination / Este trabalho retoma a assinatura dos Acordos de Oslo entre israelenses e palestinos em setembro de 1993 a partir do entendimento de que os termos necessários para a resolução do conflito histórico não são discutidos no processo de paz. No decorrer da análise do texto do primeiro documento a ser assinado, a Declaração de Princípios (DOP), percebe-se que o conteúdo da proposta de paz e a fórmula de negociações bilaterais adotada não propõem uma alteração da assimetria de poder existente entre palestinos da OLP e o Estado de Israel, o que torna o processo desigual e extremamente favorável à continuação da ocupação militar israelense sobre os territórios da Faixa de Gaza e da Cisjordânia. O trabalho, portanto, foca sua análise no processo de negociação anterior à assinatura da DOP e no contexto político e econômico dos responsáveis por Oslo para estabelecer quais foram os interesses envolvidos em fechar um acordo e de que maneira eles influenciaram a redação dos termos da declaração. Durante a pesquisa, notamos que os Acordos de Oslo beneficiaram exclusivamente os atores envolvidos nas negociações secretas na Noruega, a OLP e israelenses do partido trabalhista, o que nos permite afirmar que o processo de paz não foi representativo dos diversos setores políticos palestinos e israelenses. O estudo também revela que a proposta de paz oferecida aos palestinos em Oslo é uma formulação israelense que remete ao início do processo de paz no Oriente Médio no ano de 1978, cujo principal objetivo foi a normalização das relações diplomáticas entre israelenses e os Estados árabes vizinhos. Assim, as condições negociadas na ocasião de Oslo partiram de um antigo pressuposto de que a paz regional não pressupõe a criação do Estado palestino, mas apenas o direito de autorrepresentação dos residentes dos territórios ocupados. Essas condições foram aceitas pela liderança de Yasser Arafat como estratégia para obter prestígio político e retornar ao território da Palestina. Concluímos, portanto, que o processo de paz de Oslo não se tratou de uma legítima iniciativa para estabelecer a paz de maneira justa e igualitária na região, conforme divulgado por Israel e pelos Estados Unidos, mas de um acordo entre o partido trabalhista e os palestinos da OLP, elaborado de uma maneira que possibilitou a expansão territorial israelense sobre Gaza e Cisjordânia, desconsiderou a questão dos refugiados e não reconheceu o direito à autodeterminação nacional palestina

In 1995, the Palestinian Authority (PA) was established as an interim Palestinian government on shreds of land within the West Bank and Gaza. One of the new authority’s lesser-known administrative mandates is protection of the environment from pollution. Though the PA was to have a semblance of “self-rule,” the Oslo Accords that established the PA also stipulated that the latter seek Israeli approval when building most large-scale infrastructures—including those designed to manage waste. Meanwhile, emergent ideas about the environment defined it as a limitless expanse. The environment projected out from PA enclaves on thirty percent of the land in all directions—including into the air above and into the subterrain below. The Accords projected environmental responsibility into Israel proper as well as into areas it “shares” with Palestinians in the occupied territories. As a consequence, Palestinian waste infrastructures are objects of concern not only to the Palestinian communities they are designed to serve but also to the Israeli state, to Israeli settlements, to regional neighbors and to foreign donors in far-flung offices who are concerned with “environmental security.” This dissertation investigates a series of multimillion dollar PA projects aimed at protecting what came to be called the “shared” environment through management of Palestinian wastes. In doing so it analyzes the tension between the insistence, on the one hand, that the PA govern “its” population within strictly defined borders as part of a hierarchical system of nested sovereignties in which Israel’s is the superior form, and the imperative, on the other hand, that this territorially-defined, officially interim government perform care for the territory’s longterm ecological future. It tends to be taken for granted that Oslo produced a period of separation by enclosing the West Bank and Gaza and cleaving them off from Israel proper. Millions of West Bank Palestinians are no longer permitted to work in, travel through or even visit Jerusalem or Israel. Israel has prohibited Israeli citizens’ entry into PA areas of the West Bank. This allows PA areas to appear relatively autonomous—insofar as they are viewed as separate from Israel. But in a number of significant ways, Israel continues to control and to direct the daily experiences and future possibilities of West Bank Palestinians. Separation and control are thus equally accurate characterizations of Palestinians’ experiences post-Oslo. This dissertation contends that their particular combination in the post-Oslo period has allowed people living in the West Bank to experience PA governance as what, borrowing a term I heard there, I call a phantom state (shibih dowlah). Palestinians see the limits of PA autonomy vis-a-vis Israel and the PA’s many donors. The PA is specter-like: an appearance without stable material follow-through. People nevertheless treat the PA as a matter-of-fact, tangible part of their lives: as an address for appeal, requests and complaints, as a distinct entity upon which responsibility, blame and, very occasionally, even praise is bestowed. Studies of garbage at the turn of the twenty-first century show that modern waste has the capacity to destabilize and to undermine political systems because of the risks it is perceived to pose and because of the difficulty of keeping it stable and contained. Unlike water, oil and electricity, waste is an infrastructural substrate whose flows should move out from inhabited areas rather than into them. As mobile, abject matter that perpetually threatens the environment, it requires constant monitoring. It is managed at regional scales. In the Palestinian context, waste therefore reveals some of the spatial-geographical complexities that render the treatment of separation and control as an either/or dynamic impossible to sustain. It also reveals the ways in which believing both separation and control to be true for the people experiencing them in combination means living, working and planning within a logic of constant contradiction. Waste is not the only infrastructural substrate that reveals the Mobius strip of separation and connectedness of the post-Oslo period. But waste and its infrastructures are uniquely useful for showing the impossibility and the partialness of a politics of separation more broadly in an emergent era of environmental securitization. This dissertation thus analyzes an incommensurable tension in what Achille Mbembe has called a “late-modern colonial occupation” that operates in the style of older forms of indirect colonial rule. That tension renders governance of people and territory both difficult and incoherent. It produces environmental hazards while seeking to eliminate them. And it performs major political displacements among colonized and colonizers alike.