This dissertation explores conceptual, normative, and institutional dimensions of the emergency problematic and defends judicial participation in emergency governance. I develop my arguments on the basis of Posner and Vermeule’s discussion in their book Terror in the Balance. I reject their institutional account of emergency governance captured in their deference thesis by showing its incompatibility with fundamental liberal democratic commitments. As I argue, Posner and Vermeule’s call for across-the-board judicial deference to the executive during emergencies is unwarranted in a number of cases, most notably those involving conflicts of constitutional rights. I also reject Posner and Vermeule’s account of emergency policymaking captured in their tradeoff thesis by showing that it does not provide a suitable criterion by means of which the legitimacy of emergency policies could be determined. My arguments against the tradeoff and deference theses are based in part on my critique of Posner and Vermeule’s conception of emergency situations. In fleshing out my conception of emergency, I present and defend a methodological approach to studying the emergency problematic and offer an extensive discussion of exceptionality associated with emergencies. My conclusion is that it is necessary to take in account liberal democratic commitments in the process of emergency policymaking and that judicial review of the executive during periods of emergency is conducive to legitimate emergency governance. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / Some national security crises pose serious challenges to western liberal democracies. On the one hand, because such crises threaten individual lives and the welfare of the political community, there is a strong case in favor of demanding that the government do everything in its power to quash such threats by any means necessary. On the other hand, a number of constitutional commitments seem to prevent liberal democracies from using some means in addressing national security crises. In particular, emergency measures such as coercive interrogation and indefinite detention seem to undermine a number of values and commitments that are fundamental to liberal democratic regimes. In addition, there is a controversy surrounding the role of the judiciary during emergencies. Should judges review executive action to ensure its legitimacy during emergencies or should the executive be the final authority on the legitimacy of its policies? My dissertation develops answers to these questions. I begin by exploring conceptual issues surrounding emergencies. On the basis of this exploration, I provide an account of the role of fundamental liberal democratic commitments in the project of emergency governance and argue in favor of judicial participation in governing liberal democratic communities during periods of emergency.

This dissertation examines the behaviour of the Supreme Court of Canada in cases involving electoral/referendum laws and the alleged violation of freedom of expression and/or the right to vote. In 2007, it declared that the judiciary should adopt "a natural attitude of deference" towards Parliament's decisions about the democratic process when determining, under section one of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, whether the infringement is reasonable and justified. This declaration reflected institutional concerns about judicial competence to review legislative choices in this area of public policy and the democratic legitimacy of it doing so. It was made even though the Court had found laws unconstitutional in a majority of the cases that it had heard to date. Deference is often simply equated with government 'wins' in court. Such an equation ignores the effect that the decision has on judicial reasoning. It sets the standard of review the court uses when applying the Oakes test, the framework within which the section 1 analysis occurs. It also establishes the standard of proof that the Crown must meet to demonstrate that an infringement is justified. The outcome of constitutional disputes can turn on the decision about deference, pointing to a need for structure and coherence in the judiciary's approach. A review of the Court's jurisprudence shows that this need has not been met. In spite of its importance to constitutional adjudication, the analytical process by which the decision is made has garnered little attention from those who study the Charter. This dissertation seeks to fill this gap by examining deference theory and the use of deference in disputes involving the democratic process and by proposing an approach for specific use in these cases. The approach links the decision to the nature of the legislation, the nature of the right and the nature of the parliamentary discourse that preceded the enactment or amendment of the impugned law. Before setting the standards of review and proof used during the Oakes test, courts should determine whether: they have the necessary competence and legitimacy to act; the right warrants stringent constitutional protection; and parliamentarians engaged in serious deliberations that included the Charter and the reasonableness of any infringements. / Thesis (Ph.D, Political Studies) -- Queen's University, 2011-12-23 12:12:53.51

No / This article draws on findings from a three-year project to develop and deliver culturally appropriate support group materials for South Asian and Eastern European family carers of relatives with dementia living in the UK. Analysis of interview and field note data revealed insights into how understandings of dementia in different cultural contexts can become operationalized through stigma processes and in turn influence the ways in which people with dementia and their family carers engage with formal and informal support.

Relations between courts and public administration in statutory construction Abstract Judicial review of administrative decisions (and statutory construction contained in them) may use divergent standards (strictness). The classical continental concept of administrative justice follows from the notion that courts answer questions of law independently of the administrative body. The goal of the thesis is to cast doubt on this concept and to define situations where it can be considered that courts could be deferential towards the public administration, i.e. leave certain space to the administration for its own interpretation, which the court would accept even though the court itself might not see the interpretation as the best one. The comparative part of the thesis shows that such an approach of administrative courts regarding interpretation made by public administration is not totally rare. That is mainly the case of the United States of America, where in the instance of ambiguous statutes or secondary legislation, the interpretation made by the agency charged with administering the law is rewarded with deference if such interpretation is at least permissible. Czech administrative courts (and the Constitutional Court) also often concede that there is a plurality of equally convincing legal interpretations....

