Thesis--Harvard University. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis--Harvard University. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2005. / Thesis Advisor(s): David. C. Tucker. Includes bibliographical references (p. 63-70). Also available online.

This thesis will examine the content of American nuclear strategy between 1954 and 1968, and will analyze the factors shaping that strategy. The first problem will be examined within the theoretical context of the maximalist-minimalist strategic continuum. Minimalism, the pole toward which Washington was inclined at the beginning of the thermonuclear age, involved a countervalue threat, or a threat to enemy population and industry, and a relatively low assessment of the forces required for this mission. Maximalism, on the other hand, involved a counterforce strategy, that is to say a strategy directed primarily against enemy strategic forces, and a relatively high estimate of the forces required. Although never entirely embraced by the highest American decision-makers, this latter pole represented the general direction in which American nuclear strategy evolved in the first nine years after Dulles enunciated the doctrine of massive retaliation in 1954. This tendency was evident in Eisenhower's gradual acceptance of the necessity for planning on the basis of a greater than expected threat; it was also manifest in his reluctant acceptance of coercive deterrence, a strategy dependent primarily upon deterrence through a countervalue threat but also involving a marginal capacity for damage limitation. Even more marked changes came with the advent of Kennedy and McNamara to power in 1961. Between then and the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 there was a distinctly more pessimistic assessment of the greater than expected threat against which provision had to be made. Of yet greater significance, there was also a more energetic pursuit of a capability for coercive deterrence and an important refinement of that strategy in the form of the "hostage city" doctrine, a doctrine which provided for city-avoidance in a thermonuclear exchange. After the missile crisis, however, this tendency was reversed to a substantial extent, and by early 1968, when McNamara left office, American nuclear strategy was in large measure similar to that of the latter Eisenhower years in its emphasis on a nuclear "sufficiency" and on a countervalue policy. The second problem - the factors underlying these developments - will be examined in terms of four main variable clusters. Idiosyncratic factors, those characteristics of the decision-makers which are peculiar to them as individuals, exerted some influence in the policy process; Eisenhower's tendency to believe that he could "muddle through" and the more vigorous and rationalizing tendencies of Kennedy and McNamara played a distinct role in the evolution of American nuclear strategy. Technical factors, the state of military research and of the strategic balance, were nevertheless of greater importance. Counterforce arguments, for example, could not gain even marginal acceptance until there had been an improvement in offensive weapons technology. More important, the central fact facing American decision-makers was that it was highly probable that both superpowers would suffer unacceptable damage in a thermonuclear war and that even their greatest efforts could not save them. In the light of this latter consideration, prevention of a thermo nuclear conflict was ever the first priority of the United States. Societal and external factors, though, were most crucial. Influences which were external to the United States, such as the course of Soviet diplomacy and the state of the N.A.T.O alliance, played an essential part in defining the role which nuclear strategy must fulfill. It was generally agreed, for example, that the Russians did not desire a thermonuclear war, but their desire for expansion of their political influence carried with it some danger of escalation into such a conflict. Given the former consideration, it was hard to justify an all-out effort to attain a warfighting capability; given the latter, it was still necessary to provide at least a countervalue capability, and a case might even be made at times for developing a damage limiting capability. Finally, the nature of the society itself was a central influence. As was seen during the debate over the "missile gap," the tradition of military superiority still coloured the thinking of the people of the United States, causing them to exaggerate the threat to their security and to hanker after some form of 'nuclear superiority" even when they realized that a thermonuclear war would probably result in a mutual disaster. Itself a component of the credibility of the American deterrent, the climate of public opinion was brought to bear in Congress and at election time. Eisenhower, whose policies failed to sufficiently reassure his people, found this failure to be a substantial domestic liability, and a military-diplomatic liability of even greater magnitude. His successor was inclined to adopt policies more in accord with the temper of the American people, both from conviction and a sense of political expedience. Thus, the increasing effectiveness of American offensive forces, the seemingly unremitting hostility of the Soviet Union and the concomitant divisions within N.A.T.O. combined with the optimistic activism of the Kennedy administration and the domestic currents underlying that spirit to create the more aggressive policies pursued by that administration. Its partial retreat from those policies during its last year, and the more extensive retreat during the Johnson administration was the result of the increasingly apparent futility of the arms race, the Soviet-American detente, and a public opinion which was less concerned with the quest for superiority. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) controversy was one of the most intense intra-Alliance debates experienced by NATO. The depth of the dispute, especially between the US and the European NATO members, threatened the very unity and cohesion of the Alliance itself. The INF controversy was the result of two factors: first, the establishment of strategic parity by the Soviet Union which brought into question the credibility of the US security guarantee to Europe; and second, the widening gap in the political and strategic interests of the US and its European allies. These factors combined to produce the two central--and conflicting--forces at work during the INF debate. The Europeans sought strategic reassurance, in the form of theatre-nuclear systems, to restore the integrity of the seamless web of deterrence. The divergence of political and strategic interests between the US and Europe, however, meant conflict over the posture and character of any new force. In the interests of preserving the unity of the Alliance, these problems were "solved" in typical Alliance fashion; through compromising to a consensus. The December 12 decision was based on erroneous and outdated conceptions of the significance of nuclear weapons for deterrence in Europe. What NATO planners, and many western analysts, have failed to recognize is the diminishing effectiveness of US nuclear weapons in maintaining effective deterrence in Western Europe. Deterrence in Europe is not primarily dependent on US nuclear forces and the threat of deliberate nuclear escalation they imply. Rather, deterrence in Europe should be understood as a compound product of many risk factors. Henceforth, thinking about NATO's deterrent requirements must recognize the limited utility of successive deployments of US nuclear forces as a deterrent. Greater reliance must be placed on the deterrent value of other risk factors which exist in the European theatre, most notably the increasingly powerful and discriminating capabilities of the French and British nuclear forces. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

