By the end of the Second World War there were nearly a quarter of a million Poles in the Polish Armed Forces serving under British command. Whereas the other Allied armies eagerly anticipated their demobilisation, the future for the Poles seemed far from certain. On the 20th March, 1946, British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, issued a note to the Polish forces recommending, in the strongest possible terms, that the Poles should return to Poland to help in the country's reconstruction. Indeed some 105,000 took him up on the offer. Some 123,000 did not - a further 21,000 were recruited from Polish communities around the world and they returned home after demobilisation. The key question is why did so many Poles feel unable to return to Poland after the war? Chapter 1 examines the origins of the "Polish Armed Forces Question" and the legacy of bitterness the war has left, even in present day Poland. Chapter 2 looks at the British reactions to the Poles, particularly the important attitude of the Foreign Office. Chapter 3 deals with some of the decisions made by the troops caught in this dilemma. Chapter 4 examines conditions in post-war Poland, and is linked to Chapter 5 which looks at Warsaw's questionably welcoming attitude to the returning troops. Chapter 6 considers British public reaction to the Poles while Chapter 7 deals with the moves of the British Government to support the demobilised Polish forces and the birth of the Polish Resettlement Corps. The aim of this thesis is to establish how the troops of the Polish Armed Forces came to the decisions they did and what were the consequences of returning or not returning to Poland.

Yes / The success of programmes that relate to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants into civilian life is dependent on four crucial aspects. First, it is essential that there is insightful and comprehensive planning that is based on sound research and analysis in order for a realistic strategy to be developed. Second, it is critical that the requisite political will exist at all levels to implement this strategy efficiently and effectively. Third, these programmes are typically expensive and time-consuming processes, and hence the necessary resources, namely financial and material support, and technical expertise, need to be secured. Fourth, it is vital that effective monitoring and evaluation systems are included in DDR processes, and that these systems are an integral part of the implementation strategy. The purpose of this paper is to examine critically current DDR developments, as well as explore the possible next steps for DDR. This will include the consideration of the current state of DDR and the extent to which initiatives such as the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), the United Nations Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) and the Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR), as well as other contemporary policy instruments and programmes encompass a human security perspective and reflects the interests of the poor. The key question that this paper will explore is: to what extent does current or “third generation” DDR programming differ from those DDR initiatives of the 1980s and 1990s (or “second generation”)1; and to what extent do they contribute to the sustainable alleviation of poverty?

Faculty of Humanities School of Social Sciences 9003886p mashikel@social.wits.ac.za / Using in-depth interviews with key informants, participant observation, an analysis of documentary and archival sources, and a survey of a national sample of 395 former APLA and MK soldiers, this study analyses the process of demobilisation in South Africa between 1994 and 2004. The key questions are: why and how was the demobilisation process conducted and what were its consequences? Demobilisation is a shorthand term for the multi-staged process of converting a soldier to a civilian. This encompasses the release of soldiers from a statutory force or guerrilla group and their reintegration into civilian society. Reintegration is defined as “the process of facilitating the ex-soldiers’ transition to civilian life” (Clark, 1995: 50). In South Africa, demobilisation was envisaged as the last phase in the process of forming the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). The Interim Constitution (Act No. 200 of 1993) made provision for three phases in the formation of the SANDF. First was the integration of various armed forces. This was followed by a process of consolidation, which included the completion of bridging training by former members of the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA) and uMKhonto we Sizwe (MK). The final phase was the reduction of the size of the integrated SANDF, known as rationalisation. However, the concept held the same meaning as demobilisation. The thesis of this study is that the reduction of the size of the SANDF (known as rationalisation) was necessary for two reasons. First was the perceived and real improvement in the national and regional security environment. Second was the perceived economic and development impact of the reduction of defence expenditure. These were informed by the broadened concept of security, which was popularised by non-governmental organisations such as the Military Research Group. However, while rationalisation was postponed and anticipated as the final phase in the process of forming the SANDF, the presence of military “misfits” among former APLA and MK soldiers (the aged, the sick and those who lacked the necessary educational qualifications) led to the introduction of a process of excluding these categories from the process of integration. The process became known as demobilisation and was introduced without adequate planning. It differed from the anticipated rationalisation process which was meant to apply to all members of the integrated SANDF. Various factors pointed to the lack of adequate planning. First, demobilisation was introduced before the finalisation of the relevant legislation, and consequently the process was halted in 1995. Second, the demobilisation of former APLA and MK soldiers was not accompanied by effective reintegration programmes. The reintegration programme that was assembled consisted of a once-off demobilisation gratuity, a voluntary two-week counselling programme and an option to join the Service Corps for an eighteen-month vocational training programme. Third, while the Service Corps was part of the reintegration programme, it was not operational when demobilisation began. When it became operational, it was ineffective as an institution to provide for the re-skilling of demobilised former APLA and MK soldiers. The lack of adequate planning for the demobilisation and reintegration of former APLA and MK soldiers has hindered their full social and economic reintegration into civilian society. Following an analysis of the socio-economic needs of a national sample of 395 former APLA and MK soldiers, it is argued that they have not achieved economic reintegration in the sense of achieving a productive livelihood. Furthermore, it is argued that while respondents have achieved social reintegration some of them continue to see themselves as a distinct group different from other members of the society. Thus, demobilised soldiers may threaten the consolidation of democracy in South Africa and destabilise the region. The proliferation of light weapons throughout the region following the end of armed conflict and the lack of effective disarmament in South Africa increases the potential not only for violent crime but also for serious political and social disruptions.

