For the evaluation of banks¡¦ performance, non-performing loans ratio and capital adequacy ratio are the two major indicators other than earnings performance. Among the various tools for earnings manipulation, loan loss provisions may be the only one that could affect bank¡¦s earning numbers, non-performing loans ratio and capital adequacy ratio simultaneously. In order to satisfy the need to increase earnings and capital adequacy ratio and to decrease non-performing loans ratio, banks may have motivation to conduct earnings management. The purpose of the study is thus to investigate whether there is a relationship between the earnings management by using the discretionary loan loss provisions and the earnings before loan loss provisions, non-performing loans ratio, capital adequacy ratio, asset size, loan growth rate, and loans uncollected. In addition, the study divides the sample banks into the following categories: (1) commercial banks versus others, (2) new banks versus old banks (based on the time the bank was founded), and (3) state-run versus non-state-run (based on whether the president of the bank is appointed by the government). The study also intends to examine whether earnings management conducted by the bank¡¦s management is different between the various categories. Based on the empirical results from the Taiwan Economics Journal (TEJ) database, the study found: (1) the three variables of earnings before loan loss provisions, asset size, and loans uncollected are significantly related to the earnings management by using discretionary loan loss provisions, and the higher the three variables, the higher the degree of earnings management; (2) non-performing loans ratio, capital adequacy ratio, and loan growth rate are not found to be significantly related to the earnings management by using discretionary loan loss provisions; (3) state-run banks have conducted more earnings management than non-state-run banks; and (4) there is no significant result found in other analyses for other categories.

Purpose - the purpose of this thesis is to investigate earnings management in an emerging economy without market force. We use discretionary loan loss provisions (DLLP) to proxy earnings management, which constitute a material portion of the total accruals in the banking industry. We examine this abnormal behavior in the financial statements prepared under US GAAP and IFRS. Specifically, we try to find the differences in managerial opportunistic behavior that might exist in the two accounting regimes. We also examine the micro economy and regulatory factors that might influence the earnings behavior in the banks. Design/method/approach - This empirical investigation uses an unbalanced panel data of five commercial banks in Liberia for a period of six years, 2010 to 2012 before and 2013 to 2016 after IFRS adoption. The data generated from the audited financial statements of the commercial banks were analyzed with two sample t test and multiple linear regression. We also run robustness check with same statistical procedures to validate the results. Findings - the empirical results show a statistically insignificant difference in earnings management after the adoption of IFRS, which means the introduction of IFRS did not have significant effect on earnings management practices in the banks. Additionally, we found no significant relationship between Liberia GDP growth and DLLP. Finally, we discovered a positive insignificant relationship between the capital adequacy ratio and DLLP as predicted. Originality/value - the result of this thesis advances the understanding of earnings management under US GAAP and IFRS in an emerging economy. As most of the existing literature conducted on earnings management are mainly focused on developed economy with capital market and data from non-financial institutions. This thesis fills a gap in the existing literature by studying managerial discretion in an unusual environment. The results of our findings inform regulators, investors, auditors and standards setters considering IFRS adoption.