This dissertation describes and analyzes the work of the Supreme Court of Canada, emphasizing its internal environment and processes, while situating the institution in its broader governmental and societal context. In addition, it offers an assessment of the behavioural and rational choice models of judicial decision making, which tend to portray judges as primarily motivated by their ideologically-based policy preferences. The dissertation adopts a historical institutionalist approach to demonstrate that judicial decision making is far more complex than is depicted by the dominant approaches within the political science literature. Drawing extensively on 28 research interviews with current and former justices, former law clerks and other staff members, the analysis traces the development of the Court into a full-fledged policy-making institution, particularly under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This analysis presents new empirical evidence regarding not only the various stages of the Court’s decision-making process but the justices’ views on a host of considerations ranging from questions of collegiality (how the justices should work together) to their involvement in controversial and complex social policy matters and their relationship with the other branches of government. These insights are important because they increase our understanding of how the Court operates as one of the country’s more important policy-making institutions. The findings have significant implications for debates over judicial activism and the relationship between courts and the other branches of government when dealing with the Charter. The project also concludes that the justices’ role perceptions – the ideas, norms and rules that govern their role as judges and that of the institution – both shape and constrain their decision making behaviour. Understanding judicial behaviour with a focus on role perceptions allows for bridge-building between the competing explanations of judicial decision making and for theory-building in the broader judicial politics literature. / Thesis (Ph.D, Political Studies) -- Queen's University, 2009-11-11 13:06:59.159

This dissertation examines the behaviour of the Supreme Court of Canada in cases involving electoral/referendum laws and the alleged violation of freedom of expression and/or the right to vote. In 2007, it declared that the judiciary should adopt "a natural attitude of deference" towards Parliament's decisions about the democratic process when determining, under section one of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, whether the infringement is reasonable and justified. This declaration reflected institutional concerns about judicial competence to review legislative choices in this area of public policy and the democratic legitimacy of it doing so. It was made even though the Court had found laws unconstitutional in a majority of the cases that it had heard to date. Deference is often simply equated with government 'wins' in court. Such an equation ignores the effect that the decision has on judicial reasoning. It sets the standard of review the court uses when applying the Oakes test, the framework within which the section 1 analysis occurs. It also establishes the standard of proof that the Crown must meet to demonstrate that an infringement is justified. The outcome of constitutional disputes can turn on the decision about deference, pointing to a need for structure and coherence in the judiciary's approach. A review of the Court's jurisprudence shows that this need has not been met. In spite of its importance to constitutional adjudication, the analytical process by which the decision is made has garnered little attention from those who study the Charter. This dissertation seeks to fill this gap by examining deference theory and the use of deference in disputes involving the democratic process and by proposing an approach for specific use in these cases. The approach links the decision to the nature of the legislation, the nature of the right and the nature of the parliamentary discourse that preceded the enactment or amendment of the impugned law. Before setting the standards of review and proof used during the Oakes test, courts should determine whether: they have the necessary competence and legitimacy to act; the right warrants stringent constitutional protection; and parliamentarians engaged in serious deliberations that included the Charter and the reasonableness of any infringements. / Thesis (Ph.D, Political Studies) -- Queen's University, 2011-12-23 12:12:53.51

Prostitution, sex in exchange for consideration, has never been illegal in Canada; however, activities surrounding prostitution have been criminalized in the Criminal Code. These prohibited activities include: working indoors (s. 210 keeping a common bawdy house), providing services to sex workers (s. 212(1)(j) living off of the avails of prostitution), and communicating in public for the purposes of prostitution (s. 213). In 2007 two former and one current sex worker, Terri Jean Bedford, Valerie Scott and Amy Lebovitch challenged the constitutionality of the above laws, arguing that they increased sex workers’ vulnerability to harm. Six years later on June 13th, 2013 the Supreme Court of Canada heard the landmark case Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford. Prior to hearing the case, the Supreme Court Justices read the submitted factums outlining the arguments of the appellants, respondents, and their interveners. The final decision was released on December 22nd, 2013 and the unanimous decision to strike down all three laws was made. Using a discourse analysis inspired by Michel Foucault, this study ‘unpacks’ the meanings that are constituted within the factums submitted to the Supreme Court regarding the people who engage in sex work and the institution of prostitution. The convergences and divergences within the discourses are presented. Drawing on these findings, while applying the work of Wedeking’s (2010) strategic legal framing alongside the governmentality perspective of risk, the tensions surrounding risk and choice are further explored. In doing so, the relationship between risk (taking/avoiding) and choice (making) is teased out. In this thesis I argue that risk and choice are strategically framed in the submitted factums to demonstrate the (un)constitutionality of Canada’s prostitution laws. Furthermore, I argue that both the appellants and respondents agree that risk avoidance is an acceptable self-governance strategy for sex workers, however they diverge on what they consider to be acceptable risk avoidance measures. The conclusion of this study discusses the decision of Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford to strike down the three prostitution laws and the subsequent introduction of the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act.