No

An attempt to bring together a set of conceptual and theoretical issues related to the programming of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Process for child soldiers in Sierra Leone. By questioning if the programmes have considered cultural and contextual specificities, this is a qualitative case study based in the text analysis of secondary data from a number of different researchers and practitioners from the field. The latter will be done by correlating conceptual and theoretical dilemmas based in the definition of child soldiers and their navigational skills, and will be analyzed under four topics chosen to present the cultural and contextual specificities of this case. Conclusions and recommendations will leave in evidence the fact that in the case of Sierra Leone, the DDR programme for children did not prioritize a cross- cultural approach and deliberately ignored navigational skills from former child soldiers, it delegitimized local initiatives for reintegration, failed in promoting a gender-sensitive component in the programme, and demonstrates a lack of cooperation between humanitarian and development agencies, which have been insistently westernized. The case of Sierra Leone is an interesting experience from which much can be learned, but mostly because it highlights the fact that each case is different and the urgency of considering the improvement of aid in a more individualized perspective.

This briefing paper seeks to increase awareness of and review the linkages between disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and small arms and light weapons (SALW) reduction in the context of post-conflict reconstruction (PCR). It is targeted at those working on poverty reduction at both the policy and programme level, particularly those with comparatively modest engagement in these areas. Its objective is to outline the types of activities that have been undertaken under these rubrics, the difficulties and constraints encountered at the level of implementation, and, in particular, to identify opportunities in linking SALW programmes and DDR. It also seeks to highlight the problems created by widespread arms availability and usage in PCR. This briefing paper is not intended as a comprehensive review of the state of DDR/SALW/PCR programming and policy, but rather an introduction to some of the core issues.

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) have become a key component of the postconflict peacebuilding orthodoxy. Therefore, this study evaluates the efficacy of Amnesty, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (ADDR) in conflict prevention and resolution using the 2009 Niger Delta ADDR programme as a case study. The study evaluated the effectiveness of the programme using the minimalist and maximalist framework advanced in the DDR literature. The key findings and conclusions of the Study were that a minimalist DDR would only achieve security stabilisation and return excombatants to the status quo- ante society with all the pre-conflict grievances unaddressed thereby bequeathing a high potential of relapse to violence. Furthermore, for DDR to be an effective conflict prevention and resolution mechanism and postconflict peacebuilding force, its conceptualisation, design and implementation must be maximalist in nature with a transformative agenda that aims to address the roots causes of violence.

Magister Legum - LLM / In many countries around the world, approximately 230 million children are living in countries affected by armed conflict. 15 million of them were caught up, in various parts of Africa, in violent conflicts. Some of the African countries where children are involved in armed conflicts include: Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mali, Somalia and South Sudan. In CAR, for example, thirty four children (girls and boys) were abducted by armed groups, some as young as 3 years of age.

Student Number : 0513998G - MA research report - School of Social Sciences - Faculty of Humanities / This study aimed to investigate how specific needs of the Rwandan child combatants who fought in the Great Lakes Region are being addressed in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) processes. Data collected by the use of semistructured interviews of demobilised child combatants and key informants revealed that many children were recruited after being orphaned, separated from parents, or because of their search for physical and psychological security which was threatened by war and its immediate effects. Further, it was found that child combatants experienced harsh living conditions in the bush due to both the nature of their work as combatants and their physical and mental immaturity. As far as the DDR processes are concerned, the study revealed many weaknesses in addressing the specific needs of child combatants at least until January 2004. However, there has been a significant positive shift in dealing with the same needs since then. The absence of female child combatants in the DDR process was noted. This research concludes with a number of recommendations for both future interventions and further research.

The liberal peace approach guided the Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes under the auspices of the United Nations. While both practitioners and policymakers recognised that context fitted approaches are required, which resulted in the revision of DDR policy and practice, the driving principle approach remained the liberal peace theory, which creates a hierarchical relationship between the intervener and the intervened. I argue that applying the relational sensibility concept that places relations, dialogue, and hybridity in its focus can (potentially) contribute to a more effective locally designed, led, and implemented reintegration programme that is owned by the different stakeholders instead of imposed. Most reintegration programmes focused on the economic reintegration of ex combatants yielding limited results. I argue that social development for not only former combatants but also for youth at-risk of criminalisation is an essential element of reintegration. I probe the applicability of an alternative peace-building approach to the liberal peace that prioritises actions over relations by reviewing past DDR programmes and a specific case study in Somalia. I establish that an inclusive, community-based reintegration programme that focuses on the social rehabilitation and integration of vulnerable and at-risk youth by strengthening their social and spiritual capitals, as well as promotes restorative justice, can contribute to the decreased level of aggression at the individual level and the perceptions of the increased level of community security in Somalia. I conclude that DDR programmes both policy and practice, should look into more community-based approaches, inclusivity, and balancing between social and economic development opportunities.