The backdrop of this study is derived from a paper by Dranikoff et al (2002). To illustrate their point, Dranikoff et al argue that farm owners actively and continuously prune dead and weak branches from their farm tress in order to keep them healthy. However, in comparison, Dranikoff argues that executives spend a lot of time acquiring business (planting trees and growing them) but rarely devote any attention to divesting them. As a consequence, their empirical findings indicate that the executives end up selling the business often too late and at a low price, sacrificing shareholder value. This study investigates company’s portfolio restructuring activities. Specifically, the study aims to analyse company’s listed on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) Stock Exchange. As in the analogy of a farmer, do these company’s keep planting trees and growing them? If they keep growing, is there any evidence that executives engage in pruning activities, to what extent and the overall impact of those activities. Overall, divestitures have been researched across varying fields of study. Researchers have investigated the topic from a Strategic, Finance and Operational perspective. Their findings have returned varying results respectively. On their impact on company’s share price, these studies have indicated both positive and negative (although on a less regular basis) impact. Copyright / Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2011. / Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) / unrestricted

Lau Po Shan. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 62-63). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2. --- Literature Review and hypotheses --- p.4 / Chapter 3. --- Sample Selection and methodology --- p.9 / Chapter 4. --- Valuation Results --- p.15 / Chapter 5. --- Additional analysis of spinoffs and mergers --- p.28 / Chapter 6. --- Conclusion --- p.41 / Chapter 7. --- Tables --- p.43 / Chapter 8. --- Bibliography --- p.62

No description available.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--West Virginia University, 2001. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains vii, 109 p. : ill., map. Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 105-109).

The objective of the three essays of this doctoral dissertation is to investigate the strategic choices of organizational forms by competing firms in various environments. The first essay, which is a joint work with Professor Guofu Tan, provides an alternative theory of divestitures that relies on product-line complementarities and product market competition. We consider a simple environment in which there axe two firms, each supplying a group of complementary products and the products across groups axe imperfect substitutes. We model the firms' choices of divesting and pricing as a two-stage game. The duopohsts simultaneously choose their divestiture strategies in the first stage of the game and the independent divisions compete by setting prices in the second. It is shown that, when competing with each other, firms with complementary product-lines have incentives to split into multiple independent divisions supplying complementary products and services. Such divestitures increase prices and the parent firms' values but reduce aggregate social welfare. Moreover, the degree of divestiture, as we illustrate in the linear demand case, depends on the severity of competition and the nature of product-lines. Then, intensified competition due to deregulation, trade liberalization and entry may trigger divestitures. We further show that if two firms axe able to coordinate their divestiture strategies, they can achieve the joint monopoly prices and profits in a non-cooperative price game. The second essay analyzes the strategic incentive of oligopolists to create autonomous rival divisions when products are differentiated. We consider a two stage game where firms choose the number of autonomous divisions in the first stage and all the divisions engage in Cournot competition in the second. It is shown that product differentiation ensures the existence of an interior subgame perfect Nash equiubrium, and the equilibrium number of divisions increases with the degree of substitution among products and the number of firms. Further, if divisions are allowed to further divide, they always will, which leads to total rent dissipation. Thus, parent firms have incentives to unilaterally restrict their divisions from further dividing. In the free entry equihbrium, it is found that the possibility of setting up autonomous divisions is a natural barrier to entry. Incumbents may persistently earn abnormally high profits. In the cases where product differentiation is difficult, the only pure strategy free entry equilibrium is the monopoly outcome even if the entry cost is relatively low. The third essay develops a game theoretic model to analyze strategic leasing behaviors of landowners in a nonexclusively owned common oil pool. The oil field development is modeled as two more-or-less independent one-stage noncooperative game. The landowners choose leasing strategies in the first stage, and independent lease operators choose extraction strategies in the second. It is found that, in a nonexclusively owned oil field, it is individually rational for a landowner to unilaterally subdivide his landholding and delegate production rights to multiple independent firms, even though more dispersed production control leads to heavier common pool losses. Moreover, the degree of landownership concentration determines the degree of production concentration. The more fragmented the land ownership, the lower is the degree of production concentration i n equilibrium. The analysis offers an explanation for the puzzling landowners' leasing behaviors in U . S . onshore oil fields.

