Em nosso trabalho buscamos compreender a relação entre literatura e conhecimento do real em Jean-Paul Sartre e suas conseqüências para a ação moral, pois desta abordagem resulta o engajamento do leitor em face daquilo que foi desvendado por ele. Assim, devemos esclarecer direta ou indiretamente dois conceitos centrais da obra sartriana: o de ação por desvendamento e o de realismo, o que exige o deslocamento de conceitos tradicionais de seus locais originais, redefinindo uma nova constelação que operará um novo método. A dissertação desenvolve-se, então, em quatro partes. Na primeira, visamos o conceito de conhecimento como desvendamento, analisando passagens das obras O ser e o nada (Être et néant 1943) e, principalmente, Verité et existence (1948). A verdade passa, a partir da leitura destas obras, a ser considerada não como uma forma axiomática, mas como experiência da contingência. Daí a mudança necessária no método filosófico e o embate contra determinada tradição a das chamadas filosofias digestivas. Na segunda parte, com base principalmente nos ensaios Que é a literatura? (Quest-ce que la littérature - 1947) e Lartiste et sa conscience, vemos como as outras artes (à exceção da prosa) não se constituem para Sartre como movimentos privilegiados da experimentação e verificação do conhecimento da realidade. Na terceira parte, abordamos propriamente o conteúdo ontológico da linguagem que funciona como modo de visar o ser através da ausência e observamos como estas relações conduzem à questão moral, pois é pelo olhar do outro que o dom (o que foi verificado e estabelecido por uma comunidade) readquire o sentido de novo desvendamento e, nesta perspectiva, é a ação do leitor, que faz o papel do outro da linguagem, que terminará a obra literária tanto no sentido da criação como no da ação moral. Por fim, na parte quatro, propomos como exemplo do modo de visar o real do desvendamento e da prosa a interpretação de um conto de Franz Kafka, Tribulação de um pai de família (1919), baseada nos conteúdos abordados nas partes anteriores. / In this work, we seek comprehension about the relationship between literature and reality knowledge in Jean-Paul Sartre, as well as the consequences for the moral action, because from this approach results the reader engagement in face of what has been unveiled by him or her. Therefore, we must clarify directly or indirectly two central concepts in the sartrian works: the concept of action through revealment and the concept of realism, which requires a displacement of traditional concepts from their original places, redefining a new constellation that will produce a new method. The dissertation is developed in four parts. In the first one, we aim at the concept of knowledge as devoilement, analyzing passages of the works Être et néant (1943) and, foremost, Verité et existence (1948). After the study of these works, the truth turns to be considered not as an axiomatic form, but as an experience of contingence. Thence comes the necessary change on philosophical methods and the fight against a certain tradition the tradition of what it known as digestive philosophies. In the second part, based primary on the essays Quest-ce que la littérature? (1947) and Lartiste et sa conscience, we see how the other arts (with exception to the prose) do not constitute for Sartre as privileged movements for the experimentation and verification of the reality knowledge. In the third part, we approach properly the ontologic content of language that function as a way of aiming at the being through the absence and we observe how these relationships drive to the moral question, since it is through the others look that the gift (what was verified and established by a community) reacquires the sense of a new revealment. In this perspective, it is the action of the reader, which acts as the other opposed to the language, that will complete the literature work both in the sense of creation and in the sense of moral action. Finally, at the forth part of this work we propose an interpretation of a Franz Kafka short story, Worries of a family man (1919), as an example of the way of aiming at the real of the devoilement and of the prose, based on the contents approached on the last sections.

