<p>The purpose of this study is to map out and to analyze the spatial variation of female representation at the national level in established democracies. The aim is also to explain the variation in the female representation. The main questions that the paper tries to answer are:</p><p>1.How does women representation in established democratic parliaments vary?</p><p>2.Why does women representation in established democratic parliaments vary?</p><p>This study is a comparative and statistic study, i.e. a study that includes a bigger number of countries and where quantitative analysis methods are used in order to achieve comparative analyses. This study is both a descriptive and an explanatory study. The statistical method that is used in this study is mainly bivariat analysis and multivariat regression.</p><p>The results show that the variation in female representation in the established democracies is quite considerable. Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark and Netherlands feature high female representation at the national level during the period 1995-2005. The result also implies that the proportion of women in parliament increases during the current period. The result also shows that political institutions, socio-economic -and cultural factors, are important and necessary in order to explain the variation in female representation. The overall standards that can be discerned of the statistical analyses is that the proportion of women in parliament is higher in countries with a proportional electoral system, high number of parliament members, high socio-economic development (high HDI, GDI and GNP per capita) contemporary as the country introduced female suffrage in an early stage and have a more positive attitude toward female leadership.</p>

<p>The first purpose of this study is to examine if democratic aid is a statistically and/or substantially significant determinant of democratic development among semi-democratic states. The second purpose is to discuss the effects of democratic aid in light of the theory of ‘democratic peace’, and the debate on whether exogenous or endogenous factors are primary for democratic development. The research question is: how much, if at all, has democratic aid contributed to democratic development among semi-democratic states from 2000 to 2004?</p><p>The thesis is delimited to observing the total population of states that were semi-democratic in the year 1999, i.e. 56 countries. Moreover, it only detects the potential impact of democratic aid over one five-year period, namely 2000-2004.</p><p>Data from the Freedom House Index (FHI) has been used to distinguish states with semi-democratic regimes from states with other regime-types, and, moreover, to construct two indicators of the dependent variable. The utilized dataset on democratic aid is provided by the Creditor Reporting System (CRS), issued by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Furthermore, in order to assess the effects of democratic aid, a multiple regression model is employed that controls for nine other variables which have been found to have significant impacts on democratic development in relevant previous research.</p><p>The conclusion is that democratic aid neither had a statistically nor a substantially significant impact on democratic development of semi-democratic states from 2000 to 2004. Thus, it does not strengthen the ‘exogenous standpoint’ for democratic development, and it does not appear to contribute to an expansion of ‘democratic peace’. However, due to a number of factors, it is acknowledged that more research is required in order to assess the effects of democratic aid more adequately.      </p><p> </p>

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Northeastern University, 2008. / Title from title page (viewed March 26, 2009). Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Dept. of Political Science. Includes bibliographical references (p. 541-552).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2010. / Title from first page of PDF file (viewed February 19, 2010). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 193-206).

This thesis will deal with the position of the church in people's democracies in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary. How were these countries afected by this establishment and their settlement (compensation) after 1989. It also considers the ethical impact of the people's democrasy on the religious identity of the population of Bohemia after the Velvet Revolution.

The temptation of illiberal democracy in the postcommunist Europe Abstract This thesis deals with the concept of illiberal democracy. In the first half it sums up the debate from which the concept arose. It describes the difference between liberalism and democracy and it also explains how these two concepts are interconnected. It describes the concept of defective democracies as conceived by Wolfgang Merkel. I also outline the constitutional aspects of the debate about illiberal democracy. In the second half the text applies Merkel's theoretical framework to analyse the cases of Poland and Hungary. The period of time, that was chosen, starts with the moment when parties Law and Justice and Fidesz gained majorities large enough for profound institutional changes. The period ends with activation of article 7 of the Treaty on European union. The text follows the structure of the Merkel's criteria. It analyses, how the voting rights and free access to power were preserved in both countries, if the political decisions are taken by elected representants, if there is a mutual control between the institutions and to what degree can the state power intervene into the private sphere of the citizens. I conclude that both Poland and Hungary could not be called liberal democracies in the period under review. The Polish...

Stemming from U.S.'s ongoing war in the Middle East, this report details the foreign policy of three non-democratic states: Pakistan, Iran and Syria. Foreign policy is affected by many factors within the borders of a state, some of which include: power of the ruler, religion, extent of civil liberties, economy and the state's history. All of these factors, along with a number of others aid in understanding how non-democratic states form their foreign policy. Moreover, a detailed analysis of past conflicts is provided in order to represent how the antagonism came about, the reasons for warfare, the methods used and any attempts at reconciliation. This research has shown that at least in the cases of Pakistan, Iran and Syria, the political and religious leaders have had enormous influence in choosing battles. Although a similar conclusion cannot and should not be made about other states in the Middle East and South Asia, this methodology can be used in assessing foreign policy of other non-democratic states in the area as well. Thus, based on the findings in this thesis, one can infer that non-democratic states have been involved in much warfare due mostly to their rulers. There have been little or no attempts at diplomacy, and these states have almost always resorted to violence. Also, the power of the extremists in these countries is incomparable to the power of any given group around the world. This analysis may be used in efforts to better understand the region, which would aid U.S. in better cooperating with it.

