Excessive video play has been well documented over the course of the last decade. So much so that newest version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5; APA, 2013) has included excessive video gaming as disorder categorized as internet gaming disorder. To date, several researchers have designed assessments to evaluate excessive video game play based on the previous editions and current editions of the DSM. However, these assessments primarily measure the criterion established in these manuals, instead of measuring the maintaining function of the video game play. The field of applied behavior analysis has been utilizing functional assessments for the last 30 years and has showed evidence of effective results across different populations and environments. Therefore, the purpose of this proposed study is to validate an indirect functional assessment entitled the Video Game Functional Assessment-Revised (VGFA-R) by means of conducting content, construct and criterion related validity.

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / Several pathological disorders are characterized by maladaptive decision-making (Dalley & Robbins, 2017). Decision-making tasks, such as Delay Discounting (DD), are used to assess the behavioral manifestations of maladaptive decision-making in both clinical and preclinical settings (de Wit, Flory, Acheson, Mccloskey, & Manuck, 2007). DD measures cognitive impulsivity and broadly refers to the inability to delay gratification (Hamilton et al., 2015). How decisions are made in tasks that measure DD can be understood by assessing patterns of behavior that are observable in the sequences of choices or the statistics that accompany each choice (e.g. response latency). These measures have led to insights that suggest strategies that are used by the agent to facilitate the decision (Linsenbardt, Smoker, Janetsian-Fritz, & Lapish, 2016). The current set of analyses aims to use individual trial data to identify the neural underpinnings associated with strategy transition during DD. A greater understanding of how strategy change occurs at a neural level will be useful for developing cognitive and behavioral strategies aimed at reducing impulsive choice. The rat dorso-medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) has been implicated as an important brain region for recognizing the need to change strategy during DD (Powell & Redish, 2016). Using advanced statistical techniques, such as demixed principal component analysis (dPCA), we can then begin to understand how decision representations evolve over the decision- making process to impact behaviors such as strategy change. This study was the first known attempt at using dPCA applied to individual sessions to accurately model how decision representations evolve across individual trials. Evidence exists that representations follow a breakdown and remapping at the individual trial level (Karlsson, Tervo, & Karpova, 2012; Powell & Redish, 2016). Furthermore, these representational changes across individual trials have previously been proposed to act as a signal to change strategies (Powell & Redish, 2016). This study aimed to test the hypothesis that a ‘breakdown’ followed by a ‘remapping’ of the decision representation would act as a signal to change strategy that is observable in the behavior of the animal. To investigate the relationship between trials surrounding the breakdown and/or subsequent remapping of the decision representation and trials surrounding strategy changes, sequences of trials surrounding the breakdown and/or remapping were compared to sequences of 9 trials surrounding the strategy-change trial. Strategy types consisted of either exploiting the immediate lever (IM-Exploit), delay lever (DEL-Exploit), or exploring between the two lever options (Explore). Contrary to the hypothesis, an overall relationship between breakdown and remapping trial sequences were not associated with change-trial sequences. In partial support of the hypothesis however, at the 4-sec delay when the subjective value of the immediate reward was high, a relationship between breakdown sequence and strategy change sequence was detected for when the animal was exploiting the delay lever (e.g. DEL-Exploit strategy). This result suggests that a breakdown in decision representation may act as a signal to prompt strategy change under certain contexts. One notable finding of this study was that the decision representation was much more robust at the 4-sec delay compared to the 8-sec delay, suggesting that decisions at the 4-sec delay contain more context that differentiate the two choice options (immediate or delay). In other words, the encoding of the two choice options was more dissociable at the 4-sec delay compared to the 8-sec delay, which was quantified by measuring the average distance between the two representations (immediate and delay) on a given trial. Given that Wistar rats are equally likely to choose between the immediate and delay choice alternatives at the 8-sec delay (Linsenbardt et al., 2016), this finding provides further support for current prevalent theories of how animals use a cognitive search process to mentally imagine choice alternatives during deliberation. If context which differentiates choice options at the 8-sec delay is less dissociable, it is likely that the cognitive search process would be equally likely to find either choice option. If the choice options are equally likely to be found, it would be assumed that the choice alternatives would also be equally likely to be chosen, which is what has been observed in Wistar rats at the 8-sec delay.

