Ce mémoire a pour tâche de déterminer le statut ontologique de la puissance chez Aristote. Pour ce faire, il est d’abord question, dans le premier chapitre, de bien définir les deux sens de la puissance, soit la puissance motrice et l’état potentiel. Nous expliquons aussi alors les multiples sens de la puissance motrice et les multiples types de la puissance que sont la nature, l’âme et l’art. Ensuite, le second chapitre étudie les liens entre l’état potentiel et la matière, d’une part, et les liens entre le non-être, la puissance et la possibilité, d’autre part. Enfin, le troisième chapitre explicite la hiérarchie ontologique aristotélicienne pour en dégager le statut ontologique de la puissance par rapport à l’acte. Cela est fait de trois manières : selon l’antériorité de l’acte sur la puissance au sein d’une substance unique ; selon l’antériorité des êtres éternels, notamment celle du premier moteur, sur les êtres générables et corruptibles ; l’antériorité du bien en acte sur le bien puissance. / This master thesis seeks to determine the ontological value of potency in Arstotle’s philosophy. To do so, the first chapter defines the two meanings of potency, which are the power to change something else and the potential state of a being. We then explain the multiple meanings of power and its multiple types, namely nature, soul and art. The second chapter, in addition to analysing the links between potentiality and non-being, also studies how non-being, potency and possibility are connected. Finally, the third chapter explains the aristotelian ontological hierarchy to highlight the ontological value of potency in connection to act. This is done in accordance with three kinds of priority, which are the priority of act over potency in a single substance, the priority of eternal beings, especially the one of the prime mover, over generated and corruptible beings, and the priority of good in actuality over potential good.

Ce mémoire a pour tâche de déterminer le statut ontologique de la puissance chez Aristote. Pour ce faire, il est d’abord question, dans le premier chapitre, de bien définir les deux sens de la puissance, soit la puissance motrice et l’état potentiel. Nous expliquons aussi alors les multiples sens de la puissance motrice et les multiples types de la puissance que sont la nature, l’âme et l’art. Ensuite, le second chapitre étudie les liens entre l’état potentiel et la matière, d’une part, et les liens entre le non-être, la puissance et la possibilité, d’autre part. Enfin, le troisième chapitre explicite la hiérarchie ontologique aristotélicienne pour en dégager le statut ontologique de la puissance par rapport à l’acte. Cela est fait de trois manières : selon l’antériorité de l’acte sur la puissance au sein d’une substance unique ; selon l’antériorité des êtres éternels, notamment celle du premier moteur, sur les êtres générables et corruptibles ; l’antériorité du bien en acte sur le bien puissance. / This master thesis seeks to determine the ontological value of potency in Arstotle’s philosophy. To do so, the first chapter defines the two meanings of potency, which are the power to change something else and the potential state of a being. We then explain the multiple meanings of power and its multiple types, namely nature, soul and art. The second chapter, in addition to analysing the links between potentiality and non-being, also studies how non-being, potency and possibility are connected. Finally, the third chapter explains the aristotelian ontological hierarchy to highlight the ontological value of potency in connection to act. This is done in accordance with three kinds of priority, which are the priority of act over potency in a single substance, the priority of eternal beings, especially the one of the prime mover, over generated and corruptible beings, and the priority of good in actuality over potential good.

This essay is an attempt to provide an initial phenomenological reading of Saint Paul's notion of dunamis. Throughout his letters a thematic of dunamis is mentioned over forty times – often in close proximity to other central motifs of the Pauline message and not least to God. Although there has been a resurgence of philosophical interest in reading Paul for the last twenty years, a phenomenological thematic of dunamis hasn't been developed. Giorgio Agamben and Alain Badiou (among others) has both provided an analysis of dunamis: but for both mostly along the key of the messianic and prominently related to the political sphere. Following Martin Heideggers phenomenological reading and re-interpretation of the Aristotelean notion of dunamis in the thematic of a twofold disclosing of being I attempt to show how Paul's dunamis, through a praxis of kenotic self-emptying, manages to transform his weakness into strenght. By providing a space for the Sacred to enter and incarnate – and not least the Other – Paul's oppenes shows an ontological receptivity for change which is at the heart of the Aristotelean metaphysical framework. Thus a first attempt is made.

in English: In the first half of the book Theta of his Metaphysics, Aristotle discusses dunamis as a property of a being. In this sense, dunamis is primarily a principle of change in another thing or in the thing itself qua other, thereby exercising itself in its energeia. In the second half of the book, Aristotle discusses dunamis as a way of being. In this sense, a being is dunamei another thing and in the course of its becoming that thing it changes into being energeiai. The aim of the present thesis is to offer an interpretation of the concepts of dunamis and energeia as they appear in the chapters 1, 2, 6 and partly 7 of the book Theta. The first question is how the concepts of dunamis and energeia in both parts fit together. The problem is posed as follows: Are dunamis in the sense of a principle of change and dunamis as a way of being mutually dependent? Are energeia as change and being energeiai related? Are they not, in fact, two relatively independent philosophical concepts, relative to whether being is regarded from the point of view of physics, respectively metaphysics? Based on the interpretation of Aristotle's statements, the thesis aims to argue that Aristotle starts his exposition with the analysis of dunamis in the sense of a principle of change precisely in order to show the...