For many years, workers petitioned the Supreme Court of Canada to intervene in labour relations to protect their collective bargaining rights. Finally, the Court answered the call, but the drastic changes made were not what workers expected. This thesis outlines the effect that the Court’s decision to intervene in labour relations had on the existing collective bargaining model. In making this determination, a historical analysis was done of the Court’s attitude towards using section 2(d) Freedom to Associate to protect collective bargaining, followed by a comparative analysis with United States jurisprudence to explain the effect of the Canadian decisions on the statutory provisions. The analysis revealed that the decisions had significantly weakened protections for workers’ rights, and provided the basis to conclude that the Supreme Court of Canada had used the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to deradicalize the existing collective bargaining model.

For many years, workers petitioned the Supreme Court of Canada to intervene in labour relations to protect their collective bargaining rights. Finally, the Court answered the call, but the drastic changes made were not what workers expected. This thesis outlines the effect that the Court’s decision to intervene in labour relations had on the existing collective bargaining model. In making this determination, a historical analysis was done of the Court’s attitude towards using section 2(d) Freedom to Associate to protect collective bargaining, followed by a comparative analysis with United States jurisprudence to explain the effect of the Canadian decisions on the statutory provisions. The analysis revealed that the decisions had significantly weakened protections for workers’ rights, and provided the basis to conclude that the Supreme Court of Canada had used the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to deradicalize the existing collective bargaining model.

The 1980s witnessed a judicial “rights revolution” in Canada characterized by the Supreme Court of Canada striking down both federal and provincial legislation which violated the rights guaranteed by the 1982 Charter of Rights. The lack of a similar judicial “rights revolution” in the wake of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights has largely been attributed to the structural difference between the two instruments with the latter – as a “mere” statute of the federal parliament – providing little more than a canon of construction and (unlike the Charter) not empowering the courts to engage in judicial review of legislation. Yet this view contrasts starkly with how the Bill was portrayed by the Diefenbaker government, which argued that it provided for judicial review and would “prevail” over other federal legislation. Many modern scholars have dismissed the idea that the Bill could prevail over other federal statutes as being incompatible with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. That is, a bill of rights could only prevail over legislation if incorporated into the British North America Act. As such, they argue that the Diefenbaker government could not have intended the Bill of Rights to operate as anything more than a canon of construction. However, such a view ignores the turbulence in constitutional thinking on parliamentary sovereignty in the 1930s through 1960s provoked by the Statute of Westminster. This era produced the doctrine of “self-embracing” sovereignty – in contrast to traditional “Dicey” sovereignty – where parliament could limit itself through “ordinary” legislation. The effective author of the Canadian Bill of Rights, Elmer Driedger, was an adherent of this doctrine as well as an advocate of a “purposive” approach to statutory interpretation. Driedger, thus, drafted the Bill based upon the doctrine of self-embracing sovereignty and believed it would enjoy a “purposive” interpretation by the courts, with the Bill designed to be as effective at guaranteeing rights as the Statute of Westminster was at liberating Canada from Imperial legislation.

Over the last couple of decades or so, comparative public law scholars have been reporting a dramatic increase in the power and influence of judicial institutions worldwide. One obvious effect of this “judicialization of politics” is to highlight legitimacy concerns associated with the exercise of judicial power. Indeed, how do courts attain and retain their legitimacy particularly in the context of their increasing political relevance? To answer this question I develop a novel theory of strategic legitimacy cultivation. The theory is developed through an application of the institutionalist branch of the rational choice theory which suggests that institutional structures, rules, and imperatives provide behavioural incentives and disincentives for relevant actors who respond by acting strategically in order to attain favourable outcomes. The theory shows that courts cultivate legitimacy by exhibiting strategic sensitivities to factors operating in the external, political environment. In particular, legitimacy cultivation requires courts to devise decisions that are sensitive to the state of public opinion, that avoid overt clashes and entanglements with key political actors, that do not overextend the outreach of judicial activism, and that employ politically sensitive jurisprudence. The theory is tested in the context of the Supreme Court of Canada through a mixed-method research design that combines a quantitative analysis of a large number of cases, case-study approaches, and cross-policy comparisons. One of the central findings of the dissertation is that understanding judicial institutions and judicial policymaking influence requires taking close accounts of external contexts within which courts operate.