Delay discounting (DD) and self-regulation are important predictors of substance use disorder (SUD) outcomes. Further, regulatory flexibility (RF; i.e., selecting, monitoring, and adapting coping techniques based on contextual demands) is related to psychological resilience. However, studies have yet to examine associations between DD, RF, and remission from SUDs. Individuals (N = 148) in SUD recovery completed the Context Sensitivity Index (CSI), the Flexible Regulation of Emotional Expression (FREE) Scale, and the Perceived Ability to Cope with Trauma (PACT) Scale to assess RF and, an Adjusting Amount Delay Discounting Task. T-tests were used to examine differences in RF and DD by remission status. Univariate linear regressions were used to examine the relationship between RF and DD. Finally, mediation models examined the dynamic relationship between DD, RF, and remission status. Remitted individuals (n=82) had significantly lower DD rates (p<0.001) and higher context sensitivity (p<0.001) and coping flexibility (p<0.001). There were significant negative associations between DD and context sensitivity (p=0.008), coping flexibility (p=0.002), and emotion regulation flexibility (p<0.001). Finally, context sensitivity (p=0.023) and coping flexibility (p=0.007) mediated the relationship between DD and SUD remission. Results suggest that individuals in recovery with broader temporal windows can better identify contextual demands and flexibly cope, contributing to improved SUD recovery outcomes. / M.S. / Preference for immediate gratification (also called delay discounting), and self-regulation (the ability to control one’s emotions) are related to addiction outcomes. Regulatory flexibility - a self-regulation process by which individuals select and adapt their coping strategies based on their situation - is related to improved mental health outcomes. However, research studies have yet to examine the relationship between regulatory flexibility and delay discounting in individuals with a history of drug and/or alcohol dependence. Using a sample from an online addiction recovery research and support community called the International Quit and Recovery Registry, the current thesis examined the relationship between delay discounting and regulatory flexibility grouped by substance use disorder clinical diagnoses amongst 148 individuals. Group comparisons suggested that individuals in remission (i.e., no longer meet criteria for clinical diagnosis of addiction) were better able to delay gratification and were better able to flexibly regulate their emotions compared to individuals who relapsed. When examining the relationship between delay discounting and regulatory flexibility, we found that individuals’ who preferred delayed rewards over immediate rewards were better able to flexibly self-regulate, suggesting that being able to delay gratification is an important component of effective coping, together contributing to improved addiction recovery outcomes.

Adolescence is a period of heightened risk for substance use and heightened vulnerability to substance exposure. Yet, little is known about how socioeconomic status (SES) influences adolescent decision making and behavior across development to add to these risks. This prospective longitudinal study used latent growth curve modeling (GCM) to examine the contributions of SES on adolescent delay discounting and substance use in a sample of 167 adolescents (52% male). Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to compute SES factor scores across three waves using a composite of parent and spouse education years and combined annual household income. Adolescent delay discounting and substance use were measured annually across three waves. The main goal of this study is to examine how SES may explain individual differences in growth trajectories of delay discounting and substance use. We used parallel process growth curve modeling with SES as a time-varying and time-invariant covariate to examine the associations between adolescent SES, delay discounting, and substance use onset as well as frequency. These results reveal that delay discounting exhibits a declining linear trend across adolescent development whereas cigarette, alcohol, marijuana, and polysubstance use exhibit increasing linear trends across adolescent development. Furthermore, low SES (as a time-invariant covariate) may lead to earlier onset adolescent alcohol and polysubstance use by way of heightened levels of delay discounting. These findings suggest that delay discounting interventions may be a promising avenue for reducing socioeconomic disparities in early onset alcohol and polysubstance use, while delay discounting development is still underway. / Master of Science / Adolescence is a period of heightened risk for substance use and heightened vulnerability to the effects of substances. Yet, little is known about how socioeconomic status (SES) influences adolescent decision making and behavior to add to these risks. This study used latent growth curve modeling (GCM) to examine the role of SES on adolescent decision making and substance use in a sample of 167 adolescents (52% male). Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to compute SES factor scores across three time points using an average of parent and spouse education years and income. Adolescent delay discounting and substance use were measured annually across three time points. The main goal of this study is to examine how SES may explain individual differences in delay discounting and substance use across adolescence. We used parallel process growth curve modeling with SES as a time-varying and time-invariant covariate to examine the links between adolescent SES, delay discounting, and substance use age of onset and frequency. These results reveal that delay discounting shows linear decreases in growth across adolescence whereas cigarette, alcohol, marijuana, and polysubstance use show increasing linear growth across adolescence. Additionally, low SES may lead to earlier onset adolescent alcohol and polysubstance use by way of heightened levels of delay discounting. These findings suggest that delay discounting interventions may help reduce socioeconomic differences in early onset alcohol and polysubstance use, while delay discounting development is still in progress.