A presente tese se ocupa da percepção fônica de línguas não nativas e tem como objetivo repensar as premissas básicas do PERCEPTUAL ASSIMILATION MODEL-L2 [PAM-L2 (BEST; TYLER, 2007)] no que diz respeito aos seus eixos cognitivo, fônico e filosófico. De acordo com os proponentes do modelo, (i) a percepção da fala não nativa dispensa mecanismos cognitivos no que se refere a representações mentais ou processos inferenciais; (ii) a unidade de análise do evento perceptual, em termos de fala, é o gesto articulatório; e (iii) o acesso às informações disponíveis no mundo é direto, garantido pela atuação dos sentidos como nossos próprios sistemas perceptuais. Julgamos que tais premissas são limitadas e incoerentes com o objeto de investigação dos autores e argumentamos, portanto, que os eixos cognitivo, fônico e filosófico do modelo devam ser vislumbrados sobre um ponto de vista alternativo. Quanto ao primeiro eixo, defendemos que o evento perceptual seja concebido essencialmente como um fenômeno cognitivo, criado e gerenciado pelo encéfalo, que envolve abstrações, representações mentais e inferências acerca dos objetos do mundo. Em relação ao segundo eixo, julgamos que o tratamento acústico-articulatório (ALBANO, 2001) à unidade gestual seja mais apropriado à percepção de elementos fônicos não nativos, diferindo do tratamento articulatório (BROWMAN; GOLDSTEIN, 1989, 1992) que reside originalmente no modelo. No que diz respeito ao terceiro eixo, adotamos a posição realista indireta (JACKSON, 1977, 2010) como sendo aquela que abarca de modo mais adequado a percepção das unidades fônicas não nativas, em detrimento do realismo direto (J. GIBSON, 1966, 1986). Decorrentes de nosso refinamento teórico, questões adicionais à percepção fônica não nativa são endereçadas, as quais concernem à falsa dicotomia L2 VS. LE, à influência do sistema grafêmico sobre a percepção fônica e à formação de novas categorias fônicas a serviço do idioma-alvo. Discutimos, também, os aspectos metodológicos de alguns estudos perceptuais, assim como suas implicações para uma nova caracterização do modelo, e ponderamos sobre o delineamento, o tipo de conhecimento de base testado (língua materna ou não nativa) e o objetivo de cada tarefa perceptual a ser empregada em ambiente laboratorial. / This Doctoral Dissertation addresses the phonic perception of non-native languages and aims to rethink the central tenets of the PERCEPTUAL ASSIMILATION MODEL-L2 [PAM-L2 (BEST; TYLER, 2007)] with respect to its cognitive, phonic and philosophical spheres. According to the proponents of the model, (i) the perception of non-native speech disregards any cognitive mechanisms related to mental representations or inferential processes; (ii) the unit for analyzing perceptual events, in terms of speech, corresponds to the articulatory gesture; and (iii) we have direct access to the information available in the world, since our senses act as our own perceptual systems. We argue that these premises are limited and inconsistent with the research object of the authors and, thus, we assume that the cognitive, phonic and philosophical spheres of the model should be glimpsed from an alternative point of view. As for the first sphere, we argue that the perceptual event is essentially a cognitive phenomenon, created and managed by the brain, which involves abstractions, mental representations and inferences about the objects of the world. Regarding the second sphere, we state that an acoustic-articulatory treatment (ALBANO, 2001) to the gestural unit is more appropriate to the perception of non-native phonic elements, differing from the articulatory treatment (BROWMAN; GOLDSTEIN, 1989, 1992) that is originally conveyed by the model. With respect to the third sphere, opposing direct realism (J. GIBSON, 1966, 1986), we adopt the indirect realist position (JACKSON, 1977, 2010) as the one that encompasses the perception of non-native phonic units more adequately. Due to our theoretical refinement, we address additional issues to the phonic perception, which concern the false L2 vs. LE dichotomy, the impact of graphical systems on phonic perception, and the formation of new phonic categories at the service of the target language. We discuss methodological aspects of perceptual studies, as well as their implications for a new characterization of the model, and we also consider the design, the type of knowledge tested (native or nonnative language) and the purpose of each perceptual task to be used in a laboratory environment.

