Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Homeland Security and Defense))--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009. / Thesis Advisor(s): Knopf, Jeffrey. Second Reader: Davis, Zachary. "December 2009." Description based on title screen as viewed on February 1, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Nuclear terrorism, nuclear forensics, attribution, deterrence, risk of nuclear terrorism, probability of nuclear terrorism, consequences of nuclear terrorism, post-detonation response. Includes bibliographical references (p. 83-95). Also available in print.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2003. / Thesis advisor(s): James A. Russell, Jeff Knopf. Includes bibliographical references (p. 77-80). Also available online.

University of Macau / Faculty of Social Sciences / Department of Government and Public Administration

No description available.

Research into the democratic peace (DP) proposition has shown that democracies rarely, if ever, fight wars against each other. At the same time, rational choice models predict that there will sometimes be circumstances in which war is a rational option for rational states. If democratic states are rational, then war between them should, theoretically, be an option that is exercised. This thesis examines the possibility of Democratic Peace (DP) Breakdown, whereby the causal factors responsible for democratic peace fail to operate properly and war between democracies becomes either likely or inevitable. Applying a game theoretic model of asymmetric deterrence and the concepts of communication and commitment problems in crisis bargaining, the author shows that there is a strong deductive argument for DP Breakdown. / This thesis will attempt to show that a strong deductive argument can be made for deterrence failure between democracies embroiled in an international crisis. While most research into the democratic peace is concerned with identifying and explaining how and why democratic peace succeeds, this thesis will develop a counter-intuitive theoretical approach for understanding how and why democratic peace fails. By doing so it is expected that a greater understanding of the behavioral dynamics of democratic peace will be developed. The argument developed here will draw on the theoretical works of Fearon and Kilgour & Zagare and attempt to bridge the gap between democratic peace studies, formal deterrence modeling, and rationalist theories of war. It is hoped that the synthesis of these three bodies of literature will produce a model of democratic crisis behavior that is capable of generating new and interesting hypotheses about democracies and international crisis.

Faced with America's conventional military superiority, many countries are turning to weapons of mass destruction as a means to deter U.S. intervention in their affairs. At the same time, 11 September 2001 awakened the United States to a degree of vulnerability it had never experienced before, making it increasingly unwilling to tolerate such weapons in the hands of unstable and unpredictable regimes, particularly those with connections to terrorist organizations. These twin fears of American encroachment and American vulnerability create a modern security dilemma, forming a vicious cycle of insecurity that challenge straditional notions of deterrence. It is unquestionable that the United States possesses the strategic capabilities to retaliate with devastating effect to any attack, but regional asymmetries of interest may tip the scales of brinksmanship in favor of potential adversaries, thereby dissuading American involvement in responding to global security threats. While this might be a welcome change to some, the United States is developing Counter proliferation options to prevent, protect against, or destroy threatening weapons reserving the right to use preemptive force in order to retain freedom of action abroad and protect the homeland. This is a worthwhile objective, but deterrence will never be guaranteed by American strength, and unprovoked wars of disarmament will inevitably spark yet further proliferation and hatred toward the United States. Ultimately, the only reliable road to peace lies in nurturing and broadening friendly relations with nations that share the goal of destroying the threat posed by catastrophic weapons of mass murder and terror.

Thesis (M.S.)--Missouri State University, 2008. / "May 2008." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 87-96). Also available online.

Thesis (M.S.)--School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2008. / "June 2008." Title from cover. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 50-53). Also available via the Internet.

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Far East, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific))--Naval Postgraduate School, September 2009. / Thesis Advisor(s): Twomey, Christopher P. "September 2009." Description based on title screen as viewed on 5 November 2009. Author(s) subject terms: Deterrence, Japan, China, Nuclear Missile Defense. Includes bibliographical references (p. 57-66). Also available in print.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1995. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 340-352).