This thesis presents a case for the traditional doctrine of divine simplicity by construing it along the lines that God exists as actus purus. My formulation of divine simplicity draws upon the medieval insight that God is what He is in virtue of what He does in one, eternal act of will with which He is identical. In chapter I, I survey the contemporary literature on divine simplicity. In chapter II, I critique Alvin Plantinga??s Platonic theory of the divine attributes as formulated in Does God Have a Nature? I contend it brings with it the cost of abandoning the doctrine of God??s aseity, as well as a problematic understanding of the very notion of what it means to claim that God has a particular property. In chapter III, I provide rejoinders to all of Plantinga??s defeaters against divine simplicity. I argue that by understanding the origin of God??s attributes to be the result of what He does, Plantinga??s two major criticisms against divine simplicity fail. In chapter IV, I develop a viable theory of divine simplicity, given an actus purus conception of God, and I formulate a number of arguments supporting it. By drawing upon the resources of action theory, I clarify, in detail, what exactly it means to claim that God is identical with His act of will. And I demonstrate the fruitfulness of an actus purus construal of divine simplicity by showing how it solves a large number of problems that theists face.In the last chapter, I note some of the difficulties with my position due to its commitment to an eternal God, and I suggest some of the ways that these problems can be overcome. However, in addition to showing the difficulties that face my position, I also demonstrate the rich number of implications that follow from it. As such, I seek to demonstrate that the traditional understanding of the divine essence is something that is worthy for theists to embrace and to explore, because it is full of truth and wisdom that deserves to be preserved for later generations to celebrate and enjoy.

Twentieth-century analytic philosophy ushered in a renewed interest in an ethical theory known as the Divine Command Theory of ethics (DC). Consequent to the work of G.E. Moore, philosophers have been involved in metaethics, or how we may ground ethical terms such as “good” and “right”. The traditional DC response is to argue that God is the source of good, and best serves that role in that He is an “ideal observer” of all states of affairs. The question is how is God’s will relevant to determining the moral status of actions? At this point one may distinguish between what God wills and what God in fact commands. However, the contemporary debate is to determine whether it is God’s commands or God’s will that is primary in determining moral obligation. The most vivid portrait of this distinction is found in the binding of Isaac. There we note that God commands Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, but it is not at all clear that God wills the actual death of Isaac. Thus, in this work I will present and defend a coherent DC view of ethics, whereby our moral obligations are derived from the commands of God. In chapter II I will provide a brief history of philosophers who have endorsed DC. In chapter III I will argue that the best ground for objective moral values is best defined by DC. Chapter IV will be devoted to my particular argument for DC. I will take up the task of defending the traditional command view of DC. Chapters V and VI will be devoted to developing plausible responses to major objections to DC. In chapter V I will attempt a resolution of the famous Euthyphro dilemma, and in chapter VI I will argue that endorsing a DC view of ethics in no way negates the autonomy of the moral agent.

Twentieth-century analytic philosophy ushered in a renewed interest in an ethical theory known as the Divine Command Theory of ethics (DC). Consequent to the work of G.E. Moore, philosophers have been involved in metaethics, or how we may ground ethical terms such as “good” and “right”. The traditional DC response is to argue that God is the source of good, and best serves that role in that He is an “ideal observer” of all states of affairs. The question is how is God’s will relevant to determining the moral status of actions? At this point one may distinguish between what God wills and what God in fact commands. However, the contemporary debate is to determine whether it is God’s commands or God’s will that is primary in determining moral obligation. The most vivid portrait of this distinction is found in the binding of Isaac. There we note that God commands Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, but it is not at all clear that God wills the actual death of Isaac. Thus, in this work I will present and defend a coherent DC view of ethics, whereby our moral obligations are derived from the commands of God. In chapter II I will provide a brief history of philosophers who have endorsed DC. In chapter III I will argue that the best ground for objective moral values is best defined by DC. Chapter IV will be devoted to my particular argument for DC. I will take up the task of defending the traditional command view of DC. Chapters V and VI will be devoted to developing plausible responses to major objections to DC. In chapter V I will attempt a resolution of the famous Euthyphro dilemma, and in chapter VI I will argue that endorsing a DC view of ethics in no way negates the autonomy of the moral agent.

Thesis (M.A.)--Ohio State University, 1961. / Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center

Rev. Michael Himes

No Abstract / Philosophy & Systematic Theology / (D. Lit. et Phil. (Philosophy))

Fyodor Dostoevsky’s novel The Brothers Karamazov continually challenges the reader with variations of this concept: “Heart of my heart, my joyful one you must know that verily each of us is guilty before everyone, for everyone and everything” (289). The challenge is twofold: how does one envision this utterance moving from the realm of philosophical abstraction to an ontology of responsibility, and what is the obligation I am failing to account for regarding everyone and everything? Contained in this utterance of guilt before all is the relationship between the individual and others; it posits an intrinsic alterity. The Brothers Karamazov does not depict the ethicality of alterity as a secular responsibility, but rather a profoundly Christian one aimed at refuting atheistic Sensualism. Chronologically, then, I will examine how the novel depicts the moral depravity of sensualistic philosophy, how alterity is an ethical demand of responsibility, how it functions as an ontological posturing prior to behavioral acts and cognition, and finally as one that it is inherently religious. Thus, this essay serves as model of how Emmanuel Levinas’s theory of the Other, could be applied to the extant of The Brothers Karamazov. / text

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