Positive, but distal consequences of reducing alcohol use among at-risk users may have little impact on behavior due to temporal discounting (Mazur, 1987), in which delayed rewards are devalued relative to more proximal rewards, even if such distal rewards actually provide considerably more value. Delay discounting may be manipulated using a variety of means, one of which involves utilizing prospective thinking about future autobiographical events and is termed Episodic Future Thinking (Atance and ONeill, 2001). Episodic future thinking (EFT) has been demonstrated in previous studies to be effective in reducing delay discounting relative to a variety of control conditions (Benoit, Gilbert, and Burgess, 2011; Daniel, Stanton, and Epstein, 2013a, 2013b; Lin and Epstein, 2014; Peters and Büchel, 2010) and recently among substance-abusing populations (Snider, LaConte, and Bickel, 2016; Stein et al., 2016). The present study examined EFT in a novel sample of at-risk alcohol users. Participants were randomized to EFT, episodic past thinking (EPT), or a control condition in which non-autobiographical events were recalled (CET). Immediately following intervention, results demonstrated significantly less discounting in EFT and EPT, relative to CET. At follow-up, EFT demonstrated significantly less temporal discounting and alcohol use, when compared to both EPT and CET. No differences among conditions in alcohol demand or alcohol use intentions were observed. The present study contributes a number of novel findings to the literature, most notably that engaging in EFT predicts reductions in alcohol use prospectively and that reductions in delay discounting associated with EFT persist at least a week later, without any additional intervention. Such findings suggest that EFT manipulations influence the valuation of future rewards. Additionally, findings support EFT as a useful supplement to existing empirically-supported treatments or a component of novel substance use disorder treatments. / Ph. D. / Drug and alcohol addiction is characterized by seemingly illogical decisions to forgo important benefits associated with abstinence or moderated use (e.g., maintaining employment) in favor of the immediate gratification of intoxication. The tendency to favor instant gratification and devalue delayed rewards explains impulsive decision making typical of substance use disorders and other impulse control problems. The present study evaluated whether vividly imagining positive future events reduced this tendency toward instant gratification. College students at high risk for an alcohol use disorder participated in the study. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups: one in which they were asked to imagine positive events they anticipated in the future, one in which they were asked to imagine positive events from their past, and one in which they were asked to recall events described in a provided travel blog. Immediately after imagining the events, participants in both the past and future conditions were less oriented towards instant gratification than participants who were asked to recall events from a travel blog. When measured a week later, participants in the future condition reported less devaluation of future rewards, as well as less alcohol use, than participants in the other two groups. Overall, the results of the study provide evidence that vividly imagining positive future events reduces impulsivity among at-risk college student drinkers. As such, imagining future events may be an effective component of future treatment efforts for substance use disorders and other impulse control problems.

