The Democratic centralism, Chinese communist traced up the soviet regime, is not only the main principle of communist party organizing in china but written on the Chinese constitution for directing the public behavior. Since china communist becoming the national ruler, comrades had devoted their efforts to make sure of the c Chinese communist party could be the only one political party ruler for eternity. The highest political organization is the people representative convention what adapts the way of one that combines the congress and executive department. No matter what the communist party¡¦ s political power or government¡¦ s executive power all have to obey the principle of the democratic centralism converging the political power from basic comrades and local parity organizations to top leadership. So the democratic centralism is not like western democratic, the minor obeys the mass, but the political powers are together upon the leadership. Even though the democratic centralism is helpful to maintain the party¡¦s assertion for the china communist party, the only one political ruler party. Because of political power of leadership has not been restricted resulting in what the regime legitimately has not been convicted. Mao was dead after the china culture revolution had ceased has left the china disarrangement and disable Chinese communist party. All things seemed went to bright side after the new successor, Den, held the leadership and drove whole Chinese economy and political more openness. Since 1978, China goes evolution and keeps the openness policy with two ways, economy and political. The time of planning economy was committed to replace the function of socialization, national distribution, curbing the production resources, all factors depended the Chinese communist party regime no matter what is labors in the city or the farmers in the country. Since openness policy, the marketing economy had replaced the panning economy becoming the main policy and the regime ceased to play the role in distribution of the national resources. People have to make life not depend the regime but maintain the right of political and fight for the political participation. Chinese communist party is afraid of losing her regime, therefore not dare to react the provoking of civilian political demand and consciousness. The dilemma situation turns the discrimination of content and process time table in political and economy comes up. People discontent force the Jiang secretary general to announce¡§ the inner party democracy is the spirit of communist party, demonstrating the public democracy ¡§ for response the requiring of people. Because of the regime losing the ability of introspecting and reacting the political power centralization make a tough problem Chinese communist have to face and try to solute. Through the remedy way of conciliation the relationship between nation and society intent to maintain the one political party authority and relieve regime¡¦s political crisis. Even though, the regime does suffer the turbulence of fighting between the conservative school and evolution school and could not conglomerate whole schools advance forward peaceful. So the regime uses the tiny political evolution in executive department as a buffer of comprising democracy evolution and defensive one party authority. This dissertation try to find out public democracy by the performance of Chinese communist inner democracy through the party¡¦s leader system, decisive, supervising, election, talent selection and political power inherit. The study find out Chinese communist party inner democracy spot on the perfect of executive system for up grade the executive ability and maintain the legitimately. As we knew there are no any relation between the party inner democracy and public democracy.

本文以「歷史制度主義」為途徑，去分析毛澤東時期「二線分工」的運作與變遷。並就「歷史制度主義」的三個主要觀點，包括「路徑依賴」、「關鍵點」以及「漸續平衡」為架構，去鋪陳本文的論證。 首先，在「路徑依賴」上，本文認為因「民主集中制」的矛盾，使得中共政治在運作上，衍生出另一套非正式制度以修補之。而「二線分工」就是這套非正式制度，其目的是為了防制「民主集中制」的三項缺失，包括權力集中、非正式政治的影響以及政治繼承的危機。是故，只要中共堅持「民主集中制」，則「二線分工」就會成為一項路徑依賴，以修補「民主集中制」的缺失。毛時期「二線分工」的起點是在一九五六年九月的八大，該會決議重組中央書記處，以作為和中央政治局分工的機構。因此，開啟了毛時期「二線分工」的運作。 其次，在「關鍵點」的改變上，以一九五九年四月，毛辭去國家主席，退居政務二線為重要的關鍵。促成該關鍵點的成因上，可以「內因」和「外因」分別說明之。「內因」是起於反右運動、大躍進運動以來，逐步繁瑣的內政事務，使得毛決心辭去國家主席，以減輕工作負擔。「外因」則起於中蘇關係的惡化，使得毛有意識的了解培養革命繼承人的重要性，遂將劉少奇扶植至政務一線，以培養其接班能力。 最後，在「漸續平衡」上，在歷經一九五九年四月的「關鍵點」後，中共的「二線分工」運作由原來的「優勢政治」型演變為「權力平衡」型。在「關鍵點」之前，毛集黨務、政務一線於一身，可以直接參與黨務與政務決策的制定，因此呈現出以毛為主的「優勢政治」運作。但在「關鍵點」之後，毛雖仍居黨務一線，但因退居政務二線，所以大幅減少對於重要會議的直接參與，部分決策權轉移至劉少奇、鄧小平手中，故乃呈現出一、二線互為抗衡的「權力平衡」型。 本文在最後的結論，將討論毛時期立下的「二線分工」運作，對於後毛時期的延續性。此外，將提出中共政治的「二線分工」模式，以做為本論文的研究發現與研究成果。 / In the political regime of CCP, democratic centralism is the formal system of an organized form. “Two-front arrangement” is informal system, which is used to renovate three defects of democratic centralism, including the effects of informal system, power centralization, and the crisis of political successor. This article is used three concepts of ”historical institutionalism”, which are path dependence, critical juncture, and punctured equilibrium, to explain the transition of “two-front arrangement” in CCP. First, in the path dependence, “two-front arrangement” is a method used by CCP to repair the deficiency of democratic centralism. Second, the path of “two-front arrangement” was gone through two critical junctures of transition, one is the CCP twelve party congress in 1982, and two is the CCP sixteenth party congress in 2002. At last, the results of these critical junctures produced new punctured equilibrium . The work of “two-front arrangement” changed to patron-client type after the CCP twelve party congress and evolved to functional type after the CCP sixteenth party congress. The change of “two-front arrangement” is gradually evolving to some kinds of institutionalization. From the random type in Mao’s era, the patron-client type in Deng’s era, to the functional type in Jiang’s era, we can find that the “two-front arrangement” has remarkable function to repair three defects of democratic centralism as time went by. So we can take it as the formation of institutionalization. We analyze the “two-front arrangement” during Mao Zedong’s era. “First-front” leaders are those who participated in the policy-making process directly while leaders on the “second-front” are referred to those who only indirectly involved in the process. The article argues that the best way to identify leaders in their affiliation in the “two-fronts” division of work is to have a detailed breakdown on personnel in the highest decision-making bodies, the Politburo and the Central Secretariat. We divide Chinese leadership during Mao’s era into four categories according to official document and reputation and status of the leaders. The article further delineates the operation of the “two-front arrangement” according to the division of work between the party and the state, charisma of the leaders and formal institutions. At the end, we try to assess the impact of the “two-fronts” model on Chinese politics.

