Revision of the author's thesis, Göttingen, 1966/67. / Bibliography: p. [244]-257.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, 1909. / Published also as no. 2 of the Philosophic studies under the direction of the Department of philosophy of the University of Chicago. "A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Literature in Candidacy for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Department of Philosophy)." Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Orientador: Marcos Antonio Alves / Banca: Mariana Cláudia Broens / Banca: Leonardo Ferreira Almada / Resumo: Neste trabalho, desenvolvemos uma análise crítica da concepção cartesiana sobre as relações entre emoções, ou paixões da alma, e ações, movimentos físicos, contrapondo-a, principalmente, à concepção proposta por Ryle, a respeito do assunto. Para Descartes, as emoções são elementos pertencentes à mente, entidade independente do físico. Não raro, tais emoções são causadas pelo corpo, cujos movimentos também podem ser impulsionados, ainda que indiretamente, por aquelas. Cabe à mente, por intermédio da razão e da vontade, através do hábito, controlar as paixões e as ações resultantes delas. Um dos críticos dessa postura é Ryle. Ao contrário de Descartes, ele não caracteriza as emoções como efeitos de uma ligação causal entre o corpo e a mente. Para esse autor, as emoções precisam ser analisadas de duas formas diferentes: uma referente às inclinações pelas quais as ações tidas como inteligentes são executadas; e, outra, que consiste no estudo explicativo das disposições ou agitações. Para ele, as inclinações e as disposições são propensões e não elementos, movimentos ou estados de uma substância distinta ou independente do corpo. Para alcançar nosso objetivo central nesta dissertação, dividimo-la em três capítulos. No primeiro deles expomos a natureza do corpo, da mente e dos hábitos, segundo Descartes. Na primeira seção apresentamos as características gerais das concepções dualistas. Na segunda seção abordamos a concepção de corpo e a noção de hábito físico para, ... (Resumo completo, clicar acesso eletrônico abaixo) / Abstract: In this work, we develop a critical analysis of the Cartesian conception about the relations between emotions, or passions of the soul, and actions, physical movements, in opposition to Ryle's conception of the subject. For Descartes, emotions are elements belonging to the mind, independent entity of the physical. Not infrequently, such emotions are caused by the body, whose movements can also be driven, albeit indirectly, by those. It is up to the mind, through reason and will, through habit, to control the passions and actions resulting from them. One of the critics of this stance is Ryle. Unlike Descartes, he does not characterize emotions as effects of a causal connection between body and mind. For this author, emotions need to be analyzed in two different ways: one referring to the inclinations by which actions taken as intelligent are performed; and another, which consists in the explanatory study of dispositions or agitations. For him, inclinations and dispositions are propensities and not elements, movements or states of a substance distinct or independent of the body. To reach our central goal in this dissertation, we divide it into three chapters. In the first of these we explain the nature of the body, mind and habits, according to Descartes. In the first section we present the general characteristics of dualistic conceptions. In the second section we approach the concept of body and the notion of physical habit, in the third section, to expose the conception of mind and the notion of mental habit. In the second chapter, we deal with the relations between emotions and actions, according to Descartes. In section 2.1 we characterize the actions and passions of the soul. In section 2.2 we show how the control ... (Complete abstract click electronic access below) / Mestre