in English: In the first half of the book Theta of his Metaphysics, Aristotle discusses dunamis as a property of a being. In this sense, dunamis is primarily a principle of change in another thing or in the thing itself qua other, thereby exercising itself in its energeia. In the second half of the book, Aristotle discusses dunamis as a way of being. In this sense, a being is dunamei another thing and in the course of its becoming that thing it changes into being energeiai. The aim of the present thesis is to offer an interpretation of the concepts of dunamis and energeia as they appear in the chapters 1, 2 and partly 6 of the book Theta. The first question is how the concepts of dunamis and energeia in both parts fit together. The problem is posed as follows: Are dunamis in the sense of a principle of change and dunamis as a way of being mutually dependent? Are energeia as change and being energeiai related? Are they not, in fact, two relatively independent philosophical concepts, relative to whether being is regarded from the point of view of physics, respectively metaphysics? Based on the interpretation of Aristotle's statements, the thesis aims to argue that Aristotle starts his exposition with the analysis of dunamis in the sense of a principle of change precisely in order to show the...

The aim of this thesis is to resurrect interest in the concept of power in political theory by shedding light on some of its relatively unexplored discursive dimensions and developing a fresh approach to its understanding. Particularly, it studies an under-examined theme in the current literature, which, however, forms a crucial aspect determining different definitions of power: in what manner do different ways of thinking about power underpin variable conceptual formulations and theoretical interpretations of this key political concept? What types of cognitive, ideational and conceptual 'micro-processes' shape different ways of thinking about power in political thought? The thesis suggests novel interpretative possibilities that may be distilled from developing a hermeneutical approach extending across the dimensions of historical time and disciplinary space, by combining methodological insights from the fields of morphology, intellectual history and interdisciplinary study. To that end, it engages perspectives gleaned from historical treatments of power, as well as recent understandings of spatiality and force provided by scientific discourse. The concept of power is explored through the perspectives of (i) cultural historicity and (ii) interdisciplinarity. Along the axis of cultural historicity, the analysis studies Aristotle's classical concept of 'dunamis' as the original conceptual modality of power in political thought. Along the axis of interdisciplinarity, the examination explores the concept of force in the discourse of physics, and its parallel development in political thought. This dissertation shows that the exploration of those conceptual modalities can yield a new appreciation of certain diachronic and contingent conceptual features of power and enhance our understanding of the multifaceted discursive processes through which those form, including the underpinning 'micro-semantic', linguistic and ideational processes which contribute to the emergence of variable modes of thinking about power. In so doing, the thesis aims at illuminating our modern understanding of the concept, moving the scholarly discourse forward towards new horizons of meaning and interpretation.