Background: The valuation of risks and the speed with which decisions are made and acted upon are important characteristics of everyone’s personality. These characteristics exist along a continuum that ranges from weak to strong expressions of impulsivity. In certain situations it is crucial to decide and react quickly. Yet these qualities can prove disadvantageous if they are expressed excessively and persistently. Self-reports, such as the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, inquire long-term patterns of behavior to assess the level of trait impulsivity. Experimental paradigms, on the other hand, quantify specific impulsive facets, which depend rather on the current environment and state of the individual. These paradigms include decision-making tasks that capture impulsive facets such as the attitudes towards delays, risks and losses. Research indicates that these attitudes are governed by a valuation network of cortical and subcortical brain regions along with several neurotransmitters. Within this intricate network, frontostriatal circuits innervated by dopamine were identified as an important locus of control. Although a wealth of studies have subsequently examined the influence of the dopaminergic system on impulsive choice, the regulatory mechanisms remain largely unclear. This may originate from the interrelations within the valuation network but also from the complexity of the dopaminergic system itself. Seminal investigations have shown that this complicated interplay may be partly explained by an underlying inverted U-shaped function, which describes an optimal level of dopamine, flanked by increasing impulsivity in the context of sub- and supraoptimal signaling. Research Question: This work aimed to shed more light on the inverted-U theory by characterizing the contribution of dopaminergic signaling to trait and decisional impulsivity, and by clarifying whether the manipulation of decisional impulsivity through boosting striatal dopamine via L-DOPA depends on baseline signaling. We hypothesized that individuals with optimal striatal dopaminergic signaling as measured by [18F]DOPA positron emission tomography would feature low trait impulsivity as assessed with the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale. By contrast, individuals with suboptimal signaling were hypothesized to exhibit stronger trait impulsivity corresponding to higher scores on the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale. Assuming an inverted U-shaped function, we predicted that the dopamine precursor L-DOPA would reduce impulsive decisions in the latter but overdose individuals with an already optimal signaling and thus make their choice behavior more impulsive. Materials and Methods: The present studies combined trait and choice measures of impulsivity with the investigation of the dopaminergic system by positron emission tomography and a pharmacological manipulation. In a double-blind, randomized, placebo-controlled, counter-balanced, repeated measures design, 87 healthy adults completed a computerized decision-making test battery. The battery includes four tasks, each of which captures one distinct dimension of impulsive choice: a delay discounting task quantifies delay discounting, a probability discounting for gains task quantifies risk-seeking for gains, a probability discounting for losses task quantifies risk-seeking for losses and a mixed gambles task quantifies loss aversion. In order to test for baseline-dependent L-DOPA effects on these dimensions, we controlled for trait impulsivity (a suggested proxy for central dopamine) as assessed with the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (N = 87) and striatal dopamine as measured by [18F]DOPA positron emission tomography (in 60 of the 87 participants). Results: Our findings highlight the complex role of dopamine in impulsivity and the heterogeneity of its underlying biology. Participants who scored relatively high on the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale appeared to benefit from L-DOPA, indicated by a decrease in delay discounting, risk-seeking for gains and loss aversion. Participants with low levels of impulsive personality traits as assessed with the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, on the other hand, exhibited opposite changes in choice preference. Bearing in mind that trait impulsivity may be a behavioral expression of central dopamine, our results suggest an inverted U-shaped function in which impulsive decision-making arises from both sub- and supraoptimal dopaminergic activity. We found further support for an inverted U-shaped function when accounting for baseline dopamine as measured by [18F]DOPA positron emission tomography. Participants who had higher values on the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale featured low, presumably suboptimal, striatal dopamine signaling. After enhancing and possibly optimizing the basal signaling with L-DOPA, they discounted delays less and tended to less risk-seeking for gains and loss aversion. By contrast, participants with low trait impulsivity as assessed with