Many of the problems in dominant Western education and philosophy can be connected to various dualisms, in particular reason/emotion, reason/imagination, reason/experience, mind/body, subject/object, individual/community, abstract/concrete, theory/practice and male/female dualisms. These pairs are considered opposites, with the attributes on the left supposedly superior to their dualistic partners on the right. While those attributes on the left, such as mind and reason, are traditionally associated with knowledge, autonomy, citizenship and learning, the attributes on the right, such as emotion and experience, are traditionally thought to be opposed to knowledge, autonomy, citizenship and learning. Drawing on the philosophies of John Dewey and various feminist philosophers, I will argue that the attributes that make up each of these dualistic pairs are not opposed but are actually interdependent and interconnected. For example, I will argue that all thinking and learning involves reason, experience, emotion and imagination interacting with one and other. Neither of these attributes or functions is complete or fully functional without the others. Since mainstream Western pedagogies incorporate such dualisms they are unable to fully facilitate the thinking skills, attributes, dispositions and understandings necessary for autonomy, democratic citizenship and leading a meaningful life. It will be shown that Philosophy for Children (P4C) has the potential to overcome many of the problems with mainstream education, including many gender equity problems, because it is based on Dewey???s philosophical ideals, which reconstruct many of these dualisms. An analysis of the ideals of truth, meaning, community, self, autonomy, democracy, thinking, emotion and imagination assumed by P4C will show how it reconstructs various dualisms and overcomes many problems with traditional schooling. However, it will also be shown that P4C fails to reconstruct the undesirable theory/practice dualism because it doesn???t require students to test and apply their ideas in the real world. This is even though many P4C theorists, such as Matthew Lipman, accept Dewey???s claim that all thinking and learning involve such practicality. Thus, I will reconstruct the P4C pedagogy by integrating it with a Deweyian type of service learning that I call social reconstruction learning. Social reconstruction learning involves students engaging in P4C style communities of inquiry with members of their community in order to reconstruct real social problems. Such a Practical P4C pedagogy can better facilitate reflective thinking, autonomy, active citizenship and meaningfulness.

Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2008. / Title from file title page. Eddy Nahmias, Andrea Scarantino, committee co-chairs; Sebastian Rand, committee member. Electronic text (42 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed September 17, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 39-42).

Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Sydney, 2009. / Title from title screen (viewed October 8, 2009) Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy to the Centre for Medieval Studies, Faculty of Arts. Appendix: leaves 158-162. Includes bibliographical references. Also available in print form.

Thesis (Th. M.)--Western Seminary, Portland, OR, 2003. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 171-185).

Thesis (Th. M.)--Western Seminary, Portland, OR, 2003. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 171-185).

Submitted by Juciane Terezinha do Prado null (jucianepradowb@hotmail.com) on 2018-03-30T14:01:35Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Juciane.pdf: 769073 bytes, checksum: 13717d8c6b064a72684c453f7046260d (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Satie Tagara (satie@marilia.unesp.br) on 2018-04-02T14:34:46Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 prado_jt_me_mar.pdf: 769073 bytes, checksum: 13717d8c6b064a72684c453f7046260d (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-04-02T14:34:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 prado_jt_me_mar.pdf: 769073 bytes, checksum: 13717d8c6b064a72684c453f7046260d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-02-03 / Não recebi financiamento / Nesta Dissertação, abordamos a proposta do monismo dual (ou de duplo aspecto), sugerida por Thomas Nagel, para analisar os aspectos do mental como a consciência e os qualia. O estudo propõe analisar em que medida essas características mentais podem ser descritas de forma física, ou se, ao efetuar uma análise minunciosa dessas características, podemos concluir que elas não podem ser descritas da mesma forma que descrevemos eventos físicos. Para que possamos, então, as analisar, descrevemos, inicialmente, a abordagem dualista e em que medida ela contribui para nossa compreensão das características mentais como eventos não físicos. Analisamos, também seus problemas e dificuldades em se explicar a interação de processos mentais não físicos com o corpo físico. Em seguida, abordamos a concepção fisicalista, na qual, propomos descrever seus problemas e as razões pelas quais as características mentais não podem ser, simplesmente, explicadas ou mesmo descritas como processos físicos ordinários. No capítulo seguinte, descrevemos a perspectiva de Nagel, sobre a proposta do monismo de duplo aspecto, no qual o autor propõe duas perspectivas epistemológicas sobre a mente consciente, as perspectivas de primeira pessoa, restrita ao próprio ser consciente, e a perspectiva de terceira pessoa, correspondendo ao modo de abordagem típico das ciências empíricas. Nesta abordagem, as qualidades subjetivas (qualia) se restringem à perspectiva de primeira pessoa. Portanto, o monismo de duplo aspecto em Nagel pode ser caracterizado como sendo ontologicamente monista (trata-se de um só ser consciente) e epistemologicamente dualista (este ser é apreendido por si mesmo na perspectiva de primeira pessoa, e abordado cientificamente na perspectiva da terceira pessoa). / We approach the proposal of dual-aspect monism by Thomas Nagel to analyze the conscious mind and related concepts as qualia. To what extent these mental characteristics can be described in a physical way, or, by performing a thorough analysis of these characteristics, should we conclude that they cannot be described in the same way that we describe physical events? We first describe the dualistic approach and to what extent it contributes to our understanding of the mental characteristics as non-physical events. We also analyze the problems and difficulties in explaining the interaction of non-physical mental processes with the physical body. Then we approach the physicalist conception and propose to describe its problems and the reasons why the mental characteristics cannot be simply explained or even described as ordinary physical processes. In the following chapter, we describe Nagel's perspective on the proposition of dual-aspect monism, in which the author proposes two epistemological perspectives on the conscious mind, the first person perspective, restricted to the conscious being itself, and the third person perspective, corresponding to the typical approach of the empirical sciences. In his view, subjective qualities (qualia) are restricted to the first-person perspective. Therefore, dual-aspect monism in Nagel can be characterized as being ontologically monistic (we are one being, body and mind) and epistemologically dualistic (this being is apprehended by herself in the first-person perspective, and approached scientifically from the third person perspective).

This paper explores whether Cartesian dualism prioritizes the masculine over the feminine. Feminist authors have argued that due to the prioritization of the mind over the body in Cartesian dualism and the association of the masculine with the mind and the association of the feminine with the body, the masculine is prioritized. This paper analyzes both this prioritization of the mind over the body and the association of the masculine with the mind and the feminine with the body.

No description available.

No description available.

A thought experiment by Avicenna known as the Flying man presents a hypothetical man in the air who is not aware of the existence of his body but simultaneously is aware of himself. A common objection to the Flying Man accuses Avicenna of committing an epistemic and logical fallacy known as the Masked Man. This paper analyses the two most recent interpretations of the Flying Man thought experiment, where each interpretation attempts to understand the main argument which Avicenna poses through the thought experiment.  On one hand, I will examine Peter Adamson and Fedor Benevich’s interpretation, which rejects previous criticisms of the Flying Man with an emphasis on Avicenna’s philosophy of essences. I will, on the other hand, present Jari Kaukua’s interpretation; a response to Adamson and Benevich’s interpretation with two closely related objections. The last section of this paper discusses and evaluates the scholars’ debated points and offers a more charitable interpretation of the Flying Man through my suggestive indicative method.