Over the last 30 years, the concept of culture has gained increased ground in Canadian jurisprudence on Aboriginal and Treaty rights under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. This thesis focuses on the gendered nature of the court’s culturalist method of interpreting and adjudicating s.35, arguing that it acts as a containment strategy with respect to Aboriginal and Treaty rights generally, and Indigenous women’s rights in particular. Specific focus is given to the frequent and extreme rights infringements experienced by Indigenous women in Canadian contexts. This project foregrounds Indigenous narratives, Treaty-based and otherwise, as a way of inspiring a s.35 framework that extends well beyond the confines of culture and provides more equitable, comprehensive and substantive protection for a broad range of Aboriginal and Treaty rights within Canadian legal and political institutions. / Graduate

This thesis examines the interpretation of section 35(5) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, which empowers the courts to exclude unconstitutionally obtained evidence in criminal trials. A generous and purposive interpretation should be at the heart of the admissibility assessment. This work explores the threshold requirements and the substantive phase of the interpretation of section 35(5). Given that this provision is manifestly modelled on the terms contained in section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter, the manner in which the courts of that country have grappled with the interpretation of section 24(2) has been accorded particular importance. As a preliminary issue, the courts must consider whether the threshold requirements of section 35(5) have been satisfied. It is concluded that the courts of South Africa have interpreted the threshold requirements of section 35(5) in a broad manner, thereby making it less onerous to satisfy, compared to the threshold requirements contained in section 24(2) The substantive phase of the admissibility assessment should consist of two legs that must be clearly separated from each other, for the reason that the assessment in each leg of the analysis serve to enhance different societal interests. The public interest in protecting the rights of the accused should be the central consideration during the first leg, while the societal interest in convicting the guilty should be contemplated during the second leg. The first leg of the analysis is concerned with the effect that admission of the evidence would have on the fairness of the trial. It is suggested that the trial fairness requirement should be determined by means of a conscription analysis. The prosecution may rely on the ‘discoverability’ doctrine or on the ‘independent source’ exception. The admission of evidence based on these exceptions would not render the trial unfair. Such an infringement would, accordingly, not add to the seriousness of the violation. Conversely, although admission would tend to render the trial unfair, the evidence should not ‘automatically’ be excluded. However, such an infringement should be regarded as a serious violation, since section 35(5) was designed to prevent unfair trials. The second leg is focused on the effect that either the admission or exclusion of the evidence would have on the integrity of the criminal justice system. It is concluded that the ‘current mood’ of society should not be determinative of the admissibility assessment. The following overall admissibility framework is recommended: Despite the fact that admission would render the trial unfair, the courts should be allowed to consider police ‘good faith’ and other factors ordinarily considered during the second leg, in order to make an admissibility ruling. Differently put, a balancing exercise should be performed, in which the factors identified in the seminal case of Collins are considered and weighed at the end of the analysis. More importantly, the seriousness of the violation should be a significant factor in the overall admissibility assessment, since judicial condonation of serious infringements would generally impact negatively on the repute of the criminal justice system. / Thesis (LLD)--University of Pretoria, 2010. / Centre for Human Rights / unrestricted

The issue of the vertical /or horizontal operation of the Bill of Rights (chapter 3) is a controversial one. The interim constitution deals with this controversy in a subtle way by avoiding direct horizontal operation of Chapter 3. Instead, it provides for the so-called 'seepage to horizontal relationships' in terms of section35{3). This apparently was a political compromise between the pro-vertical only and the pro-horizontal groups. The human rights history of this country justifies a Bill of Rights that would have both vertical and horizontal operation. However, in section 35 (3) there is potential for the values enshrined in the constitution and Chapter 3, and the spirit hereof, to permeate and filter through the entire legal system in all it's applications. It would seem, however, as demonstrated by the decision in De Klerk v Du Plessis, that the extent to which this filtering process will benefit individuals in their private relations, will depend on the interpretation given to section 35 (3) by the courts. If courts, as it happend in De Klerk's case fail to realise the full import of section 35 ( 3) aspects of the existing law which are unjust could remain and the process of creating a just, open and democratic society will be hampered. / Constitutional, International & Indigenous Law / LL.M.

La Cour suprême du Canada (« Cour ») prône « ses propres valeurs» dans la détermination des droits économiques des Autochtones, dont la prédominance des intérêts économiques des non Autochtones, ainsi que la protection du couple souveraineté canadienne/primauté du droit. Ces valeurs sont maintenues avec constance par la Cour, malgré l'évolution du cadre juridique canadien applicable aux revendications des droits économiques par les Autochtones. Ce mémoire démontre que, depuis la constitutionnalisation des droits économiques des Autochtones en 1982, le domaine de la preuve - tant par l'invocation de règles de preuve que par l'appréciation de la preuve - est le principal outil invoqué par la Cour en rhétorique au soutien de la détermination des droits économiques des Autochtones selon ses propres valeurs. De plus, notre recherche nous a également permis de formuler plusieurs critiques relatives à l'indiscipline de la Cour dans l'application du domaine de la preuve dans les décisions portant sur les droits économiques des Autochtones. / When determining the scope of Aboriginal economic rights, the Supreme Court of Canada (« Court ») values the economic interests of non-Aboriginals and the reaffirmation of Canadian sovereignty/rule of law over Aboriginal claims. These values are advanced by the Court despite developments in the Canadian legal framework applicable to Aboriginal economic rights claims. This thesis demonstrates that, since 1982, when Aboriginal economic rights were granted constitutional protection, the Court began to utilize the law of evidence to justify the espousal of their values when determining the scope of Aboriginal economic rights. The Court manipulates both its weighing of the evidence and the rules of evidence in order to justify their values. My research has led me to develop several criticisms related to the methodology used by the Court in its manipulation of the rules and in its appreciation of evidence.