本論文採取歷史文獻分析與理解社會學(verstehende Soziologie)的研究途徑，從「以中國說中國」的方法入手，重視歷史事實作為論證基礎的功能與意義。 對中共「民主集中制」的研究在廣度與深度上都超乎中國大陸內部與外部學者在這方面的論述，系統化地借助中共黨史反映了民主集中制一般不為人所注意的關鍵面向。對民主集中制之作用的分析引導筆者發現，中國大陸總體面出現一個「黨、國家、社會」的三角形，這是在現階段與可預見之未來的人類文明中一個非常態的國家總體結構。筆者進而對照西方權力制衡的理論，反映出在民主集中制下是不可能發展出真正的權力制約與監督的機制的，民主集中制的內涵處處體現「一元化整體性控制意識」，民主與民主集中制之間無論就理論或現實運作都存在不可調和的矛盾。 改革開放以來的中共文化戰略奠基者為鄧小平，他的基本方法是將重心放在寄望以經濟建設的成果支持行為層面的紀律，進而鞏固精神思想層面的意識形態。順此，他主張「不搞爭論」與「堅持四項基本原則」，希望大力發展生產力，強調的是「工具理性」。這些其實都是受民主集中制之「一元化整體性控制意識」的影響。 筆者採用各種型態的資料與具體數據說明「『民主集中制』對文化戰略的影響」與「『民主集中制』對改革開放以來文化戰略與戰略造成的困難與挑戰」，呈現出中共文化戰略的不合理與不合時的性質。從文化戰略的視角可以看到許多中國大陸現今不易從單純的政治、經濟、社會的角度所能觀察到的問題。本論文針對此方面的解決方案與方向提出了一些線索與頭緒。 最後，解釋在第一章提出之胡錦濤表現的反差現象。其次，論證中國大陸的政治體制改革應為不可迴避的必要之務，民主改革未必對中共不利，可能更有利。同時回答第一章中共如何統治的問題。 / Adopting the approaches of historical document analyses and understanding sociology, this dissertation brings the method of explaining China in terms of China into bear and places importance on the function and meaning of historical facts as the departing basis of its discussions. Based on the Chinese Communist Party’s (the CCP hereafter) history, the dissertation systematically presents some key points of the CCP’s democratic centralism, to which attention was not paid. It shows wider and deeper understanding of the CCP’s democratic centralism. The understanding leads the author to notice the “party, state and society” triangle, which reflects the uniqueness of the structure of China as a country in the contemporary world. The CCP’s democratic centralism reflects “consciousness of unitary holistic control” and is in fact incompatible with democracy by its normal definition in respect of theory and practice. The foundation of the CCP’s cultural development since the reform and opening was laid by Deng Xiaoping, whose methodology laid stress on economic development. Deng hoped to accomplish some economic achievements to secure behavioral discipline among people and finally consolidate the party’s ideologies and theories. He therefore advocated “no disputes” and “insistence on four fundamental principles” and did his best to promote development of productivity, namely instrumental rationality. All he did embodied “consciousness of unitary holistic control,” so has the CCP’s cultural strategies done the same. Basing on different types of materials and data, the author analyzed the influences of the CCP’s democratic centralism on its cultural strategies and presented the difficulties and challenges to the strategies caused by the democratic centralism since the reform and opening. In the final chapter, the author explained Hu Jintao’s surprising reaction and answered the question how the CCP has been ruling the country. Both were mentioned in Chapter one.

Michal Zitek: The internal debates about the future direction of the KSČ(M) from 1989 to 1993 The aim of this thesis is to offer a comprehensive look at the debates that took place within the Communist Party and aimed to transform into a modern left- wing party. Work will familiarize you with some debates and opinion- platforms that arose in these discussions.