A presente tese se ocupa da percepção fônica de línguas não nativas e tem como objetivo repensar as premissas básicas do PERCEPTUAL ASSIMILATION MODEL-L2 [PAM-L2 (BEST; TYLER, 2007)] no que diz respeito aos seus eixos cognitivo, fônico e filosófico. De acordo com os proponentes do modelo, (i) a percepção da fala não nativa dispensa mecanismos cognitivos no que se refere a representações mentais ou processos inferenciais; (ii) a unidade de análise do evento perceptual, em termos de fala, é o gesto articulatório; e (iii) o acesso às informações disponíveis no mundo é direto, garantido pela atuação dos sentidos como nossos próprios sistemas perceptuais. Julgamos que tais premissas são limitadas e incoerentes com o objeto de investigação dos autores e argumentamos, portanto, que os eixos cognitivo, fônico e filosófico do modelo devam ser vislumbrados sobre um ponto de vista alternativo. Quanto ao primeiro eixo, defendemos que o evento perceptual seja concebido essencialmente como um fenômeno cognitivo, criado e gerenciado pelo encéfalo, que envolve abstrações, representações mentais e inferências acerca dos objetos do mundo. Em relação ao segundo eixo, julgamos que o tratamento acústico-articulatório (ALBANO, 2001) à unidade gestual seja mais apropriado à percepção de elementos fônicos não nativos, diferindo do tratamento articulatório (BROWMAN; GOLDSTEIN, 1989, 1992) que reside originalmente no modelo. No que diz respeito ao terceiro eixo, adotamos a posição realista indireta (JACKSON, 1977, 2010) como sendo aquela que abarca de modo mais adequado a percepção das unidades fônicas não nativas, em detrimento do realismo direto (J. GIBSON, 1966, 1986). Decorrentes de nosso refinamento teórico, questões adicionais à percepção fônica não nativa são endereçadas, as quais concernem à falsa dicotomia L2 VS. LE, à influência do sistema grafêmico sobre a percepção fônica e à formação de novas categorias fônicas a serviço do idioma-alvo. Discutimos, também, os aspectos metodológicos de alguns estudos perceptuais, assim como suas implicações para uma nova caracterização do modelo, e ponderamos sobre o delineamento, o tipo de conhecimento de base testado (língua materna ou não nativa) e o objetivo de cada tarefa perceptual a ser empregada em ambiente laboratorial. / This Doctoral Dissertation addresses the phonic perception of non-native languages and aims to rethink the central tenets of the PERCEPTUAL ASSIMILATION MODEL-L2 [PAM-L2 (BEST; TYLER, 2007)] with respect to its cognitive, phonic and philosophical spheres. According to the proponents of the model, (i) the perception of non-native speech disregards any cognitive mechanisms related to mental representations or inferential processes; (ii) the unit for analyzing perceptual events, in terms of speech, corresponds to the articulatory gesture; and (iii) we have direct access to the information available in the world, since our senses act as our own perceptual systems. We argue that these premises are limited and inconsistent with the research object of the authors and, thus, we assume that the cognitive, phonic and philosophical spheres of the model should be glimpsed from an alternative point of view. As for the first sphere, we argue that the perceptual event is essentially a cognitive phenomenon, created and managed by the brain, which involves abstractions, mental representations and inferences about the objects of the world. Regarding the second sphere, we state that an acoustic-articulatory treatment (ALBANO, 2001) to the gestural unit is more appropriate to the perception of non-native phonic elements, differing from the articulatory treatment (BROWMAN; GOLDSTEIN, 1989, 1992) that is originally conveyed by the model. With respect to the third sphere, opposing direct realism (J. GIBSON, 1966, 1986), we adopt the indirect realist position (JACKSON, 1977, 2010) as the one that encompasses the perception of non-native phonic units more adequately. Due to our theoretical refinement, we address additional issues to the phonic perception, which concern the false L2 vs. LE dichotomy, the impact of graphical systems on phonic perception, and the formation of new phonic categories at the service of the target language. We discuss methodological aspects of perceptual studies, as well as their implications for a new characterization of the model, and we also consider the design, the type of knowledge tested (native or nonnative language) and the purpose of each perceptual task to be used in a laboratory environment.