The issue of the vertical /or horizontal operation of the Bill of Rights (chapter 3) is a controversial one. The interim constitution deals with this controversy in a subtle way by avoiding direct horizontal operation of Chapter 3. Instead, it provides for the so-called 'seepage to horizontal relationships' in terms of section35{3). This apparently was a political compromise between the pro-vertical only and the pro-horizontal groups. The human rights history of this country justifies a Bill of Rights that would have both vertical and horizontal operation. However, in section 35 (3) there is potential for the values enshrined in the constitution and Chapter 3, and the spirit hereof, to permeate and filter through the entire legal system in all it's applications. It would seem, however, as demonstrated by the decision in De Klerk v Du Plessis, that the extent to which this filtering process will benefit individuals in their private relations, will depend on the interpretation given to section 35 (3) by the courts. If courts, as it happend in De Klerk's case fail to realise the full import of section 35 ( 3) aspects of the existing law which are unjust could remain and the process of creating a just, open and democratic society will be hampered. / Constitutional, International and Indigenous Law / LL.M.

No description available.

Section 33(1)(b) is fraught with borrowed provisions. The end-product marries German and Canadian features. The failure of the German Constitutional Courts to interpret the "essential content of a right" precipitated the adopted infant's bumpy landing in South Africa. That the sibling still lacks identity is evidenced by our Constitutional Court's evasive and superficial treatment of the clause. Section 33(1)(a) - proportionality prong enables judges to justify their neglect of Section 33(1)(b). The opinion is expressed that Section 33(1){b) demands interpretation but to date it has been shrouded in vagueness. After all without demarcating boundaries with sufficient precision and highlighting where the State may not tread the State may trespass. Alternatively the limitable nature of human rights could become a myth as Section 33(1)(b) could be transformed into an insurmountable hurdle for the State, rendering every right absolute in practice. A workable conceptual framework proposes an inverted, porous and value imbibing solution. / Law / LL.M.

Section 33(1)(b) is fraught with borrowed provisions. The end-product marries German and Canadian features. The failure of the German Constitutional Courts to interpret the "essential content of a right" precipitated the adopted infant's bumpy landing in South Africa. That the sibling still lacks identity is evidenced by our Constitutional Court's evasive and superficial treatment of the clause. Section 33(1)(a) - proportionality prong enables judges to justify their neglect of Section 33(1)(b). The opinion is expressed that Section 33(1){b) demands interpretation but to date it has been shrouded in vagueness. After all without demarcating boundaries with sufficient precision and highlighting where the State may not tread the State may trespass. Alternatively the limitable nature of human rights could become a myth as Section 33(1)(b) could be transformed into an insurmountable hurdle for the State, rendering every right absolute in practice. A workable conceptual framework proposes an inverted, porous and value imbibing solution. / Law / LL.M.

This Doctoral thesis entitled the Constitutionality of Employers' Investigative Procedures and Disciplinary Hearing Processes with Specific Reference to Dismissal of Employees on the Basis of Criminal Misconducts in South Africa, focusses on individual labour law principles of fair labour practices entrenched in section 23(1) of the Constitution. The thesis deals with fairness in situation where an employee who is suspected of committing a criminal act is investigated and subsequently goes through a disciplinary hearing for dismissal. It determines the extent to which an employee’s criminal guilt is decided before dismissal. As such, the thesis is based upon South African judicial interpretation of the right to fair dismissal. In the process the thesis examines the application of principles informing the employer’s duty to provide fair reason concerning the dismissal of employees criminal suspects. In examining if employers observe constitutional transformative objective when conducting criminal investigations and disciplinary hearings - the thesis reviews the extent to which the employer respects constitutional rationales of equity based on the principles of natural justice. These natural justice principles are the basis upon which section 23(1) fairness is founded. Section 23 (1) is implemented through the LRA provisions. The thesis then concludes that, only one principle of natural justice - audi alteram partem is respected within employer flexibility-based fairness while the other principle - nemo judex in propria sua causa is ignored. It is this denial that causes serious procedural challenges in the quest for equity intended in section 23(1) fair labour practices. It is upon these foundational equity concerns that this thesis opposes the flexibility in employer’s criminal investigations and disciplinary hearing processes entrenched in item 4 (1) of Schedule 8 of the LRA fair procedure for dismissal of employees suspected of criminal acts. The thesis interlinks labour law and criminal law to advocate for the missing constitutionally justiciable fairness for employees who have committed criminal misconducts. It argues that the current judicial interpretation of labour law fairness is based upon the principle of flexibility underlying dismissals, asserting that fairness based on flexibility breeds informal procedural processes which exempt employers from observing crucial constitutional fairness principles expressed through proportionality-based prescripts. The thesis concludes that the practice of including the right against self-incrimination in employment law, done in other common law countries be introduced into the South African labour law through section 39 of the Constitution so that the identified procedural challenges are regulated. / Mercantile Law / LL.D.

Workers’ compensation originated internationally because of the need to address the plight of workers and communities left destitute due to occupationally sustained disabilities or death. This study examines how the right to no-fault compensation developed in South Africa in comparison to the comparable law in Canada and Australia. Specific limitations regarding the right to workers' compensation pursuant to the South African compensatory laws were identified. Limitations identified include the persons falling within the ambit of the law, circumstances creating a right to compensation, the right to claims for increased compensation uniquely provided for in South African compensatory law and founded in the negligent conduct of employers as well as common law redress for damages. The background of the administrative remedy in the form of the right to compensation for occupational injuries and diseases ought to be seen in the light of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. / Mercantile Law / LL. M.