Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Bayreuth, 2004/05. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 421-438) and index.

民國99年5月19日公布施行之「刑事妥速審判法」有禁止檢察官對無罪案件上訴之規定，此項立法類似學理上所稱之「不對稱上訴（asymmetric appeal）」。不對稱上訴為英、美等國家刑事訴訟的一項重要制度，在此刑事程序，被告受有罪判決者得提起上訴，而檢察官對無罪判決卻不得上訴。這種的不對稱上訴權，被認為是刑事訴訟保障被告的措施之一，但也使得刑事程序明顯有利於被告。事實上，美國的不對稱上訴制度，並非成文法所明定，而是從美國聯邦憲法第五修正案之雙重危險禁止條款，經過聯邦最高法院數十年的判例演進，逐漸形成而來。至於英國之不對稱上訴制度，先是普通法的「前已無罪判決(autrefois acquit, former acquittal)」抗辯所發展出來，再以成文法明文加以規定。本文將介紹美、英等國刑事不對稱上訴制度發展的經過暨內涵，。並歸納分析傳統上支持不對稱上訴之理由，尤其是不對稱上訴這種有利於被告之設計的基礎，即數個錯誤之無罪判決比一個錯誤之有罪判決所付出的社會成本低這個理念（寧可錯放數人，不可錯關一人）。最後將討論屬於大陸法系的我國，在刑事訴訟以特別立法限制檢察官對無罪案件上訴之妥適性。

I analysed individual perceptions of successful leadership, from a feminist intersectional persepctive. The study is based on previous research undertaken by Chamorro-Premuzic (2019), where successful leadership has been argued to be based on embodying the characteristics of ‘confidence’, ‘competence’, and ‘emotional intelligence’. This study also investigated whether comprehensions of successful leadership are gendered, and, if so, if the gendered perceptions may be related to the social organisation of care. Furthermore, as gender is always racialised and race is always gendered, this study takes an intersectional approach, analysing perceptions of successful leadership as both racialised and gendered. Based on this, I undertook a case study analysing the words of 11 women in the United States, in order to compare the perspectives of what successful leadership entails for certain individuals in particular, to general perceptions on successful leadership, as well across identity locations. By emphasising individual perspectives on successful leadership, this study allowed for an investigation into gendered and racialised notions regarding successful leadership.

Because of its mandate and its enforcement powers, the ICC has been hailed as a major advance on the road towards individual accountability for the perpetration of the most heinous violations of human rights (international crimes) and thus as a major contribution to the prevention of such horrible crimes. However, with its limited resources in terms of human and financial means, the ICC will not be able to deal with all perpetrators of the crimes that come under its jurisdiction wherever such crimes are committed throughout the world. For this reason, in order to end impunity in the commission of international crimes, there will always be a need for combined efforts by the ICC and national courts. This reality is recognised by the Rome Statute which, in the preamble and article 1 of the Statute, provides that the jurisdiction of the ICC is “complementary” to national courts and that, therefore, States Parties retain the primary responsibility for the repression of international crimes. In legal literature, this is generally referred to as the “principle of complementarity” or the “complementarity regime of the Rome Statute”. In order to give effect to the complementarity principle of the Rome Statute, South Africa passed the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002 (hereafter the Implementation Act); which determines the modalities of prosecuting perpetrators of the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in South African courts. The Implementation Act also provides that South African courts will have jurisdiction over these crimes not only when they are committed on South African territory but also when they are committed outside the Republic, thus empowering South African courts to exercise “universal jurisdiction” over these three international crimes. This thesis examines the extent to which South African courts, acting under the complementarity regime of the Rome Statute are, or are not, allowed to exercise universal jurisdiction over international crimes committed in foreign States. The study is based on two assumptions. First, it is assumed that since under the principle of complementarity South African courts are required to do the same job as the ICC, they should have the same powers as those States Parties gave to the ICC when they adopted the Rome Statute. Secondly, it is assumed that, although having the same mandate as the ICC in terms of the complementarity principle, South African courts are nonetheless domestic courts as opposed to the ICC which is an international court and that, accordingly, the international law principle of State sovereignty may impose limitations on their ability to exercise universal jurisdiction over international crimes committed in foreign States. In the light of the above assumptions, this study investigates three issues. Firstly, do South African courts have the same powers as the ICC has to disregard immunities of foreign States’ officials which, under international customary law, attach to their functions or status? Secondly, are South African courts entitled, as the ICC is, to disregard amnesties granted by foreign States, either in the process of national reconciliation or as means to shield the criminals from prosecution by the ICC? Finally, are South African courts entitled, as the ICC is, to retry a case which has already been tried in a foreign country but with the aim of shielding the accused from criminal responsibility or where, for example, the sentence imposed was too lenient in comparison with the gravity of the crime? / PhD (Law), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

Because of its mandate and its enforcement powers, the ICC has been hailed as a major advance on the road towards individual accountability for the perpetration of the most heinous violations of human rights (international crimes) and thus as a major contribution to the prevention of such horrible crimes. However, with its limited resources in terms of human and financial means, the ICC will not be able to deal with all perpetrators of the crimes that come under its jurisdiction wherever such crimes are committed throughout the world. For this reason, in order to end impunity in the commission of international crimes, there will always be a need for combined efforts by the ICC and national courts. This reality is recognised by the Rome Statute which, in the preamble and article 1 of the Statute, provides that the jurisdiction of the ICC is “complementary” to national courts and that, therefore, States Parties retain the primary responsibility for the repression of international crimes. In legal literature, this is generally referred to as the “principle of complementarity” or the “complementarity regime of the Rome Statute”. In order to give effect to the complementarity principle of the Rome Statute, South Africa passed the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002 (hereafter the Implementation Act); which determines the modalities of prosecuting perpetrators of the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in South African courts. The Implementation Act also provides that South African courts will have jurisdiction over these crimes not only when they are committed on South African territory but also when they are committed outside the Republic, thus empowering South African courts to exercise “universal jurisdiction” over these three international crimes. This thesis examines the extent to which South African courts, acting under the complementarity regime of the Rome Statute are, or are not, allowed to exercise universal jurisdiction over international crimes committed in foreign States. The study is based on two assumptions. First, it is assumed that since under the principle of complementarity South African courts are required to do the same job as the ICC, they should have the same powers as those States Parties gave to the ICC when they adopted the Rome Statute. Secondly, it is assumed that, although having the same mandate as the ICC in terms of the complementarity principle, South African courts are nonetheless domestic courts as opposed to the ICC which is an international court and that, accordingly, the international law principle of State sovereignty may impose limitations on their ability to exercise universal jurisdiction over international crimes committed in foreign States. In the light of the above assumptions, this study investigates three issues. Firstly, do South African courts have the same powers as the ICC has to disregard immunities of foreign States’ officials which, under international customary law, attach to their functions or status? Secondly, are South African courts entitled, as the ICC is, to disregard amnesties granted by foreign States, either in the process of national reconciliation or as means to shield the criminals from prosecution by the ICC? Finally, are South African courts entitled, as the ICC is, to retry a case which has already been tried in a foreign country but with the aim of shielding the accused from criminal responsibility or where, for example, the sentence imposed was too lenient in comparison with the gravity of the crime? / PhD (Law), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014