Em nosso trabalho buscamos compreender a relação entre literatura e conhecimento do real em Jean-Paul Sartre e suas conseqüências para a ação moral, pois desta abordagem resulta o engajamento do leitor em face daquilo que foi desvendado por ele. Assim, devemos esclarecer direta ou indiretamente dois conceitos centrais da obra sartriana: o de ação por desvendamento e o de realismo, o que exige o deslocamento de conceitos tradicionais de seus locais originais, redefinindo uma nova constelação que operará um novo método. A dissertação desenvolve-se, então, em quatro partes. Na primeira, visamos o conceito de conhecimento como desvendamento, analisando passagens das obras O ser e o nada (Être et néant 1943) e, principalmente, Verité et existence (1948). A verdade passa, a partir da leitura destas obras, a ser considerada não como uma forma axiomática, mas como experiência da contingência. Daí a mudança necessária no método filosófico e o embate contra determinada tradição a das chamadas filosofias digestivas. Na segunda parte, com base principalmente nos ensaios Que é a literatura? (Quest-ce que la littérature - 1947) e Lartiste et sa conscience, vemos como as outras artes (à exceção da prosa) não se constituem para Sartre como movimentos privilegiados da experimentação e verificação do conhecimento da realidade. Na terceira parte, abordamos propriamente o conteúdo ontológico da linguagem que funciona como modo de visar o ser através da ausência e observamos como estas relações conduzem à questão moral, pois é pelo olhar do outro que o dom (o que foi verificado e estabelecido por uma comunidade) readquire o sentido de novo desvendamento e, nesta perspectiva, é a ação do leitor, que faz o papel do outro da linguagem, que terminará a obra literária tanto no sentido da criação como no da ação moral. Por fim, na parte quatro, propomos como exemplo do modo de visar o real do desvendamento e da prosa a interpretação de um conto de Franz Kafka, Tribulação de um pai de família (1919), baseada nos conteúdos abordados nas partes anteriores. / In this work, we seek comprehension about the relationship between literature and reality knowledge in Jean-Paul Sartre, as well as the consequences for the moral action, because from this approach results the reader engagement in face of what has been unveiled by him or her. Therefore, we must clarify directly or indirectly two central concepts in the sartrian works: the concept of action through revealment and the concept of realism, which requires a displacement of traditional concepts from their original places, redefining a new constellation that will produce a new method. The dissertation is developed in four parts. In the first one, we aim at the concept of knowledge as devoilement, analyzing passages of the works Être et néant (1943) and, foremost, Verité et existence (1948). After the study of these works, the truth turns to be considered not as an axiomatic form, but as an experience of contingence. Thence comes the necessary change on philosophical methods and the fight against a certain tradition the tradition of what it known as digestive philosophies. In the second part, based primary on the essays Quest-ce que la littérature? (1947) and Lartiste et sa conscience, we see how the other arts (with exception to the prose) do not constitute for Sartre as privileged movements for the experimentation and verification of the reality knowledge. In the third part, we approach properly the ontologic content of language that function as a way of aiming at the being through the absence and we observe how these relationships drive to the moral question, since it is through the others look that the gift (what was verified and established by a community) reacquires the sense of a new revealment. In this perspective, it is the action of the reader, which acts as the other opposed to the language, that will complete the literature work both in the sense of creation and in the sense of moral action. Finally, at the forth part of this work we propose an interpretation of a Franz Kafka short story, Worries of a family man (1919), as an example of the way of aiming at the real of the devoilement and of the prose, based on the contents approached on the last sections.