This thesis examines what are for us two great sources or causes of error. The first arises from the influence of various cognitive biases upon our thinking, while the second emerges as a result of our wide-ranging dependence upon others for a vast amount of our beliefs about the world. Through both we can come to adopt false and harmful beliefs, a fact that naturally has both veridical and moral significance. One response is to suggest that we should increase our reliance upon experts in order to help us better acquire true beliefs and avoid false beliefs. By examining the historical, theoretical, psychological, and linguistic character of epistemic authorities and relationships, this avenue will be argued to be problematic. Scepticism in relation to epistemic authority is avoided in favour of an adoption of a critical attitude with respect to social sources of belief. The epistemology of testimony is next looked at, to see whether any lessons can be drawn from the nature of epistemic dependence to how we should epistemically approach others. Reductive versus non-reductive conceptions of the justification of testimony are explained, with the former conception being seen as naturally lending itself more to a critical treatment of social sources of belief. The question of why we should be rational at all is then examined. The positions of William K. Clifford and Karl Popper on the matter are explained, and my own views set forward. Finally, in light of the preceding groundwork, it is argued that there is a philosophical place and a social need for public education with respect to the broad epistemic situation in which we find ourselves.

A study in the effects of the solicitor general on judicial deference to the executive branch at the state court level. There has been significant research done into the development of judicial deference, but it almost always takes place at the Supreme Court. Similarly, the Solicitor General’s success rate has only been analyzed at the federal level. Recently there has been a trend of states creating Solicitor General Offices in order to gain the advantage perceived at the federal level. By comparing the level of deference state courts give to their executive branch over two time periods I determine that although the Solicitor General does impact deference, the impact isn’t immediate. The states with the strongest level of deference were the states that have had Solicitor Generals for a significant amount of time before the analysis. States where the office was created I between the two time periods do experience heightened deference, but at a lower level. This paper seeks to fill the gap in judiciary research where the majority of the focus is on the Supreme Court, which although very important does not give a comprehensive understanding of the US judicial branch.

No description available.

Deference in international human rights law has provoked animated discussion, particularly the margin of appreciation doctrine of the European Court of Human Rights. Many commentators describe the practice of deference but do not explain how it affects judicial reasoning. Some approve characteristics of deference but do not provide a justification to defend the practice against criticism. Others regard deference as a danger to human rights because it betrays the universality of human rights or involves tribunals either failing to consider a case properly or missing an opportunity to set human rights standards. This thesis employs a different approach by focussing on deference as the practice of assigning weight to reasons for a decision on the basis of external factors. This approach draws on theories of second-order reasoning from the philosophy of practical reasoning. The thesis offers a conceptual account of deference that accords with the practice not only of the European Court of Human Rights, but also the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee. Additionally the thesis presents a normative account of deference, that the role of these tribunals entails permitting a measure of diversity as states implement international human rights standards. Deference in international human rights law then is the judicial practice of assigning weight to the respondent states’ reasoning in a case on the basis of three factors: democratic legitimacy, the common practice of states and expertise. This affects judicial reasoning by impacting the balance of reasons in the proportionality assessment. The account defended in this thesis dispels concerns that deference is a danger to human rights, whilst providing a theory that justifies the practice of the tribunals. The thesis thus provides the contours of a doctrine of deference in each of the three international human rights systems.

The present investigation was initiated in order to determine the relationship of responses to geometric designs to inferiority feelings and certain personality variables. The major problem was divided into the following sub-problems: 1. What is the relationship of responses to geometric designs to selected clinical scales on the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory? (MMPI). 2. What is the relationship of responses to geometric designs to selected personality variables on the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule? (EPPS). 3. What is the relationship of responses to geometric designs to selected personality characteristics on the Guilford-Zimmerman Temperament Survey? (G-Z).

abstract: This dissertation consists of three essays, each of which closely relates to epistemic norms for rational doxastic states. The central issue is whether epistemic rationality is impermissive or not: For any total evidence E, is there a unique doxastic state that any possible agent with that total evidence E should take (Uniqueness), or not (Permissivism)? “Conservatism and Uniqueness”: Conservatism is the idea that an agent’s beliefs should be stable as far as possible when she undergoes a learning experience. Uniqueness is the idea that any given body of total evidence uniquely determines what it is rational to believe. Epistemic Impartiality is the idea that you should not give special treatment to your beliefs solely because they are yours. I construe Epistemic Impartiality as a meta-principle governing epistemic norms, and argue that it is compatible with Conservatism. Then I show that if Epistemic Impartiality is correct, Conservatism and Uniqueness go together; each implies the other. “Cognitive Decision Theory and Permissive Rationality”: In recent epistemology, philosophers have deployed a decision theoretic approach to justify various epistemic norms. A family of such accounts is known as Cognitive Decision Theory. According to Cognitive Decision Theory, rational beliefs are those with maximum expected epistemic value. How does Cognitive Decision Theory relate to the debate over permissive rationality? As one way of addressing this question, I present and assess an argument against Cognitive Decision Theory. “Steadfastness, Deference, and Permissive Rationality”: Recently, Benjamin Levinstein has offered two interesting arguments concerning epistemic norms and epistemic peer disagreement. In his first argument, Levinstein claims that a tension between Permissivism and steadfast attitudes in the face of epistemic peer disagreement generally leads us to conciliatory attitudes; in his second argument, he argues that, given an ‘extremely weak version of a deference principle,’ Permissivism collapses into Uniqueness. However, in this chapter, I show that both arguments fail. This result supports the following claim: we should treat steadfast attitudes and at least some versions of a deference principle as viable positions in the discussion about several types of Permissivism, because they are compatible with any type of Permissivism. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Philosophy 2016