Zugl.: Gieen, Universiẗat, Diss., 2007. / Description based on print version record.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Dept of Economics, June 2003. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

The objective of the three essays of this doctoral dissertation is to investigate the strategic choices of organizational forms by competing firms in various environments. The first essay, which is a joint work with Professor Guofu Tan, provides an alternative theory of divestitures that relies on product-line complementarities and product market competition. We consider a simple environment in which there axe two firms, each supplying a group of complementary products and the products across groups axe imperfect substitutes. We model the firms' choices of divesting and pricing as a two-stage game. The duopohsts simultaneously choose their divestiture strategies in the first stage of the game and the independent divisions compete by setting prices in the second. It is shown that, when competing with each other, firms with complementary product-lines have incentives to split into multiple independent divisions supplying complementary products and services. Such divestitures increase prices and the parent firms' values but reduce aggregate social welfare. Moreover, the degree of divestiture, as we illustrate in the linear demand case, depends on the severity of competition and the nature of product-lines. Then, intensified competition due to deregulation, trade liberalization and entry may trigger divestitures. We further show that if two firms axe able to coordinate their divestiture strategies, they can achieve the joint monopoly prices and profits in a non-cooperative price game. The second essay analyzes the strategic incentive of oligopolists to create autonomous rival divisions when products are differentiated. We consider a two stage game where firms choose the number of autonomous divisions in the first stage and all the divisions engage in Cournot competition in the second. It is shown that product differentiation ensures the existence of an interior subgame perfect Nash equiubrium, and the equilibrium number of divisions increases with the degree of substitution among products and the number of firms. Further, if divisions are allowed to further divide, they always will, which leads to total rent dissipation. Thus, parent firms have incentives to unilaterally restrict their divisions from further dividing. In the free entry equihbrium, it is found that the possibility of setting up autonomous divisions is a natural barrier to entry. Incumbents may persistently earn abnormally high profits. In the cases where product differentiation is difficult, the only pure strategy free entry equilibrium is the monopoly outcome even if the entry cost is relatively low. The third essay develops a game theoretic model to analyze strategic leasing behaviors of landowners in a nonexclusively owned common oil pool. The oil field development is modeled as two more-or-less independent one-stage noncooperative game. The landowners choose leasing strategies in the first stage, and independent lease operators choose extraction strategies in the second. It is found that, in a nonexclusively owned oil field, it is individually rational for a landowner to unilaterally subdivide his landholding and delegate production rights to multiple independent firms, even though more dispersed production control leads to heavier common pool losses. Moreover, the degree of landownership concentration determines the degree of production concentration. The more fragmented the land ownership, the lower is the degree of production concentration i n equilibrium. The analysis offers an explanation for the puzzling landowners' leasing behaviors in U . S . onshore oil fields. / Arts, Faculty of / Vancouver School of Economics / Graduate

This thesis makes use of the unique reregulation of pharmaceutical monopoly in Sweden to critically examine intraindustry firm heterogeneity. It contributes to existing divestiture research as it studies the dynamism in between reconfigurations of value constellations and its effects on value creation of divested pharmacies. Because the findings showed that the predominant theory of intraindustry firm heterogeneity could not explain firm performance, the value constellation concept was applied as it captured the phenomena. A patterned finding informed how reconfigurations of value constellations in a reregulated market characterized by strict rules, regulations, and high competition did not generate additional value for firms on short term. My study unveils that value creation is hampered in situations where rules and regulations significantly affect firms’ ability to reconfigure their value constellations. The key practical implication is an alternative perspective on fundamental aspects of the reregulation and how policy-makers may impede firm performance and the intended creation of new value for not only firms but for society as a whole. / <p>Grade: A</p>

This thesis makes use of the unique reregulation of pharmaceutical monopoly in Sweden to critically examine intraindustry firm heterogeneity. It contributes to existing divestiture research as it studies the dynamism in between reconfigurations of value constellations and its effects on value creation of divested pharmacies. Because the findings showed that the predominant theory of intraindustry firm heterogeneity could not explain firm performance, the value constellation concept was applied as it captured the phenomena. A patterned finding informed how reconfigurations of value constellations in a reregulated market characterized by strict rules, regulations, and high competition did not generate additional value for firms on short term. My study unveils that value creation is hampered in situations where rules and regulations significantly affect firms’ ability to reconfigure their value constellations. The key practical implication is an alternative perspective on fundamental aspects of the reregulation and how policy-makers may impede firm performance and the intended creation of new value for not only firms but for society as a whole. / <p>Betyg: A</p>