John Diefenbakers Latin American policy was based on his vision of Canadas national interest, which placed a strong emphasis on the achievement of greater autonomy in foreign policy for Canada vis-à-vis the US and the expansion of Canadian exports to the region. For Diefenbaker, an enhanced relationship with Latin America had the potential to lessen Canadas dependency on the US, while giving Latin American countries an outlet for their trade, commercial and financial relations other than the US. This new approach implied that Canada would formulate and implement policy that focused more on Canadian political interests and goals. It was not a matter of charting a totally independent policy for Canada in Latin America true policy independence was impossible to achieve. Nor was it the case that Canada would necessarily set itself in opposition to the US when it disagreed with its policies. For Diefenbaker the goal was to pursue a foreign policy that was aligned with, but not subservient to, the US.<p> Ultimately, Diefenbakers policies towards countries such as Cuba, Mexico, the Federation of the West Indies, Argentina and Brazil were somewhat successful in expanding Canadian trade and commercial activity beyond the United States, and in establishing a stronger political relationship between Canada and the Latin American region. The policies were remarkably consistent, reflecting Diefenbakers desire to increase Canadas autonomy, and differentiated by his personal involvement in initiating policy at the Cabinet level and in building and cultivating relationships with Latin American leaders; the goal was to further Canadian economic and political interests in the region. Though there were possibilities for greater expansion and connections with Latin America that were missed, Diefenbakers Latin American policy would be built upon and continued by successive Liberal and Conservative governments once he left office.

John Diefenbakers Latin American policy was based on his vision of Canadas national interest, which placed a strong emphasis on the achievement of greater autonomy in foreign policy for Canada vis-à-vis the US and the expansion of Canadian exports to the region. For Diefenbaker, an enhanced relationship with Latin America had the potential to lessen Canadas dependency on the US, while giving Latin American countries an outlet for their trade, commercial and financial relations other than the US. This new approach implied that Canada would formulate and implement policy that focused more on Canadian political interests and goals. It was not a matter of charting a totally independent policy for Canada in Latin America true policy independence was impossible to achieve. Nor was it the case that Canada would necessarily set itself in opposition to the US when it disagreed with its policies. For Diefenbaker the goal was to pursue a foreign policy that was aligned with, but not subservient to, the US.<p> Ultimately, Diefenbakers policies towards countries such as Cuba, Mexico, the Federation of the West Indies, Argentina and Brazil were somewhat successful in expanding Canadian trade and commercial activity beyond the United States, and in establishing a stronger political relationship between Canada and the Latin American region. The policies were remarkably consistent, reflecting Diefenbakers desire to increase Canadas autonomy, and differentiated by his personal involvement in initiating policy at the Cabinet level and in building and cultivating relationships with Latin American leaders; the goal was to further Canadian economic and political interests in the region. Though there were possibilities for greater expansion and connections with Latin America that were missed, Diefenbakers Latin American policy would be built upon and continued by successive Liberal and Conservative governments once he left office.

Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

At the inauguration of John G. Diefenbaker’s 1958 election campaign, the Prime Minister announced his ‘Northern Vision,’ a bold strategy to extend Canadian nationhood to the Arctic and develop its natural resources for the benefit of all Canadians. In some ways, the ‘Northern Vision’ was a political platform, an economic platform as well as an ideological platform. Invigorated by Diefenbaker’s electoral victory in 1958, the Department of Northern Affairs and National Development (DNANR) implementing the ‘National Development Policy’ in 1958 and announced the ‘Road to Resources’ program as a major effort to unlock the natural resource potential of the Canadian north. From 1958 to 1962, DNANR implemented additional northern development programs that planned to incorporate the northern territories along with Canada’s provinces, redevelop several key northern townsites, and stimulate mining activity across Northern Canada. As a result of serious government oversight and unforeseen developments, Diefenbaker abandoned his ‘Northern Vision’ and direction of northern development in 1962. Within the broader context of northern development over the past half century, the ‘Northern Vision’ produced several positive outcome which advanced the regional development of the Arctic. This thesis will examine the ‘Northern Vision’ by evaluating Diefenbaker’s political platform, the development of the ‘National Development Policy,’ and the regional outcomes of key northern development projects initiated by the Diefenbaker administration. The ‘Vision’ was never anticipated to bring about immediate results for Canadians and many objectives were eventually completed by consecutive Liberal governments. Moreover, the socioeconomic and military conditions of the Canadian north, at the time, appears to be significant factor in the implementation of this policy. This thesis also evaluates how natural resource operations propelled developments in territorial administration, housing, transportation, and fostered a wider participation of private enterprise across northern Canada. The ‘Northern Vision’ represents an overlooked period in the federal government’s administration of the Arctic and a critical event in the region’s development over the past fifty years.