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University / PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you. / My essential purpose in this dissertation was to explore the relationship of Nietzsche's views on consciousness to his general theory of valuation. In order to carry out this project it was necessary to elaborate the two principal modes of man's being in the world for Nietzsche, the Apollonian and the Dionysian, inasmuch as this distinction provides the cornerstone of his entire philosophy of value creation. The Apollonian represents the impulse toward discipline, structure, restraint, and order, while the Dionysian stands for the impulse toward ultimate self-abandonment, the urge toward direct participation in life's most intense passions. The key to producing genuine value, for Nietzsche, lies in reconciling these two divergent aspects of man's existence. This dualism was interpreted in terms of the states of mind, the modes of awareness, which they reflect so that his formula for value creation could be meaningfully translated into distinct forms of consciousness. Reflective, or self, consciousness was found to be normative of the Apollonian impulse and unreflected, or non-self, consciousness was found to be normative of the Dionysian. Correspondingly, both reflective and unreflected elements were found to participate in the condition which represents their eventual synthesis as well as Nietzsche's axiological ideal. I next presented Nietzsche's explicit treatment of mentalistic psychology, as expressed particularly in the Twilight of Idols. It was brought out that Nietzsche distrusts reflection and introspection, since he claims that they are full of what he calls "will-o'-the-wisps", because they suggest the existence of such phantom entities as a self, causality, freedom of the will, etc. Nietzsche wants to hold an epiphenomenal view of consciousness; he insists that consciousness is merely concomitant to physiological processes, which is where, he believes, actions originate. Nietzsche does not distrust sensation, however. "Reality" is defined as co-extensive with immediate experience. Introspection is therefore seen as artificial and obscuring, since in such moments, reflection becomes the 'primary reality for us; and this is just an abstraction and removal from that which Nietzsche considers to be metaphysically most real. Next I showed that this view is incompatible with his own theory of value creation. The distinguishing traits of the Apollonian life, self-conscious, responsible, and disciplined action, are all intimately connected with both his aesthetic and ethical ideals. Yet such an individualistic theory, which places such a premium upon deliberation and calculation, cannot be reconciled with a view which would deny the validity of reflection, free will, and the causal efficacy of consciousness. Furthermore, his epistemological emphasis upon immediate experience would entail the primacy and self-sufficiency of the unreflected (Dionysian) mode of consciousness, despite the fact that he claims that this form of awareness is only a necessary, and not a sufficient, condition of the realization of value. Finally, it was shown that Nietzsche's thought does exhibit a certain unity, even though it does not fit together logically at many points. He succeeds, in spite of his treatments of consciousness and value, in virtue of his existential attempt to realize and to express his own most distinct desires, needs, and potentialities in his works. And in this he represents the individual's effort to find meaning for his life in the midst of the alienating influences wrought by modern culture. / 2031-01-01

The contemporary study in the philosophy of language concentrates extensively on a cluster of questions defining the problem of linguistic knowledge (Evans 1981, Davies 1989, Dummett 1991). What explains a speaker's language mastery? Is it knowledge that underwrites our linguistic abilities, and if so, what is the nature of this knowledge? Is rationality an intrinsic feature of language mastery, and if so, how does an account of linguistic knowledge accommodate the connection between language and rationality? While philosophers emphasize the importance of such questions for an account of language, the only systematic response to them has been based almost exclusively on research in psycho-linguistics, and in cognitive science, generally. And prominent cognitivists, such as Chomsky, use their view of linguistic knowledge to promote fervently the naturalistic ideal that the language researcher adhere faithfully to the methodology of the natural scientist, and to provide a thorough critique of any alternative (i.e., non-naturalistic or dualist) approach to language (Chomsky 1995a). / In the thesis, I respond to the negative side of cognitivism, and defend a non-naturalistic approach to linguistic knowledge which I call interpretivism. I argue that when applied to interpretivism the cognitivist's critique is rather inconclusive. And, by itself, the cognitivist's explanation of language does not imply that interpretivism is invalid, but rather leaves room for it. The cognitivist explicates linguistic knowledge either as a system of computational states (Stich 1975) or as a set of intentional states (Dwyer and Pietroski 1996). And while under the computationalist construal the cognitivist cannot address the rationality of language, under the intentionalist construal he does not do full justice to it. The interest of interpretivism lies thus in its emphasis on the rational aspects of language, and on the related idea that linguistic knowledge is multifarious: not only intentional or computational, but also similar in kind to the capacity for thought. Following Sellars [1960/1963], I introduce a broad view of explanations of human behaviour within which both the cognitivist and the interpretivist model of explanation are tenable. I conclude that there is room and a need for a non-naturalistic approach to linguistic knowledge, and that naturalism cannot be the only defensible strategy in the study of language.

Thesis (M. Div.)--Emmanuel School of Religion, Johnson City, Tenn., 2003. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 63-65).

Thesis (M. Div.)--Emmanuel School of Religion, Johnson City, Tenn., 2003. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 63-65).

Revision of the author's thesis, Göttingen, 1966/67. / Bibliography : p. [244]-257.

Thesis (M. Div.)--Emmanuel School of Religion, Johnson City, Tenn., 2003. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 63-65).

The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate just what kind of entity a self or person is (p. 1). / KMBT_363 / Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in