Over the last couple of decades or so, comparative public law scholars have been reporting a dramatic increase in the power and influence of judicial institutions worldwide. One obvious effect of this “judicialization of politics” is to highlight legitimacy concerns associated with the exercise of judicial power. Indeed, how do courts attain and retain their legitimacy particularly in the context of their increasing political relevance? To answer this question I develop a novel theory of strategic legitimacy cultivation. The theory is developed through an application of the institutionalist branch of the rational choice theory which suggests that institutional structures, rules, and imperatives provide behavioural incentives and disincentives for relevant actors who respond by acting strategically in order to attain favourable outcomes. The theory shows that courts cultivate legitimacy by exhibiting strategic sensitivities to factors operating in the external, political environment. In particular, legitimacy cultivation requires courts to devise decisions that are sensitive to the state of public opinion, that avoid overt clashes and entanglements with key political actors, that do not overextend the outreach of judicial activism, and that employ politically sensitive jurisprudence. The theory is tested in the context of the Supreme Court of Canada through a mixed-method research design that combines a quantitative analysis of a large number of cases, case-study approaches, and cross-policy comparisons. One of the central findings of the dissertation is that understanding judicial institutions and judicial policymaking influence requires taking close accounts of external contexts within which courts operate.

The 1980s witnessed a judicial “rights revolution” in Canada characterized by the Supreme Court of Canada striking down both federal and provincial legislation which violated the rights guaranteed by the 1982 Charter of Rights. The lack of a similar judicial “rights revolution” in the wake of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights has largely been attributed to the structural difference between the two instruments with the latter – as a “mere” statute of the federal parliament – providing little more than a canon of construction and (unlike the Charter) not empowering the courts to engage in judicial review of legislation. Yet this view contrasts starkly with how the Bill was portrayed by the Diefenbaker government, which argued that it provided for judicial review and would “prevail” over other federal legislation. Many modern scholars have dismissed the idea that the Bill could prevail over other federal statutes as being incompatible with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. That is, a bill of rights could only prevail over legislation if incorporated into the British North America Act. As such, they argue that the Diefenbaker government could not have intended the Bill of Rights to operate as anything more than a canon of construction. However, such a view ignores the turbulence in constitutional thinking on parliamentary sovereignty in the 1930s through 1960s provoked by the Statute of Westminster. This era produced the doctrine of “self-embracing” sovereignty – in contrast to traditional “Dicey” sovereignty – where parliament could limit itself through “ordinary” legislation. The effective author of the Canadian Bill of Rights, Elmer Driedger, was an adherent of this doctrine as well as an advocate of a “purposive” approach to statutory interpretation. Driedger, thus, drafted the Bill based upon the doctrine of self-embracing sovereignty and believed it would enjoy a “purposive” interpretation by the courts, with the Bill designed to be as effective at guaranteeing rights as the Statute of Westminster was at liberating Canada from Imperial legislation.

La Cour suprême du Canada (« Cour ») prône « ses propres valeurs» dans la détermination des droits économiques des Autochtones, dont la prédominance des intérêts économiques des non Autochtones, ainsi que la protection du couple souveraineté canadienne/primauté du droit. Ces valeurs sont maintenues avec constance par la Cour, malgré l'évolution du cadre juridique canadien applicable aux revendications des droits économiques par les Autochtones. Ce mémoire démontre que, depuis la constitutionnalisation des droits économiques des Autochtones en 1982, le domaine de la preuve - tant par l'invocation de règles de preuve que par l'appréciation de la preuve - est le principal outil invoqué par la Cour en rhétorique au soutien de la détermination des droits économiques des Autochtones selon ses propres valeurs. De plus, notre recherche nous a également permis de formuler plusieurs critiques relatives à l'indiscipline de la Cour dans l'application du domaine de la preuve dans les décisions portant sur les droits économiques des Autochtones. / When determining the scope of Aboriginal economic rights, the Supreme Court of Canada (« Court ») values the economic interests of non-Aboriginals and the reaffirmation of Canadian sovereignty/rule of law over Aboriginal claims. These values are advanced by the Court despite developments in the Canadian legal framework applicable to Aboriginal economic rights claims. This thesis demonstrates that, since 1982, when Aboriginal economic rights were granted constitutional protection, the Court began to utilize the law of evidence to justify the espousal of their values when determining the scope of Aboriginal economic rights. The Court manipulates both its weighing of the evidence and the rules of evidence in order to justify their values. My research has led me to develop several criticisms related to the methodology used by the Court in its manipulation of the rules and in its appreciation of evidence.