A presente tese se ocupa da percepção fônica de línguas não nativas e tem como objetivo repensar as premissas básicas do PERCEPTUAL ASSIMILATION MODEL-L2 [PAM-L2 (BEST; TYLER, 2007)] no que diz respeito aos seus eixos cognitivo, fônico e filosófico. De acordo com os proponentes do modelo, (i) a percepção da fala não nativa dispensa mecanismos cognitivos no que se refere a representações mentais ou processos inferenciais; (ii) a unidade de análise do evento perceptual, em termos de fala, é o gesto articulatório; e (iii) o acesso às informações disponíveis no mundo é direto, garantido pela atuação dos sentidos como nossos próprios sistemas perceptuais. Julgamos que tais premissas são limitadas e incoerentes com o objeto de investigação dos autores e argumentamos, portanto, que os eixos cognitivo, fônico e filosófico do modelo devam ser vislumbrados sobre um ponto de vista alternativo. Quanto ao primeiro eixo, defendemos que o evento perceptual seja concebido essencialmente como um fenômeno cognitivo, criado e gerenciado pelo encéfalo, que envolve abstrações, representações mentais e inferências acerca dos objetos do mundo. Em relação ao segundo eixo, julgamos que o tratamento acústico-articulatório (ALBANO, 2001) à unidade gestual seja mais apropriado à percepção de elementos fônicos não nativos, diferindo do tratamento articulatório (BROWMAN; GOLDSTEIN, 1989, 1992) que reside originalmente no modelo. No que diz respeito ao terceiro eixo, adotamos a posição realista indireta (JACKSON, 1977, 2010) como sendo aquela que abarca de modo mais adequado a percepção das unidades fônicas não nativas, em detrimento do realismo direto (J. GIBSON, 1966, 1986). Decorrentes de nosso refinamento teórico, questões adicionais à percepção fônica não nativa são endereçadas, as quais concernem à falsa dicotomia L2 VS. LE, à influência do sistema grafêmico sobre a percepção fônica e à formação de novas categorias fônicas a serviço do idioma-alvo. Discutimos, também, os aspectos metodológicos de alguns estudos perceptuais, assim como suas implicações para uma nova caracterização do modelo, e ponderamos sobre o delineamento, o tipo de conhecimento de base testado (língua materna ou não nativa) e o objetivo de cada tarefa perceptual a ser empregada em ambiente laboratorial. / This Doctoral Dissertation addresses the phonic perception of non-native languages and aims to rethink the central tenets of the PERCEPTUAL ASSIMILATION MODEL-L2 [PAM-L2 (BEST; TYLER, 2007)] with respect to its cognitive, phonic and philosophical spheres. According to the proponents of the model, (i) the perception of non-native speech disregards any cognitive mechanisms related to mental representations or inferential processes; (ii) the unit for analyzing perceptual events, in terms of speech, corresponds to the articulatory gesture; and (iii) we have direct access to the information available in the world, since our senses act as our own perceptual systems. We argue that these premises are limited and inconsistent with the research object of the authors and, thus, we assume that the cognitive, phonic and philosophical spheres of the model should be glimpsed from an alternative point of view. As for the first sphere, we argue that the perceptual event is essentially a cognitive phenomenon, created and managed by the brain, which involves abstractions, mental representations and inferences about the objects of the world. Regarding the second sphere, we state that an acoustic-articulatory treatment (ALBANO, 2001) to the gestural unit is more appropriate to the perception of non-native phonic elements, differing from the articulatory treatment (BROWMAN; GOLDSTEIN, 1989, 1992) that is originally conveyed by the model. With respect to the third sphere, opposing direct realism (J. GIBSON, 1966, 1986), we adopt the indirect realist position (JACKSON, 1977, 2010) as the one that encompasses the perception of non-native phonic units more adequately. Due to our theoretical refinement, we address additional issues to the phonic perception, which concern the false L2 vs. LE dichotomy, the impact of graphical systems on phonic perception, and the formation of new phonic categories at the service of the target language. We discuss methodological aspects of perceptual studies, as well as their implications for a new characterization of the model, and we also consider the design, the type of knowledge tested (native or nonnative language) and the purpose of each perceptual task to be used in a laboratory environment.