This thesis carefully examines the question of the effect of nuclear weapons possession on international relations through a detailed examination of all international crises between nuclear powers, as identified by the International Crisis Behavior Project (ICB). It distinguishes itself from similar studies in four key areas. First, by including the recent dyadic nuclear crises between India and Pakistan, this study significantly expands the number of cases under consideration. Next, the India-Pakistan crises provide an opportunity for a novel comparison to the US-USSR crises of the Cold War. / Third, this work is unique among studies of nuclear deterrence in its combined use of qualitative and quantitative methodology. The quantitative analysis uses ordered logit with the ICB data set on a variety of variables, discussed below, that do not lend themselves to standard regression techniques. The qualitative analysis examines whether or not nuclear weapons caused decision-makers on both sides of each crises to refrain from escalation due to fear of nuclear catastrophe. Finally, this study compares the effect of mutual nuclear weapons capability with the effects of democracy and interdependence on the level of violence in crises. / Ultimately, this thesis finds that nuclear proliferation is far less successful at preventing war among states in dyadic nuclear crises than is commonly believed. In only one of 17 crises (the Cuban Missile Crisis) is it clear that mutual possession of nuclear weapons caused leaders on both sides to eschew war. Relative to nuclear weapons possession, democracy and trade were found to be significantly more effective at limiting violence in crises and preventing war. Moreover, regimes suffering a lack of legitimacy in either the international community or among their neighbors had a significantly higher level of violence in crises. / Taken together, these findings have significant implications for public policy regarding nuclear proliferation, suggesting that the international community should work even more diligently to prevent nuclear proliferation, while working to strengthen democratic regimes, increase interstate trade, and reduce the international isolation of states such as North Korea and Iran.

No description available.

Dramatic changes in the international system since the early nineties, namely the end of the Cold War and the post-9/11 ascendancy of the Bush Doctrine, have left many to wonder whether Cold War era influence strategies such as deterrence, compellence, and engagement are viable against new U.S. threats-rogue states. This thesis will examine U.S. efforts between 1986 and 2004 to convince Libya to cease its support for international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). U.S. influence strategy towards Libya was a short term failure and a long term success. The compellence and deterrence policies established by President Reagan and strengthened by later administrations served to isolate Libya economically and diplomatically and set the conditions for successful conditional engagement. Positive behavior change by Libya began first with the Clinton Administration's introduction of conditional engagement. The Bush Administration, benefiting from years of Libyan isolation and the positive response to conditional engagement, continued to engage Libya in an incremental fashion. Libya renounced its terrorist ties in August 2003 and weapons of mass destruction in December 2003. Since then Tripoli has taken actionable steps to verify this change of policy and both governments are currently on course for reconciliation.

adversary efforts in a direction desired by Washington. Several things become clear during this investigation. First, very little scholarly work exists discussing the concept of dissuasion and the mechanisms used to formulate, implement, and execute it as a defense policy. Second, that while an admirable attempt to lessen the need for more costly policy options such as deterrence and defeat, dissuasion will not prevent China from developing counter space weapons, especially since ground-based jammers that target satellite links have already proven effective. Third, the best chance of dissuading China's efforts to acquire space-based OCS systems is through international treaties and laws.

Abstract Since being developed in 1956, no matter it¡¦s category, function or quantity, Chinese ballistic missiles have kept renewing and increasing. For example, the development of its strategic missiles has undergone the 1st through the 3rd generation with models from Dongfeng-1 to currently developing Dongfeng-41 Ballistic Missile, and its warhead has been gradually developed from carrier of single nuclear head to combination of both traditional and nuclear warheads and to multiple warheads now. Under such multiple developments, Chinese nuclear strategy according to their official speech has still adopted ¡§minimum deterrence¡¨ claimed by the 1960¡¦s and 1970¡¦s until now, and which has already led to external speculations. They think that Chinese has devoted to modernization of ballistic missiles lately, actively developed more land-based strategic missiles and sea-based nuclear submarines, techniques of multiple warheads and space-based weapons, and reinforced the practicality of tactical nuclear missiles etc. that such development has already exceeded the ¡§minimum deterrence¡¨ strategy, which even develops towards the ¡§limited deterrence¡¨ strategy. Therefore, whether China¡¦s deterrence strategy is changing is one of the assumptions in this study. If China¡¦s deterrence strategy is no longer equipped with the minimum deterrence, then whether the most important features of the minimum deterrence by ¡§no use of nuclear weapons at first¡¨ and China¡¦s¡§three nos principle on nuclear weapons¡¨will be changed accordingly is the second assumption in this study. Chinese ballistic missiles apart from being used as deterrence can also be used to practice coercive and annihilative strategies. Especially in the issue of Taiwan, when Chinese deterrence strategy fails in terms of Taiwan, it may use coercive or annihilative strategies to achieve their political and military objectives. As the ability of Taiwan¡¦s anti-ballistic missile is obviously insufficient; so if Taiwan suffers the attack from Chinese missiles, the result will be unimaginable. Therefore, how to prevent the attack from its missiles is what I would like to discuss in this paper. For the probable battle by the two sides of the Taiwan Strait in the future, in order to quickly facilitate the victory, whether Chinese will use micro-kiloton nuclear warhead to destroy the important and stable military targets in Taiwan to help smooth the warfare and further crash the myth that Chinese will not use nuclear weapons against Taiwan is the 3rd assumption in this paper. Finally how to increase our defense against ballistic missiles and whether we should participate in the TMD (Theatre Missile Defense) provided by America, I will provide several suggestions for references of the related units, hoping to make certain contributions towards Taiwanese prevention against the threat from Chinese ballistic missile.