the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale exhibited higher striatal dopamine, probably corresponding to optimal baseline activity as L-DOPA shifted their choice behavior in the opposite direction, thus indicating a dopamine overdose. The intake of L-DOPA had no influence on risk-seeking for losses, even when differences in trait impulsivity and basal levels of striatal dopamine were considered. Performance on tasks of the decision-making battery produced only few, weak intercorrelations, which implies that delay discounting, risk-seeking for gains, risk-seeking for losses and loss aversion represent dissociable aspects of choice. Conclusions: Our results endorse and extend previous findings that indicated an inverted U-shaped influence of dopamine on delay discounting and decisions under risk. Utilizing a battery of largely independent choice tasks, we were able to disentangle the effect of gains and losses on risky decisions. Whereas risk-seeking for gains seemed to depend on baseline dopamine signaling, we found no evidence for dopaminergic neurotransmission affecting risk-seeking for losses. Consistent with the literature, our data shows that self-reported trait impulsivity and experimentally measured decision-making dimensions are distinct phenomena within the multidimensional construct of impulsivity. Our analyses further revealed that choice measures were differentially related to dopaminergic activity, which suggests that they represent not merely descriptive distinctions but separable psychobiological decision-making processes. Since the regulation of choice probably spreads across neurotransmitter systems, more research on these systems is warranted. After identifying the precise mechanisms within each system, comprehensive studies of their interplay may ultimately uncover how impulsive decisions arise. Considering a series of studies that related steep delay discounting and excessive risk-seeking to poor health and mental illness, the acquired knowledge may also inform translational research on impulsivity-related maladies. / Hintergrund: Die Bewertung von Risiken und die Schnelligkeit mit der Entscheidungen getroffen und umgesetzt werden, sind wichtige Persönlichkeitsmerkmale eines jeden Menschen. Diese Merkmale existieren entlang eines Kontinuums, das von schwachen bis zu starken Ausprägungen von Impulsivität reicht. In bestimmten Situationen ist es entscheidend, schnell zu entscheiden und zu reagieren. Diese Eigenschaften können sich jedoch als nachteilig erweisen, wenn sie übermäßig und beharrlich zum Ausdruck gebracht werden. Selbstauskunftsberichte wie die Barratt-Impulsivitätsskala fragen nach überdauernden Verhaltensmustern, um den Grad impulsiver Persönlichkeit zu beurteilen. Experimentelle Paradigmen hingegen quantifizieren spezifische impulsive Facetten, die eher von der aktuellen Umwelt und Verfassung des Individuums abhängen. Zu diesen Paradigmen gehören Entscheidungsaufgaben, die impulsive Facetten wie die Einstellungen zu Verzögerungen, Risiken und Verlusten erfassen. Forschungsarbeiten legen nahe, dass diese Einstellungen von einem Bewertungsnetzwerk aus kortikalen und subkortikalen Hirnregionen zusammen mit mehreren Neurotransmittern gesteuert werden. Innerhalb dieses komplizierten Netzwerks wurden durch Dopamin innervierte frontostriatale Schaltkreise als wichtige Kontrollpunkte identifiziert. Obwohl nachfolgend eine Fülle von Studien den Einfluss des dopaminergen Systems auf impulsive Entscheidungen untersucht hat, bleiben die Regulationsmechanismen weitgehend unklar. Dies mag von den Wechselbeziehungen innerhalb des Bewertungsnetzwerks, aber auch von der Komplexität des dopaminergen Systems selbst herrühren. Bahnbrechende Untersuchungen haben gezeigt, dass dieses komplizierte Zusammenspiel teilweise durch eine zugrundeliegende umgekehrte U-Funktion erklärt werden könnte, die einen optimalen Dopamin-Spiegel flankiert von zunehmender Impulsivität bei sub- und supraoptimaler Signalgebung beschreibt. Fragestellung: Diese Arbeit zielte darauf ab, die umgekehrte U-Hypothese näher zu beleuchten, indem sie den Beitrag der dopaminergen Signalgebung zu Persönlichkeits- und Entscheidungsimpulsivität charakterisiert und klärt, ob die Manipulation der Entscheidungsimpulsivität durch Erhöhung des striatalen Dopamins mittels L-DOPA vom Baseline-Signal abhängt. Wir nahmen an, dass Individuen mit optimaler striataler dopaminerger Signalgebung, gemessen mit der 18F-DOPA Positronen-Emissions-Tomographie, eine geringe Persönlichkeitsimpulsivität aufweisen würden, die mit der Barratt-Impulsivitätsskala bewertet wurde. Bei Individuen mit suboptimaler Signalgebung vermuteten wir hingegen eine impulsivere Persönlichkeit, die höheren Werten auf der Barratt-Impulsivitätsskala entspricht. Unter Annahme einer umgekehrten U-Funktion prognostizierten wir, dass der Dopamin-Vorläufer L-DOPA bei letzteren impulsive Entscheidungen reduzieren würde, aber Individuen mit bereits optimaler Signalgebung überdosieren und somit deren Entscheidungsverhalten impulsiver machen würde. Material und Methoden: Die hier präsentierten Studien kombinierten Maße von Persönlichkeits- und Entscheidungsimpulsivität mit der