It is the position of this paper that the body plays a crucial role in the manifestation of cognition and motivation. Cognition is situationally specific and emergent from a natural, habitual functioning process that is based on the embodied needs to transact with the environment. That natural function is the well-known Disequilibrium-Equilibrium function ( D-E f ), and the denied affective [the precognitive] is the embodied needs, desires and interests that frame selective attention and are the catalyst for emerging cognitive action. This precognitive catalyst usually contributes more to motivation than cognition. Motivation also has a cognitive component. The Disequilibrium-Equilibrium function ( D-E f ) process is part of a larger holistic embodied transaction where "knowing" is a way of behaving. This larger embodied transaction is Dewey's "Transactional Realism." In this transaction "inquiry" is the tool of the goal "sense" [or equilibrium] and "knowledge" is the product of a transformed context. On an individual level this transformation is learning, enculturation and reflection. On a cultural level this transformation is consensual validation. / Master of Arts

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John Dewey. A perspective of his Concept of Truth”. Rorty proposes his view as being an heir of pragmatism, such as J. Dewey’s, emphasizing that it stems, among other things, from the pragmatist notion of truth. Differing from many of Rorty’s ideas, I attempt to expound some notions I deem relevant in J. Dewey’s philosophy, and especially discuss some aspects of his conceptof truth. I plan to show that Dewey’s pragmatism takes up some traces of our everyday concept of truth, related to correspondence, but that this does not imply an engagement with a robust notion of truth. At the same time, I believe that the acceptance of such traces, although it does not suppose a definition or clear explanation regarding the content” of truth, suffices to distinguish between truth’s normative aspect and any justificationist view that may operate as knowledge’s epistemic support. / Rorty nos propone su visión como herencia del pragmatismo, entreellos el de J. Dewey, marcando con énfasis que su concepción se desprende, entre otras cosas, de la concepción pragmatista de la verdad. En contraposición a varias ideas de Rorty, pretendo exponer algunas ideas que creo centrales en la filosofía de J. Dewey; en particular, discutir, desde cierta perspectiva, algunaslíneas de su concepción de la verdad. Pretendo mostrar que el pragmatismo de Dewey asume algunos rasgos de nuestro concepto cotidiano de verdad, vinculados a la correspondencia, y que ello no implica un compromiso con una noción robusta de verdad. A la vez, creo que la aceptación de tales rasgos, aunque no supone una definición ni una clara explicación del contenido” de la verdad, es suficiente para permitirnos mantener la diferencia entre el aspecto normativo que implica la noción de verdad, respecto a cualquier concepción justificacionista que opere como respaldo epistémico del conocimiento.

« Concernant l’expérience esthétique, le philosophe se doit donc de comprendre de quoi il y a expérience » déclare J. Dewey et c’est sur la base de son enquête que nous tenterons dans la première partie de notre recherche, de répondre à cette injonction. Il s’agira d’abord de comprendre les exigences, les difficultés et les enjeux de cette conception de l’expérience esthétique saisie dans sa continuité avec l’expérience ordinaire. On ne peut concevoir l’expérience esthétique comme une entité séparée de l’expérience ordinaire, mais on ne peut non plus en galvauder la spécificité en la diluant dans le flux de nos expériences. Radicale, l’esthétique de Dewey l’est aussi en ce qu’elle invite à ne plus dissocier l’esthétique et l’artistique, la contemplation et la pratique, la réception et la création, mais cherche plutôt à saisir la continuité qui relie ces distinctions abstraites au sein d’une même expérience vivante. C’est à la portée critique de cette reconstruction d’une expérience unifiée que nous consacrerons la deuxième partie de cette recherche. Enfin, radicale, l’esthétique pragmatiste l’est à un troisième titre en ce qu’elle refuse les fictions paresseuses de l’intériorité pour comprendre l’individualité du sujet esthétique qu’il soit créateur ou récepteur. L’expérience esthétique apparaît bien à la fois comme l’expérience la plus individuelle et la plus accomplie, mais son individualité ne présuppose pas l’existence d’un individu pensé comme un atome isolé. Ainsi, ce que Dewey nous invite à repenser et à reconstruire c’est le lien mouvant qui unit l’individu et la société démocratique. / « To esthetic experience, then, the philosopher must go to understand what experience is. » J. Dewey claims and the first part of our research will rest on Dewy's inquiry on experience in an attempt to comply with his injunction. To begin with, we will endeavour to understand what are the requirements, the difficulties and the possible gains of this conception of aesthetic experience, which is described as closely connected to commonplace experience. Aesthetic experience can not be conceived as separate from commonplace experience, but neither should its specificity be lessened by dilution in the general flow of human experience. Dewey's aesthetics is also radical in that he argues against the distinction between the aesthetic and the artistic, between the artist's creativity and the audience's contemplation, between creation and appreciation. To the contrary, he attempts to take hold of what relates the two facets of the artistic process and to merge them into one and the same living experience. The second part of our research will be devoted to uncovering the critical scope of this reconstruction of experience. To proceed further, the radical quality of pragmatist aesthetics can be found in its refusal of the lazy fictions of the inner self and in its attempt to understand the individuality of the aesthetic subject, whether creator or recipient.Aesthetic experience is revealed as the most individual and fulfilled experience; on the other hand its uniqueness in no way requires the existence of an individual conceived of as an isolated atom. Thus, what Dewey suggests is that we reconsider and rebuild the fluctuating link that unites individuals and democratic society.