In this dissertation I explore the redistributive effects of second-dimensional identity politics in parliamentary democracies. Specifically, I focus on parties’ electoral incentives to manipulate the salience of the territorial-identity cleavage. My main argument is that a greater electoral salience of the second dimension distorts the nature of redistributive outcomes. Although the redistributive effects of second dimensions of political competition have been explored in majoritarian democracies, much less is known about their effects in democracies with proportional representation (PR). The dissertation brings “bad news” in that regard: when the territorial second dimension is salient, it is no longer true that parliamentary democracies with proportional electoral systems redistribute more –which is the prevalent view in the existing literature. In fact, the so called “left-bias” of PR systems vanishes when the territorial-identity cleavage is politically activated. This key insight therefore offers a fundamental qualification to the institutionalism literature, by making an effort to understand the way in which regional diversity interacts with institutions through multidimensional political competition. The dissertation is divided in two parts: one theoretical and one empirical. First, I develop a formal model that illustrates the way in which parties’ second-dimension electoral incentives affect both the electoral stage and the subsequent post-electoral coalition bargaining among parties in national parliaments. The reason is that both right-wing and regionalist parties have incentives to increase the salience of the second dimension at the electoral stage to attract voters, and subsequently the coalition bargaining among parties in parliaments offers new opportunities for legislative coalitions. In the second part of the dissertation, I test the empirical implications at the macro-level, the meso-level and the individual-level. The main empirical results can be summarised as follows. First, I present empirical evidence according to which the legislative salience of the second dimension induces a negative effect on redistribution and a positive effect on the regionalisation of public policy. Second, I provide evidence which shows that both right-wing and regionalist parties strategically increase the electoral salience of the second dimension when they are “losers” on the first dimension. Finally, I illustrate the way in which the salience of the second dimension affects the formation of individual preferences for redistribution. In sum, this dissertation provides new arguments and empirical evidence that demonstrates how second dimensional politics can have profound redistributive consequences in parliamentary democracies.

This thesis examines the role of emotions in mediating the effects electoral campaigns have on political behavior in Britain. I contend that electoral campaigns, aside from direct effects, can also have indirect effects, manifested through the impact of the emotions they induce. I theorize that, through manipulating the tone, framing and targeting of their messages, electoral campaigns induce specific emotions. Emotions are argued to have a direct effect on turnout (intentions) and a moderating effect on the impact partisanship, policy preference and leader evaluations have on vote choice. Extending the Theory of Affective Intelligence, I hypothesize that individuals who are enthusiastic about their preferred party, or experience anxiety or anger in relation to an out-party, are more likely to turn out, and to cast their vote based on their partisanship. Contrarily, anxiety and anger experienced towards the preferred party are expected to decrease the importance of partisanship and increase the relevance of policy preferences and leader evaluations when voting. While anger experienced towards this party is also hypothesized to also decrease turnout, anxiety is not thought to affect it. To test these propositions, I rely on a multi-methodological approach that uses both panel and experimental data. The panel data was collected in two waves prior to the 2010 British General Election. The laboratory experiment, designed to specifically test the emotion-induction capacity of campaigns, was conducted on British participants in the aftermath of the same elections. The results corroborate the theory. First, the analyses confirm that campaigns, not only can, but actually do induce emotions. Second, it is shown that emotions do influence political behavior as expected. Third, it is established that the effect of the campaign on turnout intentions is partly channeled through emotions. Finally, it is shown that campaign exposure indirectly affects vote choice by increasing the magnitude of the impact emotions have on the effect of partisanship on vote choice. Aside from the literature on campaign effects in Britain, the thesis also contributes to the emerging literature pertaining to the role of emotions in politics. Moreover, it contributes to the field of voting behaviour by extending our understanding of the psychological underpinnings of vote choice.

Despite considerable research efforts, the relationship between inequality and demand for redistribution remains a highly contested topic within comparative political economy. This paper argues that a central yet widely overlooked mechanism linking macro-level income inequality to preferences for redistribution has to with the micro-level implications of certain externalities of inequality. Focusing on fear of crime, as one such externality, I argue that because (i) in- equality and crime are positively related, and (ii) because crime and fear of crime have a negative effect in individual utility, it follows that increasing in- equality should have a positive effect on support for redistribution. Importantly, however, the argument of this paper also recognises that redistribution is but one of several means through which a concern about crime can be addressed, with the most relevant alternatives being increased policing and harsher punitive measures. Drawing on literatures in criminology and political sociology, I theorise that a key determinant of this choice | between redistribution and policing/punishment as alternative approaches to dealing with crime | is the level of ethnic heterogeneity in the population. Taken together, therefore, this paper's argument implies that inequality will have differential effects on support for redistribution in different contexts: in cases where the population is homogenous, fear of crime - and by consequence inequality - will boost demand for redistribution, whilst no such effects will follow in contexts of high heterogeneity. Using a two-step statistical methodology, I analyse Eurobarometer and ESS data from 21 OECD countries and find persuasive empirical support for my theoretical expectations. Fear of crime is more strongly associated to support for redistribution when the level of population heterogeneity remains low, whilst the opposite holds true for the relationship between fear of crime and support for policing and punishment.