Il est souvent dit que l’aristotélisme représente un renversement du platonisme. Or, une lecture de Mét. N.2 nous porte à croire qu’il s’agit moins d’un renversement que d’un dépassement. Cette thèse a l’ambition d’étudier ce dépassement selon un point de vue spécifique, celui de l’être en puissance. En effet, dans le deuxième chapitre du livre N de la Métaphysique, Aristote critique les platoniciens pour avoir cru que tous les étants seraient « un » s’ils ne réfutaient pas l’argument de Parménide selon lequel il est impossible de contraindre le non-être à être. Aristote identifie ensuite l’erreur fondamentale des platoniciens comme étant d’avoir dit que le non-être « est » et il suggère à la fin de N.2 que le principe que Platon cherchait était véritablement celui de l’être en puissance. Ainsi, faute d’avoir bien distingué les sens de l’être et du non-être, Platon aurait été incapable de penser la distinction entre être en acte et être en puissance, ce qui, selon Aristote, le condamnerait à rester un penseur de l’être en puissance, voire de l’être matériel. L’analyse portera d’abord sur l’importance du Sophiste pour le projet platonicien, car Aristote soutient que ce dialogue est le lieu où s’enracine l’erreur de son maitre. Ensuite, nous démontrerons l’importance du non-être dans la conception aristotélicienne de l’être en puissance par une lecture des passages pertinents du livre Q de la Métaphysique. Ayant établi que Platon intègre le non-être au sein de l’être dans le Sophiste et que l’être au sein duquel il y a non-être est l’être en puissance pour Aristote, nous serons à même de lire N.2 de près dans notre chapitre central, afin de libérer entièrement la conception aristotélicienne du non-être de celle de Platon. Enfin, notre dernier chapitre mettra en évidence à la fois les raisons pour lesquelles le principe « matériel » de Platon est insuffisant pour Aristote et les raisons pour lesquelles de toute façon, un principe premier ne peut jamais être une matière. Cela nous permettra de conclure que selon Aristote, les idées platoniciennes ne sont que des composés matériels, des êtres en puissance, voire de simples possibles. / It has often been said that Aristotle’s philosophy represents an overturning of Platonism. Yet, a close reading of the second chapter of Book N of the Metaphysics reveals that we call an overturning might be closer to a surpassing. This thesis will explore this surpassing from a specific point of view, that of potential being. Indeed, in the aforementioned second chapter of Book N, Aristotle criticizes Platonists for having believed that all beings would form a single one if they did not refute Parmenides’ argument against the being of non-being. Aristotle then situates the Platonists’ fundamental mistake as having argued that non-being in some way « is ». However, Plato did not need to make non-being « be » he simply needed to think the multiplicity of ways which being can be said. Only then would he have found the principle of multiplicity that he wanted : potential being (dunamei on). Hence, having failed to notice that being is said in many ways, he could never think « matter » through properly. This, according to Aristotle, condemns Plato to a thought of potential being and material being. In order to argue for this position, we will firstly establish the importance of the Sophist in the platonic project, for as we have said, Aristotle places the Platonist mistake squarely in this dialogue. Secondly, we will need to show how Aristotle’s concept of non-being is central to his conception of potential being. We will do this by offering a close reading of the relevant passages of Book Q of the Metaphysics. Having established in the first chapter that Plato does indeed integrate non-being into being in the Sophist and in the second that Aristotle considers being penetrated by non- being to be merely potential being, we can read N.2 with more precise knowledge of the platonic « error » and in turn liberate Aristotle’s conception of non-being from Plato’s ; the topic of our third chapter. Finally, in our fourth chapter we will show why platonic conceptions of matter can never be adequate for Aristotle and explore the consequences of not having properly distinguished actual being from potential being, namely all of Plato’s principles are merely potential principles and not actual ones. Hence, we can conclude that for Aristotle, Plato’s ideas and principles of being are composite potential beings, close to mere possibilities.

Cet ouvrage a comme objectif de définir la nature et le rôle des disciplines mathématiques (ou dianoia) dans le système épistémologique élaboré au sein de la République de Platon. Décrite au livre VI (509d-511e), l’analogie de la ligne complexifie l’épistémologie dualiste classique, opposant opinion et science, vers une épistémologie à quatre paliers. Un espace intermédiaire entre les deux grands pôles est maintenant dégagé pour accueillir les disciplines mathématiques. Ainsi, malgré leur appartenance à la grande catégorie de l’intelligible, Platon refuse de leur accorder le statut de science, qu’il réserve à la noêsis. Le problème de l’objet de la dianoia repose sur le caractère hybride de cette section de la ligne. Le débat se divise entre deux grandes lectures : la première avance l’existence d’un objet propre aux disciplines mathématiques alors que l’autre n’admet qu’un seul objet pour l’intelligible, partagé par la dianoia et la noêsis. Notre travail débutera avec l’examen de ces des deux grands types d’interprétation. Nous tâcherons ensuite de montrer en quoi il existe une rupture épistémologique forte entre la dianoia et la noêsis, un écart qui semble suggérer la présence de deux objets distincts. Ce raisonnement est fondé sur une analyse du livre VII, soit, spécifiquement, l’exposé sur la fonction propédeutique de la mathématique dans l’éducation des dirigeants. Enfin, quant à la nature de cet objet, c’est l’hypothèse, interprétée comme une espèce d’opinion vraie, qui constitue selon nous le candidat le plus crédible à ce rôle. / This work aims to define the nature and role of mathematical disciplines (dianoia) in the epistemological system elaborated in the Republic. Described in book VI (509d-511e), the image of the divided line complexifies the classical dualistic epistemology, opposing opinion and science, thereby created an epistemological model operating on four levels: an intermediate space is opened between the two extremes to make room for mathematical disciplines. Thereby, and despite their belonging to the great category of the intelligible, Plato refuses to grant them the status of science, which he reserves for noêsis. The problem with dianoias’ object lies with its hybrid character. The literature is divided between two main interpretations: the first argues for the existence of an object proper to mathematical disciplines, while the other defends that there is only one intelligible object, split between dianoia and noêsis. The literature is divided between two main interpretations: the first argues for the existence of an object proper to mathematical disciplines, while the other defends that there is only one intelligible object, share between dianoia and noesis. Our work will begin with an examination of these two main interpretations. We will then attempt to demonstrate that there is a strong epistemological discontinuity between noêsis and dianoia, a gap which suggest the presence of two distinct objects. This argument is based on a close reading of book VII, specifically on the discussion of the propaedeutic function of mathematics in the education of leaders. Finally, regarding the nature of this object, it is the hypothesis, interpreted as a true opinion, that constitutes the most likely candidate for this role.