My central aim in the dissertation is to defend an account of the epistemic condition of moral responsibility that distinguishes culpable ignorance from non-culpable ignorance. The view that I defend is that ignorance is culpable just when an agent flouts or ignores moral reasons that underlie her epistemic norms or obligations. This view is a quality-of-will theory of moral responsibility that emphasizes the agent’s reasons-responsiveness. It holds that only relevant epistemic obligations are those that require acts of investigation or reflection. In the dissertation, I examine extant theories of culpable ignorance and suggest that they all fall short in some important respect. Then, I propose and defend an account in which epistemic norms play a leading role. I analyze the nature of epistemic norms and their normativity, and I argue that agents who ignore or flout actional investigative norms and then act on subsequent false beliefs are connected to the wrongness of their action in a way that establishes their blameworthiness. I also argue that epistemic norms that require agents to hold certain beliefs or make certain inferences are not relevant to culpable ignorance. Finally, I explore the implications of my view for certain interesting cases of moral ignorance. I discuss ignorance that results from an agent’s social or historical circumstances, ignorance that stems from pure moral deference, and ignorance that is explained by epistemic difficulty of getting certain moral facts right. There are two striking outcomes of my research. The first is that reflection on the epistemic condition shows that one cannot think deeply about moral responsibility without also engaging issues in epistemology relating to the nature and normativity of belief, and issues in normative ethics relating to what our moral obligations actually are. The second striking outcome is that bringing these rather disparate topics together, as I attempted to do, reveals that much of our ignorance is actually non-culpable, and that many of our beliefs about the blameworthiness of ignorant agents are unwarranted.

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This thesis explores the extent to which the doxastic ‘should' is information-sensitive and the implications of this for a number of debates in normative epistemology. The doxastic ‘should' is a special case of the deontic modal ‘should' and occurs in sentences such as ‘You shouldn't believe everything you read online'. In the recent semantics literature, it has been suggested that the deontic ‘should' is information-sensitive, meaning that sentences of the form ‘S should do A' are relativized to information-states. After a short introductory chapter, I survey the relevant semantics literature in chapter 2 and provide a simplified contextualist semantics for the doxastic ‘should', according to which the truth-conditions of sentences containing the doxastic ‘should' vary with the information-state provided by their context of utterance. In chapters 3 to 6, I discuss the different kinds of information-states the doxastic ‘should' can be relativized to and how the respective relativization matters for normative epistemology. Chapter 3 argues that the doxastic ‘should' has a subjective and an objective sense and that this distinction solves the apparent conflict between subjective epistemic norms and the truth norm for belief. Chapter 4 addresses the question of how one should react to misleading higher-order evidence. I propose that two seemingly opposing views on this issue, Steadfastness and Concilliationism, are both correct. In a sense of ‘should' that is relativized to one's first-order evidence, one should remain steadfast in the face of misleading higher-order evidence, but in another sense, which is relativized to one's higher-order evidence, one shouldn't. In chapters 5 and 6, I argue that when we advise others on what they should believe, we talk about what they should believe in light of their and our joint evidence. Chapter 7 concludes this thesis with a defence of contextualist semantics for the doxastic ‘should' against truth-relativist challenges.

Cette thèse tente de démontrer que la rationalité épistémique est normative, ou plus précisément, que les agents doivent être épistémiquement rationnels. On peut dire provisoirement que la rationalité est un code – ou un ensemble de règles – en ce sens qu’elle correspond à une collection systématique d’exigences. En particulier, la rationalité est souvent identifiée à un ensemble systématique de lignes de conduite ayant pour but de faire en sorte qu’un agent réponde correctement à ses raisons, qu’il évite de se contredire, d’être incohérent ou akratique. La thèse poursuit aussi certains objectifs secondaires, en particulier: (i) montrer que les raisons épistémiques apparentes de croire que P (comprises comme des propositions apparemment vraies qui, si elles étaient vraies, militeraient en faveur de la conclusion que P) sont normatives; (ii) montrer qu’il n’y a pas de dilemme insoluble de la rationalité épistémique; (iii) montrer que, relativement à un ensemble de données probantes ou de raisons épistémiques, un agent idéalement rationnel n’a jamais la permission épistémique de croire que P et de croire que ~P simultanément. Si ces objectifs secondaires sont intéressants en eux-mêmes, ils contribuent aussi à confirmer l’idée selon laquelle la rationalité épistémique est normative. / This thesis argues that epistemic rationality is normative, or that agents ought to be epistemically rational. The property of rationality is here understood as a code. Specifically, the code of epistemic rationality requires various things, such as responding correctly to epistemic reasons one has, remaining coherent and avoiding akratic combinations of beliefs. Additionally, this thesis has secondary aims, such as: (i) arguing that apparent epistemic reasons to believe P (understood as apparently true propositions which, if they were true, would count in favour of the conclusion that P) are deontically significant; (ii) arguing against unsolvable normative dilemmas of epistemic rationality; (iii) arguing against a specific type of permissiveness which roughly states that, relative to a body of epistemic reasons, it can be epistemically rational for an ideal agent to believe P and to disbelieve P. While these secondary aims are interesting in their own right, they confirm the main claim of this thesis, namely, that epistemic rationality is normative.

Alors que la société, notamment le grand public et les décideurs politiques, compte sur les experts pour lui fournir des connaissances scientifiques fiables, ceux-ci sont régulièrement en désaccord les uns avec les autres. Pourquoi, alors, faudrait-il leur faire confiance et se fier à leur jugement ? Pour y répondre, j’explore différentes causes des désaccords entre experts à travers le concept du pluralisme scientifique – le pluralisme explicatif et méthodologique, ainsi que la variété de normes épistémiques et non-épistémiques qui influencent la production de la connaissance scientifique – et les dynamiques sociales et politiques dans lesquelles le savoir expert est créé. J’argumente que les désaccords sont, dans le cadre de la recherche scientifique dite « académique », épistémiquement bénéfiques sur le long terme. Avec l’exemple du processus de l’élaboration des politiques publiques, j’explique ensuite comment l’utilisation du savoir scientifique à des fins pratiques crée des problèmes susceptibles d’exacerber les désaccords entre experts, mais que souvent, cela est dû en grande partie à des facteurs hors de leur contrôle. Enfin, j’argumente que cette utilisation particulière du savoir scientifique contribue à la méfiance du public envers les experts lorsqu’ils sont en désaccord, et je présente des conditions sous lesquelles il est justifié de leur faire confiance. / While society, notably the general public and policy makers, count on experts to provide it with reliable scientific knowledge, the latter regularly disagree with each other. Why, then, should we trust them and rely on their judgements? To answer, I explore different causes of disagreements between experts through the concept of scientific pluralism – explanatory and methodological pluralism, and the variety of epistemic and non-epistemic norms that influence the production of scientific knowledge – and the social and political dynamics in which expert knowledge is made. I argue that disagreements are, in the context of so-called “academic” scientific research, epistemically beneficial in the long term. With the example of the policy-making process, I then explain how the use of scientific knowledge for practical purposes creates problems that can exacerbate disagreements between experts, but that often, this is due in large part to factors beyond their control. Finally, I argue that this particular use of scientific knowledge contributes to public mistrust of experts when they disagree, and I present some conditions under which it is justified to trust them.