At the inauguration of John G. Diefenbaker’s 1958 election campaign, the Prime Minister announced his ‘Northern Vision,’ a bold strategy to extend Canadian nationhood to the Arctic and develop its natural resources for the benefit of all Canadians. In some ways, the ‘Northern Vision’ was a political platform, an economic platform as well as an ideological platform. Invigorated by Diefenbaker’s electoral victory in 1958, the Department of Northern Affairs and National Development (DNANR) implementing the ‘National Development Policy’ in 1958 and announced the ‘Road to Resources’ program as a major effort to unlock the natural resource potential of the Canadian north. From 1958 to 1962, DNANR implemented additional northern development programs that planned to incorporate the northern territories along with Canada’s provinces, redevelop several key northern townsites, and stimulate mining activity across Northern Canada. As a result of serious government oversight and unforeseen developments, Diefenbaker abandoned his ‘Northern Vision’ and direction of northern development in 1962. Within the broader context of northern development over the past half century, the ‘Northern Vision’ produced several positive outcome which advanced the regional development of the Arctic. This thesis will examine the ‘Northern Vision’ by evaluating Diefenbaker’s political platform, the development of the ‘National Development Policy,’ and the regional outcomes of key northern development projects initiated by the Diefenbaker administration. The ‘Vision’ was never anticipated to bring about immediate results for Canadians and many objectives were eventually completed by consecutive Liberal governments. Moreover, the socioeconomic and military conditions of the Canadian north, at the time, appears to be significant factor in the implementation of this policy. This thesis also evaluates how natural resource operations propelled developments in territorial administration, housing, transportation, and fostered a wider participation of private enterprise across northern Canada. The ‘Northern Vision’ represents an overlooked period in the federal government’s administration of the Arctic and a critical event in the region’s development over the past fifty years.

The thesis titled "Special Canadian-Cuban Relations under Prime Minister Diefenbaker" examines the roots of the Canadian Cuban Relations set during the reign of Prime Minister Diefenbaker. Whilst Canada's role is usually minimized during the events of the Cuban Revolution as well as the Cuban Missile Crisis, Canada will be discussed as one of the major players in the present thesis. The relationship of the two countries will be discussed mainly through the concepts of "other diplomacies" as the means of Canadian soft power diplomacy and Canadian "othering" of the United States as a part of Canadian nationalism. Both concepts will be introduced in the theoretical framework. The thesis is based on the assumption of Cuba's importance for Canada's national independence. Therefore greater focus will be payed to Canadian nationalist policies of Prime Minister Diefenbaker. The aim of the thesis is thus to discuss whether Canadian nationalism was the main factor influencing Canada's policy towards Cuba during the set time period. We will examine whether the means used by Canada towards Cuba during the late 1959 and early 1960s period can be linked to Canada's need to be seen as an independent country. Thanks to this approach we will be able to assess whether Cuba can be seen as a means of Canadian...