Untersuchung des dopaminergen Systems mittels Positronen-Emissions-Tomographie und einer pharmakologischen Manipulation. In einem doppelblinden, randomisierten, placebokontrollierten, balancierten Messwiederholungsdesign absolvierten 87 gesunde Erwachsene eine computerbasierte Testbatterie zum Entscheidungsverhalten. Die Batterie umfasst vier Aufgaben, von denen jede eine bestimmte Dimension impulsiver Entscheidungsfindung erfasst: „Delay Discounting“ quantifiziert die Fähigkeit zum Belohnungsaufschub, „Probability Discounting for Gains“ quantifiziert das Risikoverhalten bei Gewinnen, „Probability Discounting for Losses“ quantifiziert das Risikoverhalten bei Verlusten und „Mixed Gambles“ quantifiziert die Verlustaversion. Um auf baseline-abhängige L-DOPA-Effekte bei diesen Dimensionen zu testen, kontrollierten wir für Persönlichkeitsimpulsivität (ein vorgeschlagener Proxy für zentrales Dopamin), die mit der Barratt-Impulsivitätsskala (N = 87) bewertet wurde, und für striatales Dopamin, das mit der 18F-DOPA Positronen-Emissions-Tomographie gemessen wurde (bei 60 der 87 Probanden und Probandinnen). Ergebnisse: Unsere Ergebnisse unterstreichen Dopamins komplexe Rolle in der Impulsivität und die Heterogenität der dieser zugrundeliegenden Biologie. Probanden und Probandinnen, die auf der Barratt-Impulsivitätsskala relativ hoch punkteten, schienen von L-DOPA zu profitieren, was sich in einer Abnahme der Abwertung von verzögerten Belohnungen, der Risikobereitschaft bei Gewinnen und der Verlustaversion zeigte. Probanden und Probandinnen mit einem geringen Grad an impulsiven Persönlichkeitszügen (bewertet mit der Barratt Impulsivitätsskala) zeigten dagegen entgegengesetzte Veränderungen in der Entscheidungspräferenz. In dem Bewusstsein, dass Persönlichkeitsimpulsivität ein Verhaltensausdruck zentralen Dopamins sein mag, suggerieren unsere Ergebnisse eine umgekehrte U-Funktion, bei der impulsives Entscheidungsverhalten sowohl aus sub- als auch supraoptimaler dopaminerger Aktivität erwächst. Wir fanden weiteren Anhalt für eine umgekehrte U-Funktion nach Berücksichtigung des Baseline-Dopamins, gemessen mit der 18F-DOPA Positronen-Emissions-Tomographie. Teilnehmer und Teilnehmerinnen mit höheren Werten auf der Barratt-Impulsivitätsskala wiesen eine niedrige, vermutlich suboptimale, striatale Dopamin-Signalgebung auf. Nach Erhöhung und möglicherweise Optimierung der basalen Signalgebung mittels L-DOPA werteten diese Verzögerungen weniger ab und neigten zu weniger Risikobereitschaft bei Gewinnen und Verlustaversion. Im Gegensatz dazu wiesen Teilnehmer und Teilnehmerinnen mit geringer Persönlichkeitsimpulsivität (bestimmt mit der Barratt-Impulsivitätsskala) ein höheres striatales Dopamin auf. Dies entsprach wahrscheinlich einer optimalen Baseline-Aktivität, da L-DOPA deren Entscheidungsverhalten in die entgegengesetzte Richtung verlagerte, hinweisend auf eine Dopamin-Überdosierung. Die Einnahme von L-DOPA hatte keinen Einfluss auf das Risikoverhalten bei Verlusten, selbst wenn Unterschiede in der Persönlichkeitsimpulsivität und den Basalspiegeln von striatalem Dopamin berücksichtigt wurden. Die Performanz in den Aufgaben der Entscheidungsbatterie war nur wenig und schwach untereinander korreliert, was impliziert, dass „Delay Discounting“, „Probability Discounting for Gains“, „Probability Discounting for Losses“ und „Mixed Gambles“ separate Entscheidungsaspekte repräsentieren. Schlussfolgerungen: Unsere Ergebnisse bestätigen und erweitern bisherige Erkenntnisse, die nahelegten, dass der Belohnungsaufschub und Entscheidungen unter Risiken unter einem umgekehrt U-förmigen Einfluss Dopamins stehen. Mit einer Batterie von weitgehend unabhängigen Entscheidungsaufgaben konnten wir die Effekte von Gewinnen und Verlusten auf riskante Entscheidungen auftrennen. Während das Risikoverhalten bei Gewinnen vom Baseline-Dopamin-Signal abhängig zu sein schien, fanden wir keine Hinweise dafür, dass sich die dopaminerge Neurotransmission auf das Risikoverhalten bei Verlusten auswirkt. Übereinstimmend mit der Literatur zeigen unsere Daten, dass selbstberichtete Persönlichkeitsimpulsivität und experimentell gemessene Entscheidungsdimensionen unterschiedliche Phänomene innerhalb des mehrdimensionalen Konstrukts der Impulsivität sind. Unsere Analysen ergaben ferner, dass Entscheidungsmaße in unterschiedlicher Beziehung zu dopaminerger Aktivität standen. Dies legt nahe, dass diese nicht nur beschreibende Unterscheidungen, sondern separate psychobiologische Entscheidungsprozesse darstellen. Da die Regulierung von Entscheidungen wahrscheinlich mehrere Neurotransmittersysteme umfasst, ist die weitere Erforschung dieser Systeme gerechtfertigt. Nach Identifizierung der genauen Mechanismen innerhalb jedes Systems könnten umfassende Studien zu deren Zusammenwirken letztlich aufdecken, wie impulsive Entscheidungen entstehen. Angesichts einer Reihe von Studien, die eine geringe Fähigkeit zum Belohnungsaufschub und eine übermäßige Risikobereitschaft mit schlechter Gesundheit und psychischen Erkrankungen in Verbindung brachten, könnte das erworbene Wissen auch in die translationale Erforschung impulsivitätsassoziierter Krankheiten einfließen.