Αφορμή για τη συγγραφή της παρούσας εργασίας συνιστά η διαμάχη μεταξύ του επιστημονικού ρεαλισμού και της εργαλειοκρατίας σχετικά με τις μη παρατηρήσιμες οντότητες Στόχος είναι να μελετηθεί και να αξιολογηθεί η εργαλειοκρατική προσέγγιση της επιστήμης , με έμφαση στην μορφή εργαλειοκρατίας που υποστηρίζεται στο έργο του Bastian Cornelis van Fraassen (The Scientific Image), δηλαδή τον κατασκευαστικό εμπειρισμό (constructive empiricism). Τα βασικά ερωτήματα που θα μας απασχολήσουν είναι τα εξής: 1)Τι πρεσβεύει ο επιστημονικός ρεαλισμός; 2)Τι εννοούμε όταν μιλάμε για την εργαλειοκρατική θεώρηση στην επιστήμη; 3)Ποια είναι η εργαλειοκρατική προσέγγιση της επιστήμης στο έργο του van Fraassen. Το πρώτο μέρος της εργασίας πραγματεύεται τον όρο «ρεαλισμός» θέτοντας ως αφετηρία τη Θεωρία των Ιδεών του Πλάτωνος, φτάνοντας μέχρι τον σύγχρονο επιστημονικό ρεαλισμό. Έτσι έχουμε: 1) τον Πλατωνισμό, 2) τον Άμεσο Ρεαλισμό, 3) τον Έμμεσο Ρεαλισμό, 4) τον Επιστημονικό Ρεαλισμό. Το καθένα από τα παραπάνω εκφράζουν τον όρο ρεαλισμό με διαφορετικό τρόπο. Στην παρούσα εργασία θα αναλυθεί περισσότερο ο επιστημονικός ρεαλισμός, διότι θα την αντιπαραβάλουμε με τις εργαλειοκρατικές προσεγγίσεις για την επιστήμη. Ο Επιστημονικός ρεαλισμός υποστηρίζει οτι ο σκοπός της επιστήμης είναι να μας δώσει μία κυριολεκτικά αληθή περιγραφή για τον κόσμο και ότι οι καλύτερες (πιο ώριμες) επιστημονικές θεωρίες μας προσφέρουν προσεγγιστικά αληθείς περιγραφές του κόσμου. Επομένως, οι οντότητες που περιγράφουν είναι πραγματικές (πχ. ηλεκτρόνια). Θα διατυπωθούν επιχειρήματα υπέρ του επιστημονικού ρεαλισμού, όπως: Α) το επιχείρημα του μη θαύματος: (Νo Μiracle Αrgument, ΝΜΑ): «ο ρεαλισμός είναι η μόνη φιλοσοφία της επιστήμης που δεν καθιστά την επιτυχία της επιστήμης ένα θαύμα». (Putnam, 1975). Β)το επιχείρημα της συναγωγής στη βέλτιστη εξήγηση(Inference to the Best Explanation, IBE): συνίσταται στο ότι από την ικανότητα μιας θεωρίας να προσφέρει την καλύτερη δυνατή εξήγηση των φυσικών φαινομένων έπεται η αλήθεια της. Συνεχίζουμε με τις βασικές μορφές της εργαλειοκρατίας: 1) την εξαλειπτική: οι όροι που δηλώνουν φυσικές μη παρατηρήσιμες οντότητες (θεωρητικοί όροι) , π.χ. ‘ηλεκτρόνιο’, μπορούν να εξαλειφθούν εντελώς από την επιστημονική γλώσσα και 2) την μη εξαλειπτική: δεν είναι σκοπός των επιστημονικών θεωριών να αναζητήσουν κάτι περισσότερο πίσω από τα φαινόμενα είτε αυτά υπάρχουν είτε όχι. Η αντιρεαλιστική θέση του van Fraassen ονομάζεται κατασκευαστικός εμπειρισμός (constructive empiricism)και υποστηρίζει οτι η επιστήμη σκοπεύει να μας δώσει θεωρίες, οι οποίες είναι εμπειρικά επαρκείς και η αποδοχή μιας θεωρίας ενέχει την πεποίθηση μόνο ότι αυτή είναι εμπειρικά επαρκής. Προϋπόθεση της θέσης του είναι η διάκριση παρατηρήσιμου και μη παρατηρήσιμου, η οποία εγείρει ενστάσεις. Από την ανάλυσή μας καταλήγουμε ότι η προσέγγισή του van Fraassen είναι ενδιαφέρουσα γιατί επιχειρεί να αποδώσει συστηματικά τη θέση της μη εξαλειπτικής εργαλειοκρατίας ότι η επιστήμη επιδιώκει να περιγράψει με ακρίβεια τα φαινόμενα χωρίς να μπορεί να αποφανθεί για κάτι βαθύτερο που βρίσκεται πίσω από αυτά. Οπότε, δεν έχει καταφέρει να καταρρίψει την οντολογική θέση του ρεαλισμού ότι υπάρχουν μη παρατηρήσιμες οντότητες. Η προσπάθειά του να αποδείξει τη διάκριση παρατηρήσιμου – μη