One of the most interesting developments in recent psychological theorising has been a growing appreciation of the need for a viable theory of mental causation. Hitherto, the prospects for reconciling what seems to be the uniquely rational character of human thought and action with the non-rational mechanistic workings of the natural world have appeared to be limited or even illusory, and the pursuit of reconciliation of this sort has therefore formerly been dismissed as being either impossible of completion or inappropriate for contemplation. Much of the scepticism concerning the role of causal processes in human thought and action was dispelled, however, by the philosopher Donald Davidson, who argues that not only is human action capable of being caused by the actor�s thoughts and desires, but that only when such action is so caused, can it be rational. Davidson�s proposal for the reconciliation of human rationality with causal necessitation is articulated in his theory of Anomalous Monism. According to this theory, there exists what may be termed an ontological-conceptual distinction between events themselves and the characters or properties that are attributed to events by human observers, and it is through recognition of this distinction that one discovers how mental events, that is, events that are amenable to description in the psychological vocabulary, are causally efficacious yet free from the constraints typically associated with the necessity and sufficiency of causal laws. Anomalous Monism, if it were workable, would therefore resolve the paradox according to which human mentality is at once integrated in, and yet unconstrained by, the mechanistic natural world, by demonstrating the compatibility of the facts of causation with the intuitions of folk psychology. However, close examination of Anomalous Monism reveals it to rely on logically flawed anti-realist principles concerning the characters of events, properties and causation. It follows from this that the theory itself must be rejected, but the task that it was devised to undertake, the formulation of a viable theory of mental causation, need not be similarly discarded. Rather, what remains is the challenge of delineating an alternative theory, one that withstands logical scrutiny whilst addressing what is characteristic of human mental processes, and thereby what is characteristic of mental causation. The theory of Direct Realism that is derived from the broader philosophical realism of John Anderson provides the materials for meeting this challenge. According to Direct Realism, mental phenomena are relational situations obtaining between certain organisms (including humans) and their environments. As such, mental phenomena are included in the range of phenomena occurring in the natural world and they are therefore subject to all of its ways of working, including its deterministic mechanisms. The particular challenge that a Direct Realist theory of mental causation faces, that of demonstrating that relational situations can be causal, is revealed upon examination of the character of causation to be unproblematic. Furthermore, the seeming incompatibility between human rationality and natural necessitation is resolved when it is acknowledged that, rather than be an inherent feature of thought and action, logical structure is a characteristic of the natural environment that organisms are at times sensitive to, as revealed by its effects on the characters of their thoughts and actions. Far from being remote or illusory, the prospects for reconciling human mentality with the causal mechanisms of the natural world are discovered in the present thesis to be favourable when a realist approach to the characters of both mental events and causation is adopted.

One of the most interesting developments in recent psychological theorising has been a growing appreciation of the need for a viable theory of mental causation. Hitherto, the prospects for reconciling what seems to be the uniquely rational character of human thought and action with the non-rational mechanistic workings of the natural world have appeared to be limited or even illusory, and the pursuit of reconciliation of this sort has therefore formerly been dismissed as being either impossible of completion or inappropriate for contemplation. Much of the scepticism concerning the role of causal processes in human thought and action was dispelled, however, by the philosopher Donald Davidson, who argues that not only is human action capable of being caused by the actor�s thoughts and desires, but that only when such action is so caused, can it be rational. Davidson�s proposal for the reconciliation of human rationality with causal necessitation is articulated in his theory of Anomalous Monism. According to this theory, there exists what may be termed an ontological-conceptual distinction between events themselves and the characters or properties that are attributed to events by human observers, and it is through recognition of this distinction that one discovers how mental events, that is, events that are amenable to description in the psychological vocabulary, are causally efficacious yet free from the constraints typically associated with the necessity and sufficiency of causal laws. Anomalous Monism, if it were workable, would therefore resolve the paradox according to which human mentality is at once integrated in, and yet unconstrained by, the mechanistic natural world, by demonstrating the compatibility of the facts of causation with the intuitions of folk psychology. However, close examination of Anomalous Monism reveals it to rely on logically flawed anti-realist principles concerning the characters of events, properties and causation. It follows from this that the theory itself must be rejected, but the task that it was devised to undertake, the formulation of a viable theory of mental causation, need not be similarly discarded. Rather, what remains is the challenge of delineating an alternative theory, one that withstands logical scrutiny whilst addressing what is characteristic of human mental processes, and thereby what is characteristic of mental causation. The theory of Direct Realism that is derived from the broader philosophical realism of John Anderson provides the materials for meeting this challenge. According to Direct Realism, mental phenomena are relational situations obtaining between certain organisms (including humans) and their environments. As such, mental phenomena are included in the range of phenomena occurring in the natural world and they are therefore subject to all of its ways of working, including its deterministic mechanisms. The particular challenge that a Direct Realist theory of mental causation faces, that of demonstrating that relational situations can be causal, is revealed upon examination of the character of causation to be unproblematic. Furthermore, the seeming incompatibility between human rationality and natural necessitation is resolved when it is acknowledged that, rather than be an inherent feature of thought and action, logical structure is a characteristic of the natural environment that organisms are at times sensitive to, as revealed by its effects on the characters of their thoughts and actions. Far from being remote or illusory, the prospects for reconciling human mentality with the causal mechanisms of the natural world are discovered in the present thesis to be favourable when a realist approach to the characters of both mental events and causation is adopted.