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of Psychology / Gary L. Brase / This research tested a general mediation model which proposes that individual differences (e.g., impulsivity, delay discounting, and time orientation) mediate the relationship between time perception (one’s subjective experience of the passage of time relative to actual time) and intertemporal behavior (decision-making involving tradeoffs between costs and rewards in both the present and the future). Study I did not find evidence to support the general mediation model and found that time perception was only weakly correlated with individual differences and intertemporal behavior (average r = .06) . Study II found tentative support for the proposed mediation model: individual differences in impulsivity fully mediated the relationship between time perception and intertemporal behavior in 4 separate mediation models. Three additional mediation models met the assumptions of mediation, demonstrating indirect effects significantly different from zero, but did not fully mediate the relationship between time perception and intertemporal behavior. In general, the mediation models explored in Study II (both fully and partially mediated) suggest that self-report impulsivity mediates the relationship between time perception and intertemporal health behaviors, like hours of sleep slept per night, sociosexual orientation, and frequency of eating breakfast. The findings from Study II suggest that how time is perceived influences intertemporal behavior indirectly by influencing impulsivity. Guidelines to aid future research linking time perception to individual differences and intertemporal behavior are provided.

Individuals experience risk ubiquitously, but measuring risk taking is difficult. The balloon analogue risk task (BART) was developed in order to assess risk taking through having subjects press a key that accrues reward but also risk losing all reward with each press. In humans, greater responding in this task is associated with other maladaptive risk taking behaviors. The present research modeled this relationship in pigeons due to their previously shown propensity towards risk taking behavior. Experiment 1 used an unsignaled balloon task in which losing could only occur after 5 pecks. Results showed below optimal performance with greater pecks associated with faster acquisition of risk taking in the suboptimal choice task and evidence of modulation by delay discounting measures. Experiment 2 signaled the number of pecks with colors and tested multiple hoppers as a reinforcement modality to increase performance. Results showed only signaling the number of pecks improved performance and was related to performance in the high risk BART task. Both the low and high risk variants were associated with slower suboptimal choice acquisition and again had evidence of modulation by delay discounting measures. Potential shared underlying mechanisms are discussed.

Impulsivity and the effectiveness of a mindfulness-based intervention were explored in relation to improving behavioural self-regulation in adolescents with behavioural, emotional and social difficulties (BESD). A computerised choice task (CCT) was developed to measure delay discounting (a shift in choice from a larger reward to a smaller reward as the delay to the larger reward increases) in adolescents with BESD and compared it with several additional measures of impulsivity. The degree to which impulsivity and thoughts are related was explored using mindfulness measures. Effects of task type (computer versus sand-timer) and task context (school versus house) were also studied. Results suggested an effect of method but not location on discounting. Few between measure comparisons were significant, suggesting the possibility that different impulsivity measures assess different forms of impulsivity. However a significant negative correlation was found between impulsivity and mindfulness. A mindfulness-based intervention was implemented and results suggest potentially beneficial effects of applying mindfulness training to improve self-control and self-regulation in adolescents with BESD. Further research is necessary to determine the effectiveness of mindfulness training in adolescents with BESD, and explore differences between impulsivity measures to assist with effective measurement and intervention.

Abstract