παρατηρήσιμου ακολουθώντας τον δρόμο του κατασκευαστικού εμπειρισμού τον οδήγησε μάλλον στο να κάνει λήψη του ζητουμένου και άρα σε αδιέξοδο. Βέβαια , κάτι τέτοιο δεν μειώνει την αξία της προσφοράς του van Fraassen, αφού εκείνος είναι εισηγητής μιας νέας θεωρίας και νέων όρων, όπως η εμπειρική επάρκεια, δίνοντας έτσι το έναυσμα για περαιτέρω μελέτη και έρευνα στο πεδίο της φιλοσοφίας της επιστήμης. / The occasion of this dissertation is the conflict between the scientific realism and instrumentalism with regard to the unobservable entities. Specifically, the aim is to study and evaluate the instrumentalist approach to science, emphasising on the form of instrumentalism supported in the work of Bastian Cornelis van Fraassen (The Scientific Image), the constructive empiricism. The basic questions to be dealt with are:1) What advocates scientific realism? 2)What do we mean when we talk about the instrumentalist approach to science? 3) What is the instrumentalist approach to science in van Fraassen's work? The first part of the thesis deals with the term "realism" setting as a starting point the theory of Ideas of Plato, reaching the modern scientific realism. So we have: 1) Platonism, 2) the Direct Realism, 3) the Indirect Realism, 4) the Scientific Realism. Each of the above-expressing the term "realism" differently. This thesis focus more on the analysis of the scientific realism, because it will be compared with the instrumentalist approaches to science. The Scientific realism argues that the purpose of science is to give us a literally true description of the world and that the best (more mature) scientific theories offer us approximately true descriptions of the world. Therefore, entities that describe is real (eg. electrons). Arguments in favor of the scientific realism are the following: A)the argument of non-miracle (NMA), according to which "realism is the only philosophy of science that does not make the success of science a miracle." (Putnam, 1975). B)the argument of the Inference to the Best Explanation( IBE) is that from the ability of a theory to offer the best possible explanation of natural phenomena follows the truth of a theory. We continue with the basic forms of instrumentalism: 1) the eliminative: the terms that indicate physical unobservable entities (theoretical terms), eg 'electron', can be eliminated completely by the scientific language and 2) the non-eliminative: the aim of the scientific theories is not to seek something more behind the phenomena whether they exist or not. The van Fraassen's antirealistic view called constructive empiricism and it can be classifiable in the non-eliminative instrumentalism. Supports that science aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate and acceptance of a theory involves the belief that this is only empirically adequate. Precondition of his position is the distinction between observable and non-observable, which raises objections. His attempt to distinguish the observable from unobservable seem to have led his to an impasse. Of course, this does not diminish the value of its offer, since he is rapporteur of a new theory and new terms, such as empirical adequacy, thus triggering further study and research in the field of philosophy of science.