Αφορμή για τη συγγραφή της παρούσας εργασίας συνιστά η διαμάχη μεταξύ του επιστημονικού ρεαλισμού και της εργαλειοκρατίας σχετικά με τις μη παρατηρήσιμες οντότητες Στόχος είναι να μελετηθεί και να αξιολογηθεί η εργαλειοκρατική προσέγγιση της επιστήμης , με έμφαση στην μορφή εργαλειοκρατίας που υποστηρίζεται στο έργο του Bastian Cornelis van Fraassen (The Scientific Image), δηλαδή τον κατασκευαστικό εμπειρισμό (constructive empiricism). Τα βασικά ερωτήματα που θα μας απασχολήσουν είναι τα εξής: 1)Τι πρεσβεύει ο επιστημονικός ρεαλισμός; 2)Τι εννοούμε όταν μιλάμε για την εργαλειοκρατική θεώρηση στην επιστήμη; 3)Ποια είναι η εργαλειοκρατική προσέγγιση της επιστήμης στο έργο του van Fraassen. Το πρώτο μέρος της εργασίας πραγματεύεται τον όρο «ρεαλισμός» θέτοντας ως αφετηρία τη Θεωρία των Ιδεών του Πλάτωνος, φτάνοντας μέχρι τον σύγχρονο επιστημονικό ρεαλισμό. Έτσι έχουμε: 1) τον Πλατωνισμό, 2) τον Άμεσο Ρεαλισμό, 3) τον Έμμεσο Ρεαλισμό, 4) τον Επιστημονικό Ρεαλισμό. Το καθένα από τα παραπάνω εκφράζουν τον όρο ρεαλισμό με διαφορετικό τρόπο. Στην παρούσα εργασία θα αναλυθεί περισσότερο ο επιστημονικός ρεαλισμός, διότι θα την αντιπαραβάλουμε με τις εργαλειοκρατικές προσεγγίσεις για την επιστήμη. Ο Επιστημονικός ρεαλισμός υποστηρίζει οτι ο σκοπός της επιστήμης είναι να μας δώσει μία κυριολεκτικά αληθή περιγραφή για τον κόσμο και ότι οι καλύτερες (πιο ώριμες) επιστημονικές θεωρίες μας προσφέρουν προσεγγιστικά αληθείς περιγραφές του κόσμου. Επομένως, οι οντότητες που περιγράφουν είναι πραγματικές (πχ. ηλεκτρόνια). Θα διατυπωθούν επιχειρήματα υπέρ του επιστημονικού ρεαλισμού, όπως: Α) το επιχείρημα του μη θαύματος: (Νo Μiracle Αrgument, ΝΜΑ): «ο ρεαλισμός είναι η μόνη φιλοσοφία της επιστήμης που δεν καθιστά την επιτυχία της επιστήμης ένα θαύμα». (Putnam, 1975). Β)το επιχείρημα της συναγωγής στη βέλτιστη εξήγηση(Inference to the Best Explanation, IBE): συνίσταται στο ότι από την ικανότητα μιας θεωρίας να προσφέρει την καλύτερη δυνατή εξήγηση των φυσικών φαινομένων έπεται η αλήθεια της. Συνεχίζουμε με τις βασικές μορφές της εργαλειοκρατίας: 1) την εξαλειπτική: οι όροι που δηλώνουν φυσικές μη παρατηρήσιμες οντότητες (θεωρητικοί όροι) , π.χ. ‘ηλεκτρόνιο’, μπορούν να εξαλειφθούν εντελώς από την επιστημονική γλώσσα και 2) την μη εξαλειπτική: δεν είναι σκοπός των επιστημονικών θεωριών να αναζητήσουν κάτι περισσότερο πίσω από τα φαινόμενα είτε αυτά υπάρχουν είτε όχι. Η αντιρεαλιστική θέση του van Fraassen ονομάζεται κατασκευαστικός εμπειρισμός (constructive empiricism)και υποστηρίζει οτι η επιστήμη σκοπεύει να μας δώσει θεωρίες, οι οποίες είναι εμπειρικά επαρκείς και η αποδοχή μιας θεωρίας ενέχει την πεποίθηση μόνο ότι αυτή είναι εμπειρικά επαρκής. Προϋπόθεση της θέσης του είναι η διάκριση παρατηρήσιμου και μη παρατηρήσιμου, η οποία εγείρει ενστάσεις. Από την ανάλυσή μας καταλήγουμε ότι η προσέγγισή του van Fraassen είναι ενδιαφέρουσα γιατί επιχειρεί να αποδώσει συστηματικά τη θέση της μη εξαλειπτικής εργαλειοκρατίας ότι η επιστήμη επιδιώκει να περιγράψει με ακρίβεια τα φαινόμενα χωρίς να μπορεί να αποφανθεί για κάτι βαθύτερο που βρίσκεται πίσω από αυτά. Οπότε, δεν έχει καταφέρει να καταρρίψει την οντολογική θέση του ρεαλισμού ότι υπάρχουν μη παρατηρήσιμες οντότητες. Η προσπάθειά του να αποδείξει τη διάκριση παρατηρήσιμου – μη παρατηρήσιμου ακολουθώντας τον δρόμο του κατασκευαστικού εμπειρισμού τον οδήγησε μάλλον στο να κάνει λήψη του ζητουμένου και άρα σε αδιέξοδο. Βέβαια , κάτι τέτοιο δεν μειώνει την αξία της προσφοράς του van Fraassen, αφού εκείνος είναι εισηγητής μιας νέας θεωρίας και νέων όρων, όπως η εμπειρική επάρκεια, δίνοντας έτσι το έναυσμα για περαιτέρω μελέτη και έρευνα στο πεδίο της φιλοσοφίας της επιστήμης. / The occasion of this dissertation is the conflict between the scientific realism and instrumentalism with regard to the unobservable entities. Specifically, the aim is to study and evaluate the instrumentalist approach to science, emphasising on the form of instrumentalism supported in the work of Bastian Cornelis van Fraassen (The Scientific Image), the constructive empiricism. The basic questions to be dealt with are:1) What advocates scientific realism? 2)What do we mean when we talk about the instrumentalist approach to science? 3) What is the instrumentalist approach to science in van Fraassen's work? The first part of the thesis deals with the term "realism" setting as a starting point the theory of Ideas of Plato, reaching the modern scientific realism. So we have: 1) Platonism, 2) the Direct Realism, 3) the Indirect Realism, 4) the Scientific Realism. Each of the above-expressing the term "realism" differently. This thesis focus more on the analysis of the scientific realism, because it will be compared with the instrumentalist approaches to science. The Scientific realism argues that the purpose of science is to give us a literally true description of the world and that the best (more mature) scientific theories offer us approximately true descriptions of the world. Therefore, entities that describe is real (eg. electrons). Arguments in favor of the scientific realism are the following: A)the argument of non-miracle (NMA), according to which "realism is the only philosophy of science that does not make the success of science a miracle." (Putnam, 1975). B)the argument of the Inference to the Best Explanation( IBE) is that from the ability of a theory to offer the best possible explanation of natural phenomena follows the truth of a theory. We continue with the basic forms of instrumentalism: 1) the eliminative: the terms that indicate physical unobservable entities (theoretical terms), eg 'electron', can be eliminated completely by the scientific language and 2) the non-eliminative: the aim of the scientific theories is not to seek something more behind the phenomena whether they exist or not. The van Fraassen's antirealistic view called constructive empiricism and it can be classifiable in the non-eliminative instrumentalism. Supports that science aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate and acceptance of a theory involves the belief that this is only empirically adequate. Precondition of his position is the distinction between observable and non-observable, which raises objections. His attempt to distinguish the observable from unobservable seem to have led his to an impasse. Of course, this does not diminish the value of its offer, since he is rapporteur of a new theory and new terms, such as empirical adequacy, thus triggering further study and research in the field of philosophy of science.

Ce travail participe aux recherches contemporaines qui s'attachent à améliorer notre compréhension de ce que nous appelons les « objets d'expérience », et en particulier des objets ordinaires. Il s'arrête sur une dimension qui leur apparaît propre, leur permanence, c'est-à-dire leur continuité spatio-temporelle, telle que nous pouvons la constater et en faire usage dans l'expérience perceptive ou le discours, et leur identité intersubjective – en dépit des différentes visées qu'autrui et moi pouvons avoir sur eux. L'objet est pluriel, son identité, qui n'est pas simplement logique, manque de critères nets, mais cela ne peut remettre en question son existence, comme le voudraient les éliminativistes que nous affrontons. Mais les universalistes, les intellectualistes et tous les idéalistes sémantiques qui, à l'inverse, voient des objets partout, par notre seul pouvoir de les penser, confondent objet réel et objet de pensée. Nous défendons un réalisme contextualiste de l'objet ordinaire qui en précise l'existence dans les contextes où il fait sens d'en parler, et d'abord le contexte perceptif, puisqu'il semble définitoire des normes d'objectification et d'objectivation les plus courantes dans nos pratiques identificatoires, réidentificatoires et catégorisantes, de s'inscrire au sein de la perception et de l'action. Ce sont des processus plus ou moins simples cognitivement et plus ou moins répandus éthologiquement qui sont enjeu selon les cas. Cette pluralité implique d'en explorer les terrains, en particulier dans le plus jeune âge lorsque beaucoup des normes réglant notre saisie cognitive du réel sont en formation. C'est pourquoi notre investigation choisit rapidement de se faire philosophie de la connaissance afin de comprendre la genèse des objets ordinaires dont nous parlons, plutôt que d'essayer de dresser de façon abstraite une liste exhaustive de leurs critères d'identité. Nous défendons que la permanence de l'objet peut être comprise à trois niveaux, perceptif, social et logicolinguistique. Le bébé atteint ces niveaux d'objectivité par des concepts naturels (concepts affordantiels et modules innés, qui ont une inscription corporelle et un développement social), des concepts expérientiels (prototypiques et essentialisants, aidés par nos activités humaines de socialisation et d'attention partagée, qu'on trouve aussi dans le monde animal), et des concepts lexicaux, hérités de notre langue. C'est l'occasion de remettre en cause l'opposition trop facile entre l'inné et l'acquis, ou le nativisme et le constructivisme. À chacun de ces niveaux, il y a des raisons d'utiliser, en un sens non mentaliste mais naturaliste et fonctionnaliste, la notion de représentation, pour comprendre ce qui fait la transcendance de ces objets distaux, traités à partir des stimuli proximaux mais différents d'eux. On peut user d'un discours réaliste à leur sujet, sans présupposer que celui-ci se fonde sur des capacités cognitives rationnelles propositionnelles, synthétiques, inférentielles ou judicatives de haut niveau et nécessairement spécifiques à l'humain, mais sans céder non plus aux oppositions classiques entre réalisme indirect et réalisme direct, ou conceptualisme et non-conceptualisme. De même, on défendra, au-delà des débats entre continuisme et discontinuisme sur l'humain et l'animal, un émergentisme qui pense à la fois la continuité des espèces et leurs différences chaque fois propres dans leur rapport aux objets de leur environnement, tels qu'ils sont visés dans des normes naturelles et sociales. / The understanding of the ordinary objects of our daily experience implies a definition of spatiotemporal and intersubjective levels of permanence. This is due to the fact that these objects, whose existence we defend against eliminativism and mereological nihilism, can be said to endure or perdure, at least in our experiences and our discourses about them. This existence in time and space and between subjects of experience cannot be defined by mere logical features. That is why we choose a contextualist approach of objects, and study perceptual situations where identifications and categorizations occur, especially at the early stages of objectification and objectivation which babies are able to achieve. The newborn and the young child indeed need to gain object permanence, a phenomenon first described by Gestalt psychologists like Michotte and Piaget's school of developmental psychology, and which has been even more accurately studied by cognitive psychologists such as Elizabeth Spelke, Dominique Baillargeon, Susan Carey or Susan Gelman. We defend the thesis that three types of object permanence can be distinguished (perceptual, social and logical-linguistic). Object transcendence can be described as an emergent feature of these stages. Babies acquire these levels of objectivity through normal and universal phases of development, even though different cultural environments can influence rhythms of maturation and the intentional behaviors relating to objects, which children develop. To access ordinary objects, infants need natural concepts (affordantial concepts and innate modular abilities - quite common among animals -, which are embodied and developed through social stimulations), experiential concepts (prototypical and essentialist tendencies, stimulated by joint attention and social phenomena that also occur in the animal world), and inherited lexical concepts. Nativism and constructivism work together and a realist, naturalist and emergentist approach of our cognitions of objects and their representations (understood only as a functional ability to register distal objects from proximal stimuli) enables us to overcome classical oppositions between direct and indirect realism, conceptualism and anti-conceptualism, as well as the continuity-thesis and the discontinuity-thesis between human and non-human beings.