The 1980s witnessed a judicial “rights revolution” in Canada characterized by the Supreme Court of Canada striking down both federal and provincial legislation which violated the rights guaranteed by the 1982 Charter of Rights. The lack of a similar judicial “rights revolution” in the wake of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights has largely been attributed to the structural difference between the two instruments with the latter – as a “mere” statute of the federal parliament – providing little more than a canon of construction and (unlike the Charter) not empowering the courts to engage in judicial review of legislation. Yet this view contrasts starkly with how the Bill was portrayed by the Diefenbaker government, which argued that it provided for judicial review and would “prevail” over other federal legislation. Many modern scholars have dismissed the idea that the Bill could prevail over other federal statutes as being incompatible with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. That is, a bill of rights could only prevail over legislation if incorporated into the British North America Act. As such, they argue that the Diefenbaker government could not have intended the Bill of Rights to operate as anything more than a canon of construction. However, such a view ignores the turbulence in constitutional thinking on parliamentary sovereignty in the 1930s through 1960s provoked by the Statute of Westminster. This era produced the doctrine of “self-embracing” sovereignty – in contrast to traditional “Dicey” sovereignty – where parliament could limit itself through “ordinary” legislation. The effective author of the Canadian Bill of Rights, Elmer Driedger, was an adherent of this doctrine as well as an advocate of a “purposive” approach to statutory interpretation. Driedger, thus, drafted the Bill based upon the doctrine of self-embracing sovereignty and believed it would enjoy a “purposive” interpretation by the courts, with the Bill designed to be as effective at guaranteeing rights as the Statute of Westminster was at liberating Canada from Imperial legislation.

The 1980s witnessed a judicial “rights revolution” in Canada characterized by the Supreme Court of Canada striking down both federal and provincial legislation which violated the rights guaranteed by the 1982 Charter of Rights. The lack of a similar judicial “rights revolution” in the wake of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights has largely been attributed to the structural difference between the two instruments with the latter – as a “mere” statute of the federal parliament – providing little more than a canon of construction and (unlike the Charter) not empowering the courts to engage in judicial review of legislation. Yet this view contrasts starkly with how the Bill was portrayed by the Diefenbaker government, which argued that it provided for judicial review and would “prevail” over other federal legislation. Many modern scholars have dismissed the idea that the Bill could prevail over other federal statutes as being incompatible with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. That is, a bill of rights could only prevail over legislation if incorporated into the British North America Act. As such, they argue that the Diefenbaker government could not have intended the Bill of Rights to operate as anything more than a canon of construction. However, such a view ignores the turbulence in constitutional thinking on parliamentary sovereignty in the 1930s through 1960s provoked by the Statute of Westminster. This era produced the doctrine of “self-embracing” sovereignty – in contrast to traditional “Dicey” sovereignty – where parliament could limit itself through “ordinary” legislation. The effective author of the Canadian Bill of Rights, Elmer Driedger, was an adherent of this doctrine as well as an advocate of a “purposive” approach to statutory interpretation. Driedger, thus, drafted the Bill based upon the doctrine of self-embracing sovereignty and believed it would enjoy a “purposive” interpretation by the courts, with the Bill designed to be as effective at guaranteeing rights as the Statute of Westminster was at liberating Canada from Imperial legislation.

This thesis follows the development of Howard Charles Green’s (1895-1989) views on war and disarmament as both a private citizen and as a Member of Parliament. It draws its conclusions from a large archival base. Beginning with Green’s experiences in the First World War, this thesis charts Green’s views on war through to the United Nations Irish Resolution on disarmament of December 20, 1960. Contrary to current historiography examining the Diefenbaker period, it proves that Green’s beliefs about war only changed after his appointment as Secretary of State for External Affairs in June 1959, and even then it took time for his new ideals to “harden.” Prior to his “conversion” he believed that war remained a viable aspect of foreign policy and often encouraged its fuller prosecution.

This thesis follows the development of Howard Charles Green’s (1895-1989) views on war and disarmament as both a private citizen and as a Member of Parliament. It draws its conclusions from a large archival base. Beginning with Green’s experiences in the First World War, this thesis charts Green’s views on war through to the United Nations Irish Resolution on disarmament of December 20, 1960. Contrary to current historiography examining the Diefenbaker period, it proves that Green’s beliefs about war only changed after his appointment as Secretary of State for External Affairs in June 1959, and even then it took time for his new ideals to “harden.” Prior to his “conversion” he believed that war remained a viable aspect of foreign policy and often encouraged its fuller prosecution.