Ce travail participe aux recherches contemporaines qui s'attachent à améliorer notre compréhension de ce que nous appelons les « objets d'expérience », et en particulier des objets ordinaires. Il s'arrête sur une dimension qui leur apparaît propre, leur permanence, c'est-à-dire leur continuité spatio-temporelle, telle que nous pouvons la constater et en faire usage dans l'expérience perceptive ou le discours, et leur identité intersubjective – en dépit des différentes visées qu'autrui et moi pouvons avoir sur eux. L'objet est pluriel, son identité, qui n'est pas simplement logique, manque de critères nets, mais cela ne peut remettre en question son existence, comme le voudraient les éliminativistes que nous affrontons. Mais les universalistes, les intellectualistes et tous les idéalistes sémantiques qui, à l'inverse, voient des objets partout, par notre seul pouvoir de les penser, confondent objet réel et objet de pensée. Nous défendons un réalisme contextualiste de l'objet ordinaire qui en précise l'existence dans les contextes où il fait sens d'en parler, et d'abord le contexte perceptif, puisqu'il semble définitoire des normes d'objectification et d'objectivation les plus courantes dans nos pratiques identificatoires, réidentificatoires et catégorisantes, de s'inscrire au sein de la perception et de l'action. Ce sont des processus plus ou moins simples cognitivement et plus ou moins répandus éthologiquement qui sont enjeu selon les cas. Cette pluralité implique d'en explorer les terrains, en particulier dans le plus jeune âge lorsque beaucoup des normes réglant notre saisie cognitive du réel sont en formation. C'est pourquoi notre investigation choisit rapidement de se faire philosophie de la connaissance afin de comprendre la genèse des objets ordinaires dont nous parlons, plutôt que d'essayer de dresser de façon abstraite une liste exhaustive de leurs critères d'identité. Nous défendons que la permanence de l'objet peut être comprise à trois niveaux, perceptif, social et logicolinguistique. Le bébé atteint ces niveaux d'objectivité par des concepts naturels (concepts affordantiels et modules innés, qui ont une inscription corporelle et un développement social), des concepts expérientiels (prototypiques et essentialisants, aidés par nos activités humaines de socialisation et d'attention partagée, qu'on trouve aussi dans le monde animal), et des concepts lexicaux, hérités de notre langue. C'est l'occasion de remettre en cause l'opposition trop facile entre l'inné et l'acquis, ou le nativisme et le constructivisme. À chacun de ces niveaux, il y a des raisons d'utiliser, en un sens non mentaliste mais naturaliste et fonctionnaliste, la notion de représentation, pour comprendre ce qui fait la transcendance de ces objets distaux, traités à partir des stimuli proximaux mais différents d'eux. On peut user d'un discours réaliste à leur sujet, sans présupposer que celui-ci se fonde sur des capacités cognitives rationnelles propositionnelles, synthétiques, inférentielles ou judicatives de haut niveau et nécessairement spécifiques à l'humain, mais sans céder non plus aux oppositions classiques entre réalisme indirect et réalisme direct, ou conceptualisme et non-conceptualisme. De même, on défendra, au-delà des débats entre continuisme et discontinuisme sur l'humain et l'animal, un émergentisme qui pense à la fois la continuité des espèces et leurs différences chaque fois propres dans leur rapport aux objets de leur environnement, tels qu'ils sont visés dans des normes naturelles et sociales. / The understanding of the ordinary objects of our daily experience implies a definition of spatiotemporal and intersubjective levels of permanence. This is due to the fact that these objects, whose existence we defend against eliminativism and mereological nihilism, can be said to endure or perdure, at least in our experiences and our discourses about them. This existence in time and space and between subjects of experience cannot be defined by mere logical features. That is why we choose a contextualist approach of objects, and study perceptual situations where identifications and categorizations occur, especially at the early stages of objectification and objectivation which babies are able to achieve. The newborn and the young child indeed need to gain object permanence, a phenomenon first described by Gestalt psychologists like Michotte and Piaget's school of developmental psychology, and which has been even more accurately studied by cognitive psychologists such as Elizabeth Spelke, Dominique Baillargeon, Susan Carey or Susan Gelman. We defend the thesis that three types of object permanence can be distinguished (perceptual, social and logical-linguistic). Object transcendence can be described as an emergent feature of these stages. Babies acquire these levels of objectivity through normal and universal phases of development, even though different cultural environments can influence rhythms of maturation and the intentional behaviors relating to objects, which children develop. To access ordinary objects, infants need natural concepts (affordantial concepts and innate modular abilities - quite common among animals -, which are embodied and developed through social stimulations), experiential concepts (prototypical and essentialist tendencies, stimulated by joint attention and social phenomena that also occur in the animal world), and inherited lexical concepts. Nativism and constructivism work together and a realist, naturalist and emergentist approach of our cognitions of objects and their representations (understood only as a functional ability to register distal objects from proximal stimuli) enables us to overcome classical oppositions between direct and indirect realism, conceptualism and anti-conceptualism, as well as the continuity-thesis and the discontinuity